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Abstract 
 
Over that past three decades, power sector reform has been a key pillar of policy agendas in 
more than half of the countries across the world. This thesis specifically concerns the 
empirical investigation of the economic performance of the international electricity 
generation industry. Drawing on the stochastic frontier analysis techniques, the thesis 
considers the influence of reform as exogenous factors in shifting frontier technology as well 
as shaping inefficiency function directly -determinants and heteroscedasticity variables. The 
first essay uses an extensive panel dataset of 91 countries over the period 1980 to 2010 to 
measure the impact of deregulation on efficiency and total productivity growth using 
stochastic input distance frontier (SIDF). Three specific issues are addressed in the first 
essay: (1) the relationship between deregulation and technical efficiency, (2) the extent of the 
rank correlation of the country intercepts with deregulation via their position on the frontier, 
(3) the trend of total factor productivity and its components. We establish a positive impact of 
deregulation on efficiency and some compelling evidence suggesting that the country 
intercepts equally account for the influence of deregulation aside efficiency.  
 
In particular, the technical efficiency index from the first paper reveals that most OECD 
European countries are consistently efficient. Building on this finding, the second essay 
investigates the performance in term of cost efficiency for electricity generation in OECD 
power sector while accounting for the impact of electricity market product regulatory 
indicators. Empirical models are developed for the cost function as a translog form and 
analysed using panel data of 25 countries during the period 1980 to 2009. We show that it is 
necessary to model latent country-specific heterogeneity in addition to time-varying 
inefficiency. The estimated economies of scale are adjusted to take account of the importance 
of the quasi-fixed capital input in determining cost behaviour, and adjusted economies of 
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scale are verified for the OECD generation sector. The findings suggest there is a significant 
impact of electricity market regulatory indicators on cost. Cost complementarity between 
generation and emissions found to be significant, indicating the possibility of reducing 
emissions without necessarily reducing electricity generation.  
 
Finally, the third essay examines the performance of electric power industry’s using 
consistent state-level electricity generation dataset for the US contiguous states from 1998-
2014. We estimate stochastic production frontier for five competing models in order to 
identify the determinants of technical inefficiency and marginal effects. We find evidence of 
positive impacts of deregulation on technical efficiency across the models estimated. Our 
preferred model shows that deregulated states are more efficient in electricity generation than 
non-deregulated states. The result of the marginal effects shows that deregulation has a 
positive and monotonic effect on the technical efficiency. 
 
Key words: Cost efficiency, Deregulation, Electricity generation, Heterogeneity, Input 
distance function, Panel data, Power reform, Market structure, Marginal effect, Stochastic 
frontier analysis, Total factor productivity. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1   Background 
 
Beginning from the early 1980s, significant structural change has taken place in the 
electricity industry the world over. The power sector market reform was driven by plethora of 
reasons. Notable among them are political factors, financial crises (pressure on public 
budget), rapid technological advancement and the globalisation of the world economy. More 
importantly, the institutional arrangements have become unpopular and property rights need 
reallocation (Toba, 2007). Historically, the industry characteristic meant that it was more 
efficient to operate in the form of natural monopoly. In other words, a large electricity utility 
was considered to achieve economies of scale and operate more efficiently if it can generate, 
transmit and distribute electric power.  
The unbundling of the vertically integrated power sector into different constituent 
components represents the flagship of the many dimensions of electricity market reform. The 
attendant organisation structure allows for the continual regulation of the monopoly 
transmission and distribution networks while the potentially competitive generation and retail 
segments are subject to deregulation. Of particular interest is the claim that competition 
drives efficiency gains, which can be substantial considering the fact that generation accounts 
for an unusually large share of value added in the sector, as much as 65%. (see Sioshansi, 
2011). This has informed the bedrock of the empirically analysis of thesis on generation 
segment of the electricity industry.  Indeed, two apparent reasons can be adduced to the 
attention given to this strategic segment.  
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First, the issue of supply security and the reliability of the electricity system. This is a 
fundamental issue that relates to the ability of the system to withstand contingencies, such as 
changes in generator availability and having a sufficient supply of generation capacity readily 
accessible to maintain system security under all but the most extreme circumstances. In 
addition, the possibility of equipment failure and primary input price fluctuations makes the 
supply of electricity uncertain, while continuous acquisitions of more installed capacity to 
guarantee security of supply and reliability of electricity system could be counterproductive 
to efficiency (See Morey, 2001, Delma and Tokat, 2005). Thus, reliability of electric power 
supply is one of the main motivating factors for technical innovation and change in market 
organization. Moreover, electricity demand worldwide is projected to balloon by over 50 per 
cent which could be matched appreciably by increasing energy supply in the next 20 years, 
especially cleanly-generated electricity (See EIA, 2016 IEA, 2013). What is more, global 
electricity demand is increasing twice as fast as overall energy use and represents the fastest 
growing form of end-use energy consumption. Therefore, expanding world electricity 
demand growth while at the same time ensuring secured and reliable electricity generation for 
sustainable economic growth, allied with greater efficiency of electricity generation, poses 
problems for governments and regulators.  
 
Second, concerns about climate change and the decarbonisation of electricity policy 
objectives to increase renewable and combined heat and power (CHP) energy contribution to 
the energy supply. The electric power industry is one of the biggest contributors to the global 
emission of CO2 due to the use of fuels like coal for power generation. The need for 
electricity generation to be clean and safe has never been more obvious, nor have those 
attributes ever been as popularly supported. Environmental consequences of electricity 
generation are important issues, as production of electricity from any form of primary energy 
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has some environmental effect, and some risk.  Arguably, the variation in the costs of 
internalisation of the external costs of CO2 emissions and choice of technological investment 
for cleaner generation is central to cost complementarities in the process of joint production 
of electricity output and undesirable products.  
 
1.2   Overview and contributions of this research 
This thesis contributes essentially to the literature on power sector market reform as well as 
efficiency and productivity literature. Recently, debates on the restructuring-efficiency nexus 
has been a fertile area for research following the structural changes to the competitive and 
regulatory environments of the electricity industry. Notwithstanding the growing popularity 
of the studies on electricity market reform, there is seemingly contention about its benefits, as 
global findings on the success of electricity reform are surprisingly mixed. One would have 
expected to find convincing evidence of ex-post efficiency gains from deregulation success 
showing up from the different econometric studies carried out by many scholars. However, 
demonstrating this has been laced with difficulty as pointed out by Jamasb et al. (2004). This 
thesis revisits the on-going debate over the impact of deregulation, primarily from the 
standpoint of cross-country and US state level analysis. This study therefore is significant in 
many respects.   
 
First, this thesis provides a novel approach by measuring the impact of reform using a 
country intercept. This represents a clear departure from the traditional efficiency 
measurement of deregulation benefits. Greene (2005a, b) posits that if latent heterogeneity 
exists across countries and not adequately accounted for, all time-invariant heterogeneities 
will be pushed into the intercept term and, finally, into the inefficiency term. This potentially 
causes inefficiency to pick up latent cross-country variation that is not in any way related to 
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inefficiency, thereby resulting in underestimation of the overall efficiency level. Therefore, 
this thesis intends to contribute to the literature by demonstrating further empirical evidence 
on deregulation using ‘true’ panel data stochastic frontier models which control for time-
invariant heterogeneities. More importantly, accounting for deregulation in this model reveals 
the extent of the rank correlation of the country intercepts with deregulation via their position 
on the frontier. This also provides an additional framework for benchmarking countries in 
order to identify the best-practice vis-a-vis policy reform as a complement to efficiency 
benchmark.  
 
Second, reshaping market structure by unbundling the dominant vertically integrated firm is 
expected to lower the cost of production. While this argument is usually based on the long 
run cost function assumption, it is possible that there is short run non-optimality in the 
utilisation of the stock of capital. This situation could be warranted due to the absence of 
static equilibrium optimality in relation to cost associated with adjustments, external factor 
and time in generation. Given the foregoing, treating capital as a quasi-fixed input in the 
model provides an interesting motivation for the thesis to reveal an intriguing development 
with regards to cost structure and economies of scale in the face of market product regulatory 
indicators.  
 
Third, the behaviour of competing power generators in relation to environmental and social 
welfare aspects arising from power market reform is sometimes neglected in the analysis of 
cost structure. More often than not, the possibility of reducing carbon emission without a 
corresponding reduction in generation output is constrained.  This thesis extends the output to 
include this undesirable carbon emission output, such that cost characteristics of generation 
i.e. cost complementarity and non-jointness of electricity output and carbon emission can be 
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evaluated. This thesis also contributes to the literature by providing estimation tests and 
procedure for the theoretical underpinnings complementarity and non-jointness of desirable 
and undesirable products.  
 
Again, the conventional efficiency and productivity analysis usually comes at the cost of 
ignoring long-term (persistent) inefficiency when measuring reform impact, even when firm 
heterogeneity is accounted for. Efficiency arising from electricity reform in this analysis 
therefore may be misleading as a firm may eliminate part of its inefficiency by removing 
some of the short-run rigidities, while other sources of inefficiency might stay with the firm 
over time (see Kumbhakar et al., 2014). Decomposing this inefficiency into persistent and 
residual differs from standard stochastic frontier models, and this constitutes a new idea in 
the literature, hence another motivation for this thesis. 
 
Lastly, the modelling impact of deregulation has been considered to be monotonic in nature 
in the efficiency literature. It suffices to say that the existing modelling approach has since 
been taken for granted in most efficiency studies. This monotonic impact might not 
necessarily apply in all cases as exogenous factors can positively (negatively) affect the mean 
and variance efficiency when their values are within a certain range, and then the impacts 
turn negative (positive) for values outside the range (See Wang 2002, 2003).  This thesis 
analyses the classical and newly developed panel data stochastic frontier models from the 
simplest situation to the more complicated situations with applicable restrictions on different 
alternative models. This offers ex-post information on the dynamic nature of the marginal 
effect which gives the actual magnitude of the impact of deregulation. 
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1.3   Research questions 
This thesis consists of three independent but related essays which quantitatively examine the 
impact of power sector market reform on efficiency using country and state level data. In 
order to achieve the objectives of this study, the research is centred on the following 
questions in a bid to offer some plausible answers.  
 
Q1: Do countries with significant reform progress attain higher efficiency in electricity 
generation compared to their counterparts with little or no reform? 
Q1.1: Do unobserved heterogeneities measure the influence of deregulation? 
Q1.2:  What is the key driver of total productivity growth? 
 
Q2: What are the impacts of the electricity regulatory reform indicators on cost efficiency? 
Q2.1:  Does cost complementarity exists between generation and carbon emission? 
Q2.2:  Is there any difference between scale economies in the long run and the short run? 
 
Q3:  Does restructuring shape the mean and variance of electricity generation 
inefficiency? 
Q3.1: What is the dynamics of the marginal effects of electricity restructuring on 
efficiency?  
 
1.4   Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 of the thesis provides a general literature review of the theoretical and empirical 
evidence of reform and performance the electricity supply industry. The literature review 
surveys the efficiency studies in the existing literature on electricity sector reforms. The 
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chapter also incorporates original and recent developments in theoretical methodologies to 
measure efficiency with a central emphasis on the parametric stochastic frontier approach. 
 
Chapter 3 of the thesis quantitatively examines the efficiency of cross-country electricity 
generation using an input distance function approach by incorporating country specific 
factors to influence the production frontier. This chapter considers national electricity 
generation data of 91 countries which makes the study inclusive and reliable. Several frontier 
models, including the true fixed effect and true random effect model were estimated to 
investigate technical efficiency of electricity generation. The chapter also examines the total 
factor productivity change and its decomposition to unravel the potential driving forces 
behind productivity progress. Two fundamental, yet unresolved, research questions are 
addressed in this chapter. First, whether countries with a high level of political freedom1, an 
indication of a condition precedent to adoption and implementation of electricity market 
reform, achieve a significant level of technical efficiency than other countries which are 
autocratic. Second, whether deregulation is being measured by unobserved heterogeneity 
rather than efficiency components. 
 
Chapter 4 assesses cost efficiency and market structure of twenty-five OECD countries while 
relaxing the long run assumption of cost function in order to accommodate inter-temporal 
sub-optimal quasi-fixed capital input. Specifically, the chapter evaluates the impact of market 
product regulatory indicators such as the degree of vertical integration, entry barriers, public 
ownership and overall market reform on the cost of production.  Besides electricity 
generation output, carbon emission is also considered as an undesirable output and are both 
modelled as the dependent variables. This chapter also extends the frontier models to include 
                                                          
1 Political freedom is measured by political rights index, on integers ranging from 1 (most freedom) to 7 (least freedom). 
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the four-way error components model that specifies two stochastic inefficiency terms 
(residual and persistent inefficiencies) and other two components; the time invariant 
heterogeneity and idiosyncratic error term. The underlying issues of exhaustion of economies 
of scale in the generation segment are reconsidered through the estimation of both the long 
run and short run economies of scale. The chapter also addresses the research question 
whether cost complementarity exists between electricity output generation and carbon 
emission. 
 
Chapter 5 empirically examines the performance of electric power industry’s using state-level 
electricity generation dataset for the forty-eight US contiguous states. Adopting a general-to-
specific estimation approach, five alternative models were estimated and compared 
stochastically in order to identify the determinants of technical inefficiency and marginal 
effects. Given the differences in the interstate electricity reform milestone in the United State, 
the competing models contain some variables that account for heterogeneity and 
heteroscedasticity in the models. Exogenous variables such as reform variables, political 
index and some socioeconomic variables are modelled to affect the mean of the inefficiency, 
variance of the inefficiency or both.  Further evidence of the potential efficiency gain 
accruable from reform to the deregulated state was confirmed in this chapter. The chapter 
ends with a discussion on the last research question which is centred on the recent the debate 
relating to monotonic and non-monotonic magnitude of deregulation on inefficiency. 
 
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis by summarising the findings from the three empirical chapters, 
and revisits the research question. This chapter also highlights the contributions of the 
research and offers suggestions for future work. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
 
 
2.1   Introduction 
 
This chapter contains a review of the literature and theoretical framework for the three essays 
in this thesis. The chapter starts with a discussion on the general overview of power sector 
reform and the electricity market deregulation structure. It then proceeds to discuss 
organisation and competition of the electricity supply industry. Issues of market power, 
privatisation and regulation of the industry are discussed thereafter. A brief explanation of the 
theory of liberalisation is also provided. Afterwards, the discussion focuses on empirical 
studies regarding the impact of reform, while the last sub-sections provide an extensive 
review on the methodological theoretical framework. 
 
2.2   Overview 
Network utilities such as electricity, gas, telecommunications and water are public utilities 
which require a fixed network to deliver their services. The economic significance of these 
network industries is widely recognised in modern society and their contribution to the 
socioeconomic life of nations has become indispensable. They make up a large fraction of an 
economy’s productive capital. For instance, Forman-Peck and Millward (1994, p.3) posit that 
between 1850 and 1960 network utilities accounted for between 18 and 30 percent of the total 
net fixed assets in the United Kingdom, always larger than the share of manufacturing 
industry.  
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Traditionally, the Electricity Supply Industry (ESI), like other network industries, was 
dominated by state-owned, vertically integrated power companies. The functional segments 
of the utilities were typically bundled under the same management and government control. 
The argument espousing this arrangement suggests that power companies are better organised 
as a vertically integrated firm, whereby the firm that generates electricity also transmits it 
over high tension transmission voltage lines, distributes it over low tension distribution 
voltage lines, and retail it by billing the end users. The ownership by one sole firm 
(government) helped to ensure the necessary coordination among the different segments 
(generation, transmission and distribution). The economic arguments for large vertically 
integrated electricity companies which were significant in size also rested on a claim that 
vertical economies were significant (Pollitt, 2007).  In some parts of the world, these utilities 
were regulated private companies, while in others they were public companies or government 
agencies. 
 
For many years, this earlier structure of the electric utility industry was centred on the 
economic theory that an integrated system of electricity supplied by efficient, low cost utility 
generation, transmission, and distribution was a classic natural monopoly. Regardless of 
ownership and the level of vertical integration, geographical monopolies were the norm 
(Kirshen and Strbac, 2004, p. 1). This idea of natural monopoly is based on the existence of 
economies of scale throughout the relevant range of production on the market. This means 
one firm was thought to produce goods less expensively than if there were any other 
combination of firms in the market, as average costs declined as output increased (Joskow 
and Schmalensee, 1983, pp. 29–20; Newbery, 2001a, pp. 1–2). The implication of the 
economies of scale was that it might result in inefficient and unstable prices as they create 
rents that will be fought over and tends to persist due to the durable, long lived and 
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immovable nature of the network. The capital outlay of the network of electric utility is large 
and sunk, shifting the balance of bargaining advantage shifts from consumer to investor. 
Given that these utilities are directly linked to the consumer; they offer their owner 
potentially large exploitative power. Thus, in order to address the challenge facing investors 
and consumers, while at the same time balance the interests and powers, the utilities were 
either state owned or operate under regulations set by government institutions (Newbery, 
1997).  Government ownership of the monopoly (or public regulation) was often justified on 
the grounds that the state was the custodian of the public interest and therefore would be the 
least likely to act in an opportunistic manner, as monopolists were prone to do (Gratwick and 
Eberhard, 2008).  
 
2.2.1   The root of electricity deregulation 
The past three decades have witnessed efforts throughout the world towards restructuring 
electricity industry. This has been carried out in many countries across the world within the 
framework of liberalisation, restructuring, competition, regulatory reform, and privatisation 
(Jamasb & Pollitt, 2008). The performance of the electricity sector varied widely across 
countries. In many developing countries, the sector was characterized by low labour 
productivity, poor service quality, high system losses, inadequate investment in power supply 
facilities, unavailability of service to large portions of the population, and prices that were too 
low to cover costs and support new investment (World Bank 1994, Bacon and Besant-Jones 
2001, Besant-Jones 1993). In developed countries, sector performance was considerably 
better, but high operating costs, construction cost overruns on new facilities, costly programs 
driven by political pressures, and high retail prices required to cover these costs stimulated 
pressures for changes that were expected to reduce costs and retail prices (Joskow 1998a, 
2000). 
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The motivation for electricity sector reform has been slightly different in different countries, 
despite the common objective to improve the performance of the industry. In the developed 
countries, the main objective has been to improve the performance of a relatively efficient 
system. On the other hand, the burden of price subsidies, low quality of service, low 
collection rates, high network losses, poor service coverage and frequent power outage have 
meant that many governments in developing countries are no longer willing, or able, to 
support the existing systems (Newbery, 2004; Joskow, 1998). However, the overarching 
motive of liberalisation has been to create a new institutional arrangement for the electricity 
sector that ensures society benefits through prices that reflect the efficient economic cost of 
supplying electricity and a service quality that reflects consumer valuation (Nagayama, 2007; 
Joskow, 2008). The electricity reforms have been implemented in each country based on its 
economic, political and historical circumstances.  
 
In the United Kingdom, for example, privatisation of a state-owned enterprises reinforced the 
market orientation of the Thatcher government and its interest in reducing the costs of 
domestic coal subsidies. Similar ideological and political explanations can be found from 
Norway to New Zealand. Budgetary shortfalls, foreign debt, the preferences of donor 
agencies such as the World Bank and the perceived poor performance of state-owned firms, 
facilitated electricity reform in developing countries (Spiller & Martorell, 1996; World Bank, 
1995; World Energy Council, 1998). The financial development institutions made new power 
sector loans contingent on government commitments to introduce reform. However, there has 
been a common theme of growing disaffection with the electricity market model of the past 
and a belief that the success found in "deregulation" of other industries, such as airlines or 
telephones, could be repeated in the case of electricity production and delivery (Hogan, 
2002).  
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Three important trends that have contributed to the significant changes in global electricity 
industry are economic, market logics and technological changes. First, electricity sector 
reform dates back to the oil price shock in the 1970s which resulted in higher fuel prices, with 
its attendant impact on the oil importing countries’ socioeconomic status. For instance, 
Britain growth’s rate was 7.0% between 1947 and 1974, but fell to 1.4% from then till 1990, 
while US growth fell from 7.3% to 2.6% between the same period (Newbery, 1997). This 
shock systematically changed the conditions for power sector investments. The cost of power 
generation increased due to a hike in oil prices and this was passed to the customer directly. 
The increased public awareness in the 1980s of the excessive cost and poor quality service 
associated with state ownership without the forces of competition necessitated a demand for a 
competitive market to reduce the cost of electricity production while ensuring improved 
quality and security of electricity supply. Similarly, there was a huge financial burden on the 
state due to the demand for additional generating capacity, as well as the need to upgrade 
existing distribution and transmission networks. The inability of the state sector to finance 
needed expenditure and new investment and maintenance especially in the rapidly 
industrialised emerging economies, has been a driving force for the restructuring of 
electricity industry. 
 
Second, the “idea” of markets took hold from the early 1980s. This new neo-classical 
economic theory insisted that free and competitive markets were more efficient than 
government agencies at delivering basic services, and that divestiture of state-owned assets 
would have flow-on social benefits in terms of improved resource allocation, innovation, and 
ultimately, greater employment opportunities. In part, the focus on markets for power 
reflected a new thinking about ways to organize the power sector so that it did not fully have 
the attributes of a natural monopoly (e.g, Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983). 
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Third, rapid improvement in technology in generation and digitalisation of meter and 
dispatched power serve as a key force for electricity reform (APERC, 2000; Bacon and 
Besant-Jones, 2001). The significant concepts of economies of scale, where a central source 
of power supplied by a single firm seemed diminished in the 1980s as a result of 
technological innovation. Due to the existence of economies of scale and scope, efficiency 
gains, cannot be achieved through competition because parallel networks have hardly been 
profitable and network operations usually demand a high degree of coordination. However, 
technological changes have weakened the industry’s natural monopoly features and thereby 
change the cost and access structure in a more liberalization–friendly direction (Askim and 
Claes, 2011).  For example, the development of natural gas combine cycle turbine (CCGT) 
with high thermal efficiency, rapid installation time and low emission levels results in 
relatively low-cost electricity generation. This development of information and 
communication technologies enabled the electricity system to be organized and controlled 
without vertical integration, as exemplified in the wholesale power pool2 and on constantly 
changing market prices for electricity, thereby reducing transactions cost.  
 
 
2.2.1.1   Electricity Market Deregulation Structure 
The electricity sector’s reform began in Chile (1982), England & Wales (1989), Norway 
(1991) and the trend spread to Latin American countries and the rest of the world subsequent 
to the 1990s. Although deregulation of electric power sector in the USA, Australia, countries 
in Europe, and some selected countries in Latin America are already advanced, countries in 
Africa and the Middle East have been late in implementing reforms and reforms have only 
been gradually taking effect in Eastern Europe and Asia (Nagayama, 2007).  Electricity 
                                                          
2 ICT has created a platform in the wholesale power pool such that there is access to real time information on all aspects of 
their operation 
15 
 
reforms are primarily designed to introduce competition in the upstream production and 
downstream supply functions of the industry structure, and to use economic regulation of the 
wholesale and retail electricity markets to promote competition and protect consumer’s 
interest (Bacon and Besant-Jones, 2001). Although there are variations in the reform 
structures, depending on countries, the choice of deregulation model, timing and sequencing 
of the deregulation became crucial economic issues. The UK deregulation model has been in 
the vanguard for many reform programmes implemented by other countries and have closely 
agreed common elements which are as follows;  
1. Restructuring the industry in order to enable the introduction of competition. This 
means breaking up or vertically unbundling the incumbent monopoly utilities, possibly into 
separate generation, transmission, distribution and retail suppliers of electricity. It also 
involves horizontal splitting of generation and supply. 
2. Development of a competitive market by allowing wholesale and retail competition, 
and new entry into generation and supply.  
3. Privatisation, where feasible, of the unbundled generators, transmitters, distributors or 
suppliers, and allowing new private sector actors. 
4. Development of a new regulatory framework. Instead of direct regulation by a 
government department, the establishment of ‘independent’ or quasi-independent regulatory 
bodies, in the forms of offices and commissions, has been favoured, drawing particularly on 
the regulatory models of the USA and UK.  
 
The key elements of restructuring, privatisation and development of regulatory reform for the 
electricity reform process generally involve some series of generic sequences for full 
liberalization of power markets. These reform steps had been formulated rather roughly as 
follows: corporatization, commercialisation; primary enabling legislation; establishment of an 
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independent regulator; creation of independent power producers (IPPs); restructuring, 
privatisation and competition (Williams and Ghanadan, 2006). The preliminary steps: 
corporatization, commercialization, passage of energy legislation and the establishment of an 
independent regulator are required to transform the electricity industry from a government 
agency or department into a commercial enterprise. Although there are some noticeable 
similarities as well as differences across the countries with respect to the above models and 
do not necessarily represent the reform paths of the pioneer countries exactly. For instance, 
Norway liberalised its electricity market without privatisation, the industry remaining almost 
literally in public hands. The reforms in most Latin American countries have broadly 
followed similar paths to the generic sequence model outlined above, with Brazil being an 
exception as some privatization took place prior to establishment of a regulator (Jamasb, 
2006). Until recently, New Zealand attempted an approach without regulation while relying 
on market competition to provide market discipline to participants. The New Zealand 
government subsequently imposed price control regulation on the plant suppliers due to the 
failure of competition to control pricing (Patterson and Cornwall, 2000).  
 
The reform in much of continental EU (with the exception of Spain and the Netherlands), in 
Japan and in a large portion of the US have been partial liberalisation or simply continuing 
with a regulated vertically integrated monopoly as against the generic textbook model 
(Joskow 2006a; Haas, et al., 2006). The England and Wales electricity reform is adjudged the 
standard for electricity reform (Joskow, 2008). This approach dubbed “standard prescription’’ 
(Hunt, 2002, p. 8, 15, 239) or “standard model’’ (Littlechild, 2006, p. xviii), as it follows the 
basic architecture of the textbook model and have led to significant improvement in many 
dimensions (Joskow, 2008), allowing competition in all parts of this sector where it was 
feasible. Regardless of the variation in reform across countries, the sequencing of reform, 
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especially at the generation segment, is very important to ensure their long-term 
sustainability. Bacon and Besant-Jones (2001) argue that the legal and regulatory framework 
should be set up before sale of assets of the restructured power supplier while major 
restructuring should precede the creation of privatization to avoid problems with stranded 
assets. Furthermore, the scope for introducing competition to the wholesale power generation 
market should be incorporated into the initial structural reforms to the power market. 
 
2.2.1.2   Organisation and Competition  
Electricity supply industry restructuring has been driven largely by generation technological 
changes and this has led major reorganisation in industry. The industry is no longer 
considered as a vertically integrated natural monopoly activity; rather it is regarded as a set of 
separate but inter-related activities with distinctive economic characteristics (Jamasb, 2006). 
This has then shifted electric power electric power generation and retail supply business 
toward a free, competitive environment, allowing a local monopoly in the power transmission 
section promoting economic efficiency (Nagayama, 2009).  
 
Liberalisation of the electricity industry has brought the issue of market competitiveness to 
the front line. The argument for liberalisation is that competition provides stronger and less 
manipulable incentives to efficiency than regulation. Perfect competition would provide the 
strongest incentives for efficiency and would transfer all the gains to consumers and thus 
solve the problem of bargaining over rents. As electricity is extremely costly to store and 
requires supply and demand balancing, generation must closely match demand on a 
continuous basis. Delivery of the product consumed must take place through a potentially 
congested transmission network. The combination of very inelastic short-run demand and 
supply (at peak times) with the real–time nature of the market (costly nature and grid 
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reliability requirements) makes the electricity market vulnerable to the exercise of market 
power (Borenstein and Bushnell, 2000). These attributes must be recognized and 
incorporated into the successful design of competitive markets and regulatory institutions to 
avoid performance failures (Joskow, 2003).  
 
Following the liberalization of the electricity market, different types of companies and 
organizations play a role in the electricity market. Since markets have evolved at different 
rates and in somewhat different directions in each country or region, not all these entities will 
be found in each market. In some cases, one company or organization may perform more 
than one of the functions described below: 
 
Generating companies (gencos) produce and sell electrical energy. They may also sell 
services such as supervision; voltage control and reserve that the system operator needs to 
maintain the quality and security of the electricity supply. A generating company can own a 
single plant or a portfolio of plants of different technologies. Generating companies that 
coexist with vertically integrated utilities are sometimes called independent power producers 
(IPP).  
 
Transmission companies (transco) own transmission assets such as lines, cables and 
transformers. They operate this equipment according to the instructions of the independent 
system operator. Transmission companies are sometimes subsidiaries of companies that also 
own generating plants. An independent transmission company (ITC) is a transmission 
company that does not own generating plants and also acts as an independent system 
operator. They may also act as the spot and capacity balance market maker.   
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Distribution companies (discos) own and operate distribution networks. In a traditional 
environment, they have a monopoly for the sale of electrical energy to all consumers 
connected to their network. In a fully deregulated environment, the sale of energy to 
consumers is decoupled from the operation, maintenance and development of the distribution 
network.  
 
Retailers then compete to perform this energy sale activity. One of these retailers may be a 
subsidiary of the local distribution company. Retailers buy electrical energy on the wholesale 
market and resell it to consumers who do not wish, or are not allowed, to participate in this 
wholesale market. Retailers do not have to own any power generation, transmission or 
distribution assets. Some retailers are subsidiaries of generation or distribution companies. 
All the customers of a retailer do not have to be connected to the network of the same 
distribution company.  
 
A market operator (MO) typically runs a computer system that matches the bids and offers 
that buyers and sellers of electrical energy have submitted. It also takes care of the settlement 
of the accepted bids and offers. This means that it forwards payments from buyers to sellers 
following delivery of the energy.  
 
The independent system operator (ISO) is usually responsible for running the market of last 
resort, that is, the market in which load and generation are balanced in real time. Markets that 
close some time ahead of real time are typically run by independent for-profit market 
operators. The independent system operator (ISO) has the primary responsibility of 
maintaining the security of the power system. It is called independent because in a 
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competitive environment, the system must be operated in a manner that does not favour or 
penalize one market participant over another.  
 
Effective competition in electricity markets is a feature of successful electricity supply 
industry restructuring. Competition has been described as the backbone of electricity reform 
which brings efficient performance and lower electricity tariffs. Competition in the electricity 
industry generally implies competition only in the generation of electricity and in the 
commercial functions of wholesaling and retailing (Hunt, 2002). These two segments, 
generation and supply, are the deregulated functions in order to ensure that prices are set in 
the competitive markets and not by regulators. The degree of competition permitted can vary 
depending on which restructuring model has been used, for example the single-buyer model, 
wholesale competition (which can itself take various forms), or retail competition (Lovei, 
1996; Hunt and Shuttleworth, 1996).  Economists since Adam Smith have argued that 
competition not only provides incentives for firm to minimise production costs but also 
restrains prices and ensures that consumers satisfy their wants at least cost. Competition leads 
to greater allocative efficiency, since prices are related more closely to marginal costs, and 
provides incentives for management to minimise waste and maximise productive efficiency.  
 
Under monopolistic conditions, in contrast, the cost can be passed onto consumers in the 
form of higher prices. Therefore, competition in the product market is an important driver of 
cost reduction and product innovation. However, many reforming countries have experienced 
difficulties in enforcing competition in electricity markets (Joskow, 2003). According to 
Sioshansi (2008), the US has experienced slow paced growth in retail competition in recent 
years while transition to a national competitive electricity market has been stalled. He cited 
reasons for this, among other things, as mixed results in a number of states that have 
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introduced retail competition, problems of some wholesale markets and lack of interest by the 
US Congress to push retail competition at the national level. Germany also provides a good 
example of how reform without the creation of competitive market can result in performance 
problems (Brunekreet and Bausknecht, 2006). The German electric power system continues 
to be dominated by a few large vertically integrated utilities which prevent competition. 
 
2.2.1.3    Market Power  
Lack of effective competition has been recognised to result in market power, and therefore 
poses a major obstacle to competition in the generation sector of the electricity supply 
industry. Significant wholesale market power problems have been identified empirically in 
several countries (Wolfram, 1999; Borenstein, Bushnell and Wolak 2000; Joskow and Kahn, 
2002; Sweeting, 2007). Electricity possesses practically all of the product features that 
support producers to display market power. According to Wolak (2004), the technology of 
electricity production historically favoured large generation facilities to be owned by 
relatively few numbers of firms, with generation capacity ownership concentrated in small 
areas these regional wholesale markets. Thus, this makes the wholesale market sustainably 
less competitive and enhances the ability to exercise market power. In the same vein, Joskow 
(2003) argues that market power can be attributed to interactions between the attributes of 
electricity networks, too few competing generating companies, wholesale market design 
flaws, vertical integration between transmission and generation that creates the incentive and 
opportunity for exclusionary behaviour, excessive reliance on spot markets rather than 
forward contracts, and limited diffusion of real time prices and associated communications 
and control technology that facilitates the participant of demand in wholesale spot markets. 
 A deregulated market for electricity provides very strong incentives for least-cost production 
by a profit-maximising generating firm. However, if a firm or set of firms possess market 
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power, they will alter their production patterns in ways that violate the assumption of market-
wide least –cost production. Market power on the part of sellers is the ability to profitably 
maintain prices above competitive levels by restricting output below competitive levels 
(Werden, 1996). This has consequences for significant consumer harm as a result of firms 
simply engaging in unilateral profit-maximising behaviours given the action of their 
competitors.  In the U.K., for example, as posited by Sweeting (2007), generators exercised 
increasing market power in the wholesale electricity market in the second half of the 1990s 
which caused prices to stay above marginal costs, a behaviour that was consistent with tacit 
collusion or with them increasing Pool prices to raise prices in future contracts. Similarly, 
market power in the California wholesale market was a significant factor during the crisis. 
There was an exercise of market power by some generators as they withheld supply in a tight 
situation, resulting in rapid increase in wholesale prices which subsequently caused prices to 
rise markedly above costs (Borenstein, et. al, 2000; Joskow and Kahn, 2002).  
 
Mitigation strategies against market power have become an important component of the 
wholesale market deregulation process. Diagnosing market power associated with 
unregulated supplies of generation services requires significant analytical challenges 
(Borenstein et. al., 1995; Werden, 1996). The preliminary step involves identification of 
market power by cost and the availability of transmission capacity (Joskow and Schmalensee, 
1983, ch. 12). Having identified significant market power problems in the power market, 
mitigation can be through subjecting incumbent generators to some type of incentive–based 
price regulation, mandatory forward contracts, and market design improvements. Market 
power also can be mitigated by horizontal divestiture of the existing generating facilities as a 
way of creating additional independent competitive suppliers, to avoid the creation of 
dominant firms and to ensure a balanced resource mix among the competing firms (Joskow, 
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1997; Jamasb, 2006). The horizontal restructuring of the generation segment potentially 
creates an adequate number of competing generators to mitigate against the market power 
and to ensure that the wholesale markets are reasonably competitive.  In the electricity prices 
case of the U.K., for example, the problem of potential power in the pool was addressed only 
after a lengthy process of new IPPs entries when the regulator took actions that led to forced 
divestiture of the two incumbent monopolist generators resulting in a less concentrated 
generation sector to encourage competition which have indeed led to substantial efficiency 
gains (Newbery, 1999; Peerbocus, 2007). Therefore, given that the restructuring process is an 
evolutionary one, regulators and market monitors are expected to actively adapt to changing 
conditions by improving market structure and design, market monitoring and market power 
mitigation.   
 
2.2.1.4    Privatisation and Economic Regulation  
Since the power sector liberalisation wave, a number of countries have privatised their 
electricity industry to replicate the British experience. Two central arguments are advocated 
in favour of privatisation. First, privatisation of the electricity sector in Britain was driven by 
the belief that private ownership changes the motive of the erstwhile public enterprises so as 
to increase its productive efficiency. This position is prompted by some schools of thought 
who argue that government has no business in the running of public utilities such as 
electricity. In principle, economic theory suggests that privatisation may improve resource 
allocation (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). Second, governments find the revenues raised by 
selling the utilities to be useful for a number of political reasons, although the revenue-raising 
motive is controversial, and the validity has been dismissed as a rationale for privatisation in 
the developed countries (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991). Privatisation is sometimes regarded as 
either a purely ideological phenomenon or as a response to the perceived poor performance of 
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state-owned industries. (Parker and Saal, 2003 p.42). Privatisation of electric utilities is 
mainly about ownership rather than control, as utilities can face remarkably similar regulation 
under public or private ownership.                                                            
 
Privatisation of state-owned utility is often considered as most advanced part of reform. The 
England and Wales electricity sector, for example, were almost completely unbundled and 
restructured before privatisation. After privatisation, almost all the distribution network 
operators (DNOs) became joint investors with independent power producers (IPP) in building 
gas-fired combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) generation stations, whose high efficiency, low 
capital costs, modest economic of scale and use of cheap fuel made them attractive 
competitors to the predominantly coal-fired generation of National Power and PowerGen 
(Bergman, et al. 1999, p.91). Privatisation is necessary but not sufficient, and it is often 
assumed as the end point of liberalisation, although it is a least common step in electricity 
reforms as it is not necessarily associated with liberalisation process. Norway provides a good 
example that a state and locally owned electricity sector can be efficient and implement 
necessary reforms.  Competition is difficult to achieve within the public sector, so there is 
natural complementarity between liberalisation and privatisation (Newbery, 1997). Hence, 
privatisation remains an option to improve efficiency of network companies by reducing 
distortions and improving incentives as private firms can be expected to be aggressive in 
dealing with the regulators (Nepal, Menezes and Jamasb, 2014).   
 
International experiences of privatisation show that the distribution segment is often subject 
to privatisation, subsequently followed by the generation segment.  Privatisation of the 
transmission network is less common as it is strategic importance for the national economy 
and viewed as an economically and politically undesirable step. The main arguments for 
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privatising distribution network are a reduction in technical losses due to new investment and 
a reduction in commercial losses, especially in the developing countries. In most developing 
economies, privatization of power has occurred in the form of operating concessions and 
greenfield investments, as well as state asset sales, as opposed to complete transfer of the 
entire electricity supply chain to the private sector, as occurred in Britain (Zhang, Parker and 
Kirkpatrick, 2008).  
 
Privatisation raised new regulatory questions that did not arise when utilities had always been 
under private ownership, and where regulation had evolved organically (Newbery, 2001, p.5). 
The relationship between the government, together with regulator and the privatised utility, is 
one of principal (the regulator) and agent (the utility) as in the standard literature.  The 
principal-agent model in economics has drawn attention to the importance for achieving 
economic efficiency of principals monitoring and controlling agent behaviour effectively 
(Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). Principal-agent theory, especially when coupled with the 
arguments from public choice theory, provides a very powerful theoretical rationale for 
privatisation to increase efficiency (Parker, 2000). It has been argued that private ownership 
is better positioned to solving the challenges attributable to principal-agent relationships and 
the lack of pressure to induce maximising behaviour. Thus, successful privatization of 
network companies requires incentive-based regulation that allows investment to be 
adequately rewarded from unsubsidised revenues while maintaining quality, but contains 
restrictions that permit effective competition for the network services (Newbery (2004). In 
practice when a public utility is privatised, a regime of regulation and monitoring is typically 
chosen, and the regulation often takes a simple form such as price cap regulation in the UK or 
rate of return regulation in the U. S. 
 
26 
 
Regulation is crucially important in assessing the privatisation of monopolies while the latent 
competitive elements still need regulatory oversight to ensure that markets are not 
manipulated nor market power abused. The electricity networks are capital intensive and 
exhibit natural monopoly characteristics where competition is not feasible or desirable, and 
make entry to network business potentially restricted. A system for setting price charged by 
this regulated monopoly is needed to minimise inefficiencies associated with monopoly 
pricing. An independent regulatory body is usually formed by government to set the regulated 
price in a way that allowed the regulated firm to recover the efficient cost of providing the 
service. In the US and Japan, network transmission is governed by cost based regulation 
where the regulated firm is compelled to charge a price that would ideally prevail in a 
perfectly competitive market which is equal to the efficient cost of production plus a market-
determined rate of return on capital. Thus, the firm can earn revenues equal to their historical 
costs including a return on investment corresponding to the cost of capital. It also provides 
firms with an incentive to over/under invest in plant, inflate costs, and cross subsidize. It has 
been increasingly criticized for its inefficiency. The central problem of rate-of-return 
regulation is that linking revenues to cost reduces the incentive to cut costs, notably as over-
capitalisation of the regulatory asset base otherwise known as Averch-Johnson effect3. 
Regulators generally try to remedy these perverse incentives through regulatory lag, sliding 
scales, and efficiency audits/reviews.  
 
However, some countries such as Italy and Norway use price-or revenue cap regulation (Al-
Sunaidy and Green, 2006), while the UK uses a combination of regulations called hybrid 
regulation. The regulators in the UK combine elements of rate of return regulation and price 
cap regulation to create their form of RPI-X regulation. Price cap regulation sets the 
                                                          
3 The Averch–Johnson effect is the tendency of regulated companies to engage in excessive amounts of capital 
accumulation in order to expand the denominator in the ratio of profit to capital, i.e. lower the apparent return on capital. 
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maximum average revenue that a regulated firm is allowed to charge for its outputs for a 
specific price control period. The regulator sets a cap with an incentive factor X, to induce 
lower costs which take the form of RPI-X price capping in which the initial price is allowed 
to escalate at an annual percentage rate equal to RPI-X, where RPI is the annual growth rate 
in the consumer price index and X is productivity growth rate (Weyman-Jones, 2003 p.496). 
Although service quality and infrastructure development may be hampered in price 
regulation, it is less vulnerable to "cost-plus" inefficiency, cross-subsidization and over-
capitalization, and reduces the effects of cost information asymmetries between firms and 
regulators. The initial level of X is set by the government at the time of privatization as part 
of the privatization process, whereas X is reset at periodic reviews every four or five years by 
the regulator as part of the,  
continuing regulatory process (Beesley and Littlechild, 1989). Arguably, rate-of-return 
regulation, which appears to allow utilities to recover their investment costs, is more 
vulnerable to opportunistic liberalisation than price regulation, which offers no such 
guarantee, and where investors expect to earn a higher risk premium in compensation.  
 
2.3   The Theory of Liberalisation and Economic Performance 
Liberalisation has been a prominent component of policy advice for utility sectors of both 
developed and developing countries for the last three decades owing to the demonstrative 
effect of the pioneering reform in the UK, Chile and Norway. Among the benefits claimed to 
spring from it, economic efficiency (i.e. reduced costs and/or prices) is probably the most 
important. Along with economic reasons come other political and financial objectives. Other 
ancillary benefits include reduction of the budget deficit, wider share ownership, increased 
efficiency of the government, reduced power of the public-sector unions and even personal 
profit (Pollitt, 1995). Based on efficiency considerations, D’Souza and Megginson (1999) 
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argued that not only the customers of privatized enterprises enjoy benefits from privatization, 
but also, as the enterprises become more efficient, the whole economy will benefit.  Whether 
privatization (the often-assumed end point of liberalisation) actually leads to that 
improvement in efficiency has been the subject of what appears to be a considerable amount 
of research, both theoretical and empirical. And yet economists continue to argue about, and 
conduct research on, the connection between the potential gains in efficiency and 
privatisation.    
 
Many theoretical postulates have been advanced by the privatization advocates to support the 
reasons why liberalisation might improve economic performance. These theories explain the 
differences between state-owned and private firms and what these differences imply for firm 
efficiency (Villalonga, 1999, Arocena and Oliveros, 2012). The argument is based on the 
belief that firms under private hands perform better than under public ownership. The three 
well-known theoretical arguments supporting the position on why liberalisation can lead to 
economics performance are (1) Agency Theory; (2) Property Rights Theory; and (3) Public 
Choice. 
 
2.3.1   Agency Theory 
Agency problems in industrial organisation stems from the principal–agent theory, which 
presumes publicly owned firms and separation of ownership and control (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  The principal-agency theory (following Vickers and Yarrow, 1988) is a 
supposition that explains the relationship between principals and agents in business who does 
not share the same objectives. According to agency theory, control is more difficult when 
information asymmetry increases between the principal and agents and when successive 
delegation increases managerial discretion (Fama and Jensen, 1995). The theory is concerned 
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precisely with this problem of information and incentives, and addresses a central question: 
what is the optimal incentive scheme for the principal to lay down for the agent? An agent 
who is supposed to take decisions on behalf of the principal may act otherwise as he has 
objectives and constraints, which may conflict with that of the principal. The principal wants 
to induce the agent to act in his (principal’s) interest, but he does not have full information 
about the circumstances and behaviours of the agent, and so has a monitoring problem. This 
prevents the principal from successfully telling the agent what to do, for he cannot fully 
observe what is happening. An outcome that diverges from the optimal outcome is possible if 
there is information asymmetry in favour of the agent. Asymmetric information leads to a 
moral hazard problem since the agent may use the principal’s ignorance as an excuse to 
supply a sub-optimal level of efforts. Therefore, the agent can be expected to exploit the 
information advantage that may adversely affect the outcome of the decision taken.  
 
The theory points to the separation of ownership and control as the main source of the 
relative poorer performance of public firms. The owners of public enterprises are less likely 
to monitor the behaviour of managers while managers in private companies are more 
disciplined by a number of external control mechanisms. Thus, most of the state-owned 
utilities are not being controlled and managed efficiently. Following privatization exercise in 
UK, Caves (1990), finds evidence on the behaviour of the public enterprises which is 
consistent with an organizational model of the relevant principal-agent relationships. On the 
control dimension, empirical result supports the prediction that the privately-controlled firms 
are more efficient than agent-led firms (Durand and Vargas, 2003). To manage principal-
agent relationships, agency theory suggests governments should write complete contracts 
(e.g., laws and regulations) that adequately protect public interests and prevent privatized 
firms’ opportunistic behaviours. Or at least, the contract should be such that an optimal 
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outcome is elicited given the possibility that an agent will optimise for himself under 
whatever contract is specified (Holmstrom, 1979).  
 
Furthermore, addressing the agency problems in strategic economic sectors (financial, 
utilities, mining, steel, telecommunications, transportation) has led to the reduction of the role 
played by government as a dominant actor in the economy and to favour the emergence of an 
active private sector. Private ownership potentially induces corporate governance through 
better monitoring of managers for improved performance and profits maximization. Agency 
theories suggest that both private ownership and competition provide strong incentives to 
improve technical efficiency. Theoretical and empirical considerations suggest that private 
ownership leads to better outcome in terms of performance.  Empirical analyses show that 
privatization has contributed to the growth of stock market capitalization and trading all over 
the world (Megginson and Netter, 2001). Meanwhile all relevant laws or regulations that 
apply to the privatized firms should be specified by every privatization deal, and enforcement 
of the contracts should be followed (Ramamurti, 2000).  
In the context of electricity sector, these theoretical predictions provide good cases in the 
electric utilities. Although there are difficulties in controlling the behaviour of monopolistic 
incumbent privately owned electric utilities due to the firm’s ability to game the regulators 
arising from asymmetric information which might prevent the regulator from observing 
actual efficiencies and cost structures (see Joskow 2003, 2005; Stigler and Friedland, 1962)  
However, liberalisation of the sector ensures the opening up of the market to new entrants 
and the demerging of the incumbent into competitive firms. Thus, privatisation in the absence 
of liberalisation is unlikely to improve efficiency, and may introduce additional market 
distortions (Domberger and Piggott, 1986). Moreover, the separation of the different 
constituent segments of the sector introduces competition into the generation chain which 
31 
 
provides managers of privately owned generation firms in competitive markets to face high 
powered incentives to increase firm productivity. These institutional changes tend to 
ameliorate the potential principal-agent dilemma created between regulators and managers of 
privately-owned electric utilities.  
 
  2.3.2   Property Rights 
A major theme in the literature on the economics of property rights is the argument that 
public ownership is inherently less efficient than private ownership and a change in allocation 
of property rights will affect incentive structure, and hence, performance. Property rights are 
mainly concerned with the relationship between ownership rights, incentives and economic 
efficiency. Drawing from Alchian (1965), property rights theory involves a clearer 
assignment of property rights to those with a comparative advantage in the ownership of 
particular assets.  This position is based on the fact that various forms of ownership give rise 
to different economic incentives and therefore, different economic performances. Property 
rights theory argues that different institutional settings, such as ownership type, provide 
decision-makers with different rights to the use of economic resources, thus imposing 
different constraints upon them. These constraints will affect the costs and rewards of 
production and might systematically affect the behaviour of consumers and firms.  Public 
ownership is diffused among all members of society, and no member has the right to sell his 
share therefore performs less than private firms, where rights to profits are clearly defined 
(Alchian 1965, De Allessi, 1969). There is little economic incentive for any owner to monitor 
the behaviour of the firm's management, but ownership of private firms is concentrated 
among fewer individuals, each having the right to sell his shares; and thus the owners have 
incentives to scrutinize management to ensure efficiency in the production of goods or 
32 
 
services. Managers in public firms do not suffer the economic consequences of their 
decisions, which limit their incentives to reduce economic waste and maximize profitability. 
The presence of soft budget constraints prevents public enterprises from bankruptcy, since 
any possible gap between income and expenditures is balanced by the government. In 
contrast, the threat of bankruptcy and takeover prevent the managers of private firms seeking 
only their own advantage. They are residual claimants who benefit directly from efficiency 
and hence have greater incentives to monitor managers. Moreso, under public ownership, 
since no one has a clear claim over the residual assets of SOE, there will be no market for 
corporate control, and hence no threat of takeover to discipline managers who are not 
maximizing profit (Vickers and yarrow, 1988).  The process of deregulation and liberalisation 
allows contracting out and financing of the utilities activities to be undertaken by more 
efficient firms, and thus a fully integrated SOE with little contracting out and commercial 
freedom is unlikely to minimize costs (Pollitt, 1997).  
 
2.3.3   Public Choice 
Public Choice theory is based on the central argument that politicians, bureaucrats and 
government officials are more concerned with the maximization of their own objectives, like 
votes, power and prestige, than with the pursuit of the general interest and the efficiency of 
their decisions. The rationale for this approach is that such bodies are themselves agents for, 
and therefore properly should act in the best interest of, the wider public. If the public official 
monopolizes service delivery, then the result is over supply and inefficiency (Blaise and 
Dion, 1992, Jackson, 1982). By contrast, if services are contracted out, then the pressure of a 
competitive market leads to improved performance.  For the public, who are the ultimate 
owners of the firm, the costs of monitoring this public-sector behaviour (e.g. information 
gathering, lobbying) are likely to offset the benefits (e.g. less taxes, or more efficient public 
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spending). This is not the case, however, for interest groups such as trade unions, which 
makes state-owned enterprises an easy target for rent-seeking activity. Thus, Public choice 
theorists concentrate on the process which generates demand and on its manipulation by 
management, in the face of efficiency monitoring difficulties or even disinterest on the part of 
the members of the polity.  
 
Drawing on the public choice literature, particularly the theory of bureaucracy associated 
with Niskanen (1968), bureaucrats and politicians who may be responsible for running 
publicly owned- utilities are not literally interested in the profitability of the enterprise or in 
minimising its costs. Rather, they may have the objective of maximising the budget of their 
department as it allows them to maximise departmental discretionary expenditure, which may 
be the function of the employee of the enterprise. In like manner, bureaucracy may be found 
within the utility where managers place a premium on their personal interest at the expense of 
the corporation or society (Pollitt, 1997). As described in Newbery and Green (1996, p. 58), 
Britain’s former generation and transmission monopoly, the CEGB, was inflexible, 
bureaucratic, secretive and largely out of political control, as such a bureaucracy had a 
tendency to build expensive nuclear and coal plants in a culture where engineering was the 
dominant discipline rather than finance.  Niskanen (1971, 1975) further argued that public 
firms will perform less efficiently than their private counterparts. The rationale behind 
Niskanen's argument is that, in terms of scale efficiency, it can be expected that publicly 
owned enterprises will not be scale efficient and would be expanded beyond the optimal 
level. 
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2.4   Empirical studies on the impact of reform 
The central objective of privatisation, restructuring, deregulation, and liberalising access to 
networks and markets all seek to improve operational and investment efficiency of regulated 
or state-owned industries (Newbery and Pollitt, 2007).  In developed economies, the 
emphasis is on raising productivity and reducing costs of production and this is reflected in 
the studies of power sector undertaken in these countries, which focus on performance at the 
enterprise level. Economic growth, distributional and poverty effects are important 
components in assessing the welfare impact of electricity reform in lower-income economies, 
although the relative weight that is given to each of these objectives will vary between 
countries and over time (Parker and Kirkpatrick, 2005). 
 
The methodologies often used to assess the impact of reform are based on price or cost 
comparisons in publicly-owned and privately-owned electric utilities which might not be 
sufficient to gauge a firm or industry’s economic performance accurately. It is possible that 
these financial indicators might be more a reflection of the distortions themselves rather than 
of the performance of the firm or industry in question. Moreover, in several literatures on the 
impact of the privatisation, restructuring, deregulation, and liberalising of the electricity 
industry, there are other approaches to the measurement of the impact of the power reform. 
The commonly used approaches are the econometric studies and the efficiency and 
productivity analysis They all, whether explicitly or implicitly, fully or partially aim to assess 
the impacts of electricity reform on price, generation investment, the productivity and 
efficiency of the electricity industry and the wider economy.  
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2.4.1   Econometric Studies 
Several econometric studies have investigated the impact of electricity reforms on price in 
developing and developed countries using regression analysis. One of the earlier studies is 
Steiner (2001) who investigates the impact of electricity market reform on final electricity 
prices using panel data for 19 OECD countries for the period 1986-1996. She tests the 
assumption that lower industrial electricity prices, lower industrial to residential price ratios 
and higher capacity utilization rate are expected to stem from liberalization, restructuring, and 
private ownership. She finds that regulatory reforms, in most cases, cause a decline in the 
industrial price and an increase in the price gap between industrial customers and residential 
customers, revealing that industrial customers have the advantages of receiving much lower 
end-user’s energy prices as a result of market reform.  On the contrary, the finding shows that 
unbundling of the vertical chain has no significant impact in lowering electricity prices but 
induced a lower industrial to residential price ratio and higher capacity utilization rates and 
lower reserve margins. In similar vein, Hattori and Tsutsui (2004) examine again the impact 
of the regulatory reforms on price in the electricity supply industry, using panel data for 19 
OECD countries for the period 1987–1999 and compares the results with an earlier study by 
Steiner. Consistent with Steiner (2000), they find that expanded retail access is likely to lower 
the industrial price and increase the price differential between industrial customers and 
household customers. They also find that the effect of unbundling on the level of industrial 
price is statistically insignificant. However, in contrast with Steiner (2000), they find that the 
introduction of a wholesale spot market did not necessarily lower the price and may possibly 
have resulted in a higher price.  
 
Nagayama (2007) examines how each policy reform measure influenced electricity prices 
using panel data for 83 countries during the period from 1985 to 2002. He finds that variables 
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such as the entry of independent power producers (IPP), unbundling of generation and 
transmission, establishment of a regulatory agency, and the introduction of a wholesale spot 
market have had a variety of impacts on electricity prices, some of which were at variance 
with expectations. The research findings also suggest that neither unbundling nor introduction 
of a wholesale pool market on their own necessarily reduces the electric power price and has 
a tendency for the price to raise in every market modelled. This result is also consistent with 
Nagayama (2009), where findings suggest that the development of liberalization models in 
the power sector does not necessarily reduce electricity prices using panel data from 78 
countries in four regions (developed countries, Asian developing countries, the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe, and Latin America) for the period from 1985 to 2003.  
 
Zhang, Parker and Kirkpatrick (2008) provide an econometric assessment of the effects of 
privatization, competition and regulation on the performance of the electricity generation 
industry using panel data for 36 developing and transitional countries covering the period 
1985–2003. They concluded that on their own privatization and regulation (PR) do not lead 
to obvious gains in economic performance, though there are some positive interaction effects. 
By contrast, introducing competition does seem to be effective in stimulating performance 
improvements in terms of greater electricity generation, generating capacity and improved 
labour productivity. Cubbin and Stern (2006) argue that both regulatory law and higher 
quality regulatory governance are positively and significantly associated with higher per 
capita generation capacity while controlling for privatization and competition in 28 
developing economies over 1980–2001. Jamasb and Pollitt (2007) demonstrate that the use of 
performance targets combined with a penalty and reward incentive regulation system has 
improved the quality of service in the UK distribution utilities. Erdogdu (2011) also examines 
the impact of electricity industry reforms on residential and industrial electricity price-cost 
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margins and their effect on cross-subsidy levels between consumer groups using panel data 
for 63 developed and developing countries covering the period 1982–2009. The study finds 
there is no uniform pattern for the impact of the reform process as a whole on price- cost 
margins and cross-subsidy levels as each individual reform step has a different impact on 
price-cost margins and cross-subsidy levels for each consumer and country group. 
 
2.4.2   Efficiency and productivity studies 
Efficiency and productivity studies are appropriate for evaluating how successfully inputs are 
converted into outputs in relation to best practices; hence the approach is relevant to the 
research study.  In line with widely cited methodology, there are two methods which have 
almost monopolised the vast literature on efficiency measurement, especially for the 
electricity supply sector. They are programming (non-parametric) or statistical (parametric) 
techniques. An increasing number of recent studies on the efficiency of the electricity sector 
are using frontier methods such as data envelopment analysis (hereafter, DEA) and stochastic 
frontier analysis (hereafter, SFA). DEA is a non-parametric technique which uses piecewise 
linear programming to calculate (rather than estimate) the efficient or best-practice frontier of 
a sample while SFA is a statistical technique which estimates the efficient or best-practice 
frontier of a sample. These have involved the estimation of both production and cost 
functions.  
 
Several empirical studies have examined the impact of reform on efficiency among publicly-
owned and privately-owned power plants. Kleit and Tecrell (2001) apply Bayesian stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA) that imposes concavity and monotonicity restrictions to study the cost 
efficiency of 78 US power plants operating in 1996. The study finds efficiency gains 
immediately after the deregulation and restructure of the electricity industry in the US.  
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Atkinso and Halabi (2005) develop a constrained cost-minimization model for thermal and 
hydro generation to obtain the shadow price of water and to determine the qualitative effect 
of these constraints on allocative efficiency. Using panel data from 1986–1997, they assess 
the economic efficiency of the hydro industry by estimating a stochastic distance frontier and 
price equations from the dual cost-minimization problem and found dramatic increases in 
technical change and productivity change, with positive efficiency change for all years after 
privatisation but the last. They equally observe a dramatic decline in allocative inefficiencies 
over the sample period and concluded that market reform plays an important role in 
increasing plant efficiency in Chile.  
 
Furthermore, Estachea and Martın (2005) analyse the impact of alternative regulatory 
regimes on the labour productivity of electricity distribution firms in Latin America. They 
find that incentive-based regimes lead to higher labour productivity than rate-of-return 
regulation, and privatized firms operating under rate of return have, at most, similar labour 
productivity as public firms. Scully (1998) tests the hypothesis that privatization is efficiency-
improving by estimating a translog cost function for all electrical supply firms in New 
Zealand over the period, and finds that the reforms had substantial cost-reducing effects. 
Economies of scale were found to exist over the entire size range of the firms. The reforms 
that were begun in 1988 had substantial cost-reducing effects. The reforms are found to have 
benefitted customers, with the real price of electricity falling 16.4 per cent over the period 
1982–94.  
 
Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson (1996) analyse productive efficiency in Swedish retail 
electricity distribution during 1970-1990. They examine whether ownership of the 
distribution companies has any systematic impact on efficiency, returns to scale and technical 
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change. The study shows that privately owned companies are relatively more efficient, and 
evidence of scale economies and technical progress. Weyman-Jones (1991) applies a non-
parametric linear programming methodology to measure productive efficiency of the 
regulated electricity distribution industry in England and Wales. The study finds that only 
five of the twelve boards are technically efficient, and that there are wide divergences in their 
performance.  
 
A few studies find that privatisation has no effect on productivity, for instance, See and 
Coelli (2014) measures the total factor productivity (TFP) growth of Tenaga Nasional Berhad 
(TNB) from 1975 to 2005 using the Tornqvist index method. The study finds no direct 
evidence that positive changes in productivity are attributable to industry restructuring and 
suggest that the partial privatisation of TNB and the introduction of private entry were 
insufficient to produce improved TFP performance. In the same vein, See and Coelli and See 
(2013) examine the total factor productivity (TFP) growth of the Malaysian electricity 
generation industry over the 1998 to 2005 period. The stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) 
approach is used to measure TFP change and decompose TFP growth into efficiency change 
and technical progress. They find that it achieved average annual TFP growth of 2.33 percent, 
with technical change contributing the most to the TFP growth over the eight-year period. 
They concluded that that there is no clear evidence indicating the role of privatisation in the 
change in productivity after the restructuring period. 
 
Filippini, Hrovatinc and Zoric (2004) carry out a study focusing on the efficiency and 
regulation of Slovenian electricity distribution. They estimate a cost frontier function on a 
sample of Slovenian electricity distribution utilities over the 1991–2000 period. The results 
show that Slovenian distribution companies are cost inefficient with average cost inefficiency 
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of distribution utilities in the sample being around 35%. Arocena & Waddams-Price (2002) 
examine generating efficiency of Spanish public and private electricity generators using data 
from 1984 – 1997. The research findings challenge some of the conventional wisdom on 
productive efficiency in the public and private sectors under both cost of service and 
incentive regulation as publicly owned generators were more efficient under cost of service 
regulation; private (but not public) firms responded to incentive regulation by increasing 
efficiency, bringing their productivity to similar levels. Pollitt (1995), using an international 
sample of electricity generation plants, detects small differences in productivity efficiency in 
favour of private plants of the order of 2 to 5 per cent, but publicly-owned plants had a higher 
variance in their efficiencies. 
 
Barros (2008) estimates changes in total productivity on the hydroelectric energy generating 
plants of the Portugal Electricity Company by means of data envelopment analysis (DEA). 
He concludes that some plants experienced productivity growth while others experienced a 
decrease in productivity. Estachea, Tovarc and Trujillo (2008) analyses efficiency levels in 
Africa’s electricity firms via a sample of 12 operators providing services in the 12 country 
members of the Southern Africa Power Pool between 1998 and 2005. Using a data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) decomposition to identify the sources of the changes in TFP, the 
results suggest fairly comparable levels of efficiency in the region and performance levels 
and evolution quite independent of the degree of vertical integration, the presence of a private 
actor, or the main sources of energy supply. The study concludes that no clear correlation 
could be associated with the adoption of reforms during the sample period. This is the first 
documented efficiency study on the electricity sector on Africa. 
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Meibodi (1998) estimates technical efficiency in electricity generation using Iranian data and 
data from the World Bank and arrives at a similar conclusion. The study suggests that market 
reforms, such as privatisation, are not a good choice to resolve industry problems and to 
reach the production frontier. Bishop and Thomas (1992) uses a weighted index approach to 
estimate the total factor productivity (TFP) of nine of the largest British enterprises 
nationalised industries, including the electricity industry from 1970 to 1990. The study did 
not find evidence of efficiency gains after the privatisation of the electricity industry.  
 
Similarly, Estache and Rossi (2005) shows for electricity distribution that privatized firms 
operating under rate-of-return regulation have, at most, similar labour efficiency as public 
firms. The result is controversial as the privatised firms do not show better improvements in 
labour efficiency than public firms. Hjalmarsson and Veiderpass (1992) also examines 
productivity growth of electricity distribution in Sweden on multiple output-input 
frameworks using DEA. The study indicates a higher rate of productivity growth due to 
economies of density when measured over a period of 17 years. The study shows further that 
there is no significant difference in productivity growth between types of ownership or 
economic organisation. 
 
There are also studies on international comparisons of electric utilities efficiency, for instance 
Hattori, Jamasb and Pollitt (2004) examine the relative performance of electricity distribution 
systems in the UK and Japan between 1985 and 1998 using cost based benchmarking with 
data envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) methods. The results 
suggest that the productivity gain in UK electricity distribution has been larger than in the 
Japanese sector. The findings further indicate that while both sectors exhibit efficiency 
improvements, the efficiency gap between the frontier firms and less efficient firms has 
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widened. Using data envelopment analysis (DEA), Vaninsky (2006) estimates the efficiency 
of electric power generation in the United States for the period of 1991 through 2004.  
Operating expenses and energy loss are used as inputs, utilization of net capacity, as an 
output. The results point to a relative stability in efficiency from 1994 through 2000 at levels 
of 99–100% with a sharp decline to 94–95% in the years following. The study of Hawdon 
(1996) for the productive efficiency of the power sector in 82 countries shows that the 
privatising group of eight countries exhibit significantly higher efficiency than the non-
privatising group.   
 
Domah (2002) conducts a comparative technical efficiency analysis of electricity generators 
in 16 small island economies using panel data, and two methodologies: data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). The results indicate no apparent 
differences in the production structure between islands and non-island electric utilities, nor 
any evidence suggesting that they are less technically efficient. He suggests that 
benchmarking of small islands, using non-island generating utilities as comparators, is both 
feasible and desirable given the lack of historical generation data for most small islands. 
Zhang and Bartels (1998) investigate the efficiency of the electricity distribution industries in 
Australia, Sweden and New Zealand by employing DEA to examine the effect of sample size 
on the mean productive efficiency of firms.   They find that as sample size increases the 
estimated mean technical efficiencies decrease generally. The rates of decrease also depend 
on the sample size. When sample size is small the rate is high and when size is large the rate 
is low. 
 
Several studies have also attempted to examine the productivity growth impact of 
privatisation including labour productivity measures. Privatization and the application of 
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high-powered regulatory mechanisms has led to improvements in labour productivity in 
electric distribution systems in England and Wales, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Peru, New 
Zealand and other countries (Newbery and Pollitt, 1997, Bacon and Beasant-Jones, 2001, 
Estache and Rodriguez-Pardina, 1998). Bishop and Thomson (1992) investigate labour 
productivity and total factor productivity of the British electricity supply industry before and 
after privatization over the period 1970 to 1990. The results are inconclusive as the electricity 
the industry was only privatized very late in the period studied (1989–90). The results in fact 
show that total factor productivity growth for the electricity supply industry was greater in the 
1970s than it was in the 1980s (2.3 percent on average versus 1.4 percent). Lawrence, Swan, 
and Zeitsch (1991) find that various state-owned components of the Australian electricity 
industry substantially improved their levels of productivity after structural reform in the 
1990s.  
 
Aghdam (2011) examines whether the Australian electricity industry’s efficiency measures 
truly improved as a result of the reform-driven changes using the Malmquist Total Factor 
Productivity Index approach. The results reveal that the productivity gains in the industry 
have been largely driven by technological improvements and, to a lesser extent, by reform-
induced comparative efficiency gains. The result further shows that, on average, at national 
level and for the entire industry, there are efficiency gains that, to large extent, can be 
attributed to functional unbundling and public corporatisation and, to a lesser extent, to 
market restructuring and privatisation. The results, however, reveal that the reform-driven 
changes have made an insignificant contribution to comparative efficiency at the level of 
thermal generation. See and Coelli (2009) examines TFP growth using Törnqvist index 
methods, finding that there is no direct evidence of productivity improvements attributable to 
privatization. They argue that it is not clear whether consumers have benefited from this, 
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since the Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) have generally been quite generous to the IPPs 
in terms of risk sharing and prices paid.  Abbott (2006) applies DEA Malmquist approach to 
estimate total factor productivity of the electricity supply industry over the period 1969 to 
1999.  The results indicate that there has been a substantial improvement in the performance 
of the industry since the mid-1980s and productivity performance of the industry did speed 
up after 1991.  
 
Although conventional wisdom has taken the superiority of private ownership for granted, the 
intellectual debate over the benefits of private over public ownership of productive resources 
remains inconclusive as empirical studies of the relative efficiency of public and private firms 
have often appeared to be inconsistent with the theoretical prediction (Kumhbakar and 
Hjalmarsson, 1998). Thus, there is no consensus on the impact of power sector reform based 
on the evidence from the country and firm-level studies.  However, many empirical studies 
have given credence and are broadly favourable to power sector reform, suggesting that 
deregulation; competition and privatisation often lead to improvements in production, 
productive efficiency, prices and service delivery, while also confirming that each of the 
policy reform instruments alone may not be sufficient to raise economic performance. It is 
not surprising that there is growing literature and empirical evidence on the impact of 
electricity sector reform where different reform activities are transforming the structure and 
the operating environment of the industry across many countries. A summary of the selected 
frontier empirical studies is presented in Table 2.1 where it reveals a mixed evidence of the 
impact of electricity reform on economic performance, an important justification that 
underpin a further study using latest development in frontier econometrics.   
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      Table 2.1: Selected past studies on efficiency & productivity  
 
Authors  Method(s)a Data Variable usedb 
 
Main findings 
Weyman-Jones 
(1991) 
DEA 12 UK electricity boards, 
1986/87 
O: Domestic sale, commercial   
     sale, industrial sales 
 
I:   Labour, capital 
 
(i) Only five of the twelve boards are 
technically efficient, with wide divergences 
in performance. 
Hjalmarsson and 
Veiderpass (1992) 
DEA 289 Swedish retail 
electricity distributors, 
1970-1986 
O: Low voltage electricity 
received by customers, high 
voltage electricity received by 
customers, number of   low    
voltage electricity customers, 
number of high voltage   
electricity   customers 
 
I:  Low voltage power lines, high 
voltage power lines, transformer 
capacity, hours worked 
(i)   High rate of productivity growth due to 
economies of density.  
(ii) No significant differences in 
productivity growth between different types 
of ownership or economic organization. 
Førsund and 
Kittelsen (1998) 
DEA 
Malmquist 
150 Norwegian 
electricity 
distributors,1983- 1989  
O: Distance index, number of   
customers, electricity delivered 
I: Capital, labour, energy loss, 
materials 
(i) Positive productivity growth averaging 
nearly 2% per year, and it is mainly due to 
frontier technology shift. 
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Kumbhakar and 
Hjalmarsson (1998) 
DEA 300 Swedish retail 
electricity distributors, 
1970-1990 
O: Low voltage electricity 
received by customers, high 
voltage electricity received by 
customers, number of low voltage 
electricity     customers, number of 
high voltage electricity customers 
I: Low voltage power lines, high 
voltage power lines, transformer 
capacity, Labour 
(i) Privately owned companies are relatively 
more efficient. 
(ii) The persistent efficiency differences 
between private and publicly owned firms 
indicate the impact of yardstick 
competition. 
 
Kleit and Terrell 
(2001) 
Bayesian SFA 74 US power generation 
plants, 1996 
O: Annual electricity output, peak   
   electricity output, cost 
     
I:  Wage rate, price of fuel, price 
of capital 
(i) Plants could reduce costs by up to 13% 
by eliminating production inefficiency. 
(ii) Most plants operate at increasing returns 
to scale, suggesting further cost savings 
could be achieved through increasing 
output. 
 
Arocena and 
Waddams-Price 
(2002) 
DEA 
Malmquist 
33 publicly and 
privately-owned power 
plants in Spain, 1984-
1997 
O: Electricity generated, 
availability, three pollutants (i.e. 
sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxide 
and particulates) 
I:   Nameplate generating capacity, 
labour, fuel 
(i) Publicly owned generators were more 
efficient under cost of service regulation. 
 
(ii) Private firms responded to incentive 
regulation by increasing efficiency, bringing 
their productivity to similar levels. 
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Domah, 2002 SFA and DEA 16 small islands’ 
generators and 121 US 
investor-owned utilities, 
1994-2000. 
O: Electricity generated 
I:  Labour, installed capacity, fuel 
consumption 
D: Per capital consumption of 
electricity, number of       
customer, capacity factor, Island 
dummy, connection dummy 
 
(i) No apparent differences in the 
production structure between islands and 
non-islands electric utilities. 
(ii)  No any evidence suggesting that they 
are less technically efficient. 
 
Estache et al. 
(2004) 
SFA and DEA 84 electricity distributors 
from 10 South American 
countries, 1994 – 2001. 
O: Number of customers, 
electricity sales, service area  
I: Distribution network length, 
transformer capacity, labour 
D: Resident sales share, GDP per 
capita 
(i) The levels of efficiency are not 
consistent across the different methods of 
frontier estimation 
Hattori et al (2004) SFA and DEA 21 utilities (12 UK RECs 
and 9 Japanese electric 
utilities), 1985-1998. 
O: Number of customers, 
electricity delivered 
I: Total expenditure, operating 
expenditure 
D: Customer density, load factor 
(i)  Despite both sectors exhibiting 
efficiency improvements, the efficiency gap 
between the frontier firms and less efficient 
firms has widened. 
(ii) Multiple techniques recommended in 
comparative analysis and in incentive 
regulation. 
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Lam and Shiu 
(2004) 
DEA and Tobit 
Regression 
30 provinces in China, 
1995-2000. 
O: Electricity generated 
I:   Nameplate generating capacity, 
labour, fuel 
D: Fuel efficiency, capacity 
utilisation, State Power    
Corporation control dummy 
(i) Technological change accounts for 
almost all the TFP growth.  
 
(ii) Municipalities and coastal provinces 
have higher technical efficiency and TFP 
growth  
Rungsuriyawiboon 
and Coelli (2004) 
SFA cost 
function, SFA 
input distance 
and Törnqvist 
index numbers 
61 electricity generation 
companies in the United 
States, 1986-1998. 
O: Net steam electric power 
generation 
I: Aggregate fuel, aggregate labour 
and maintenance, capital 
(i)  The results from the stochastic cost 
frontier are discarded because they are 
found to differ from those obtained using 
the other techniques.  
(i)  The introduction of incentive regulation 
has not had the desired positive effect upon 
the economic performance of the firms 
involved. 
 
Estache and Rossi 
(2005)  
DEA 
Malmquist 
127 electricity 
distributors from 14 
Latin American 
countries, 1994- 2001. 
Ed: Labour 
Ex: Number of customers, 
electricity delivered, service area, 
distribution network length 
(i)  Incentive-based regimes lead to higher 
labour productivity than rate-of-return 
regulation 
(ii) Privatized firms operating under rate of 
return have, at most, similar labour 
productivity as public firm 
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Atkinson and 
Halabi (2005)  
Stochastic 
distance frontier 
16 Chilean hydroelectric 
power generation plants, 
1986-1997.  
O: Price and quantity of electricity 
outputs 
I:  Price and quantity of labour, 
capital and water, hydrologic 
conditions 
(i) Increases in technical change and 
productivity change, with positive 
efficiency change for all years but the last.  
(ii) Dramatic decline in allocative 
inefficiencies over our sample period. The 
overutilization of labour to capital and water 
has fallen over time. 
Abbott (2006) DEA 
Malmquist 
6 states in Australia, 
1969-1999. 
O: Electricity consumed 
I: Capital, labour, energy used 
 
(i) Substantial improvement in the 
performance of the industry since the mid-
1980s which pre-dates the substantial 
restructuring of the industry in the early 
1990s.  
Barros (2008) DEA 
Malmquist and 
censored Tobit 
regression 
25 hydroelectric plants in 
Portugal, 2001-2004. 
O: Electricity generated, capacity 
utilisation 
I: Capital, labour, operation costs, 
investment costs 
D: Plant location, plant age, 
variation in rainfall, time trend 
(i) Hydroelectric plants exhibit on average 
improvements in technical efficiency as 
well as technological change.  
(ii) The increase in technological change is 
higher than the increase in technical 
efficiency  
Estache et al. 
(2008) 
DEA 
Malmquist 
12 electricity utilities 
from 12 Southern 
African countries, 1998-
2005. 
O: Electricity generated, number 
of customers, electricity sales 
I: Nameplate generating capacity, 
labour 
(i)   Fairly comparable levels of efficiency 
in the region and performance levels.  
(ii)   No clear correlation could be 
associated with the adoption of reforms 
during the last decade of the sample period 
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Chang et al. (2009) SFA cost 
function 
25 power plants in 
Taiwan, 1995-2006. 
O: Electricity generated 
I: Fuel price, price of capital 
investment, wage 
(i)  The power generation exhibits an 
increasing return to scale across all the 
power plants based on the pooled data.  
(ii)  Installed capacity has a positive 
relationship with cost efficiency while the 
factor of working years has a negative 
relationship 
Jaraite and Di 
Maria (2012) 
DEA 
Malmquist 
24 European Union 
countries, 1996-2007. 
O: Electricity generated, CO2 and 
SO2 emissions 
I: Nameplate generating capacity, 
labour, fuel 
(i)  Carbon pricing led to an increase in 
environmental efficiency and to an outward 
shift of the technological frontier 
See and Coelli 
(2012) 
SFA  14 thermal power plants 
in Malaysia, 1998-2005.  
 
O: Electricity sent-out 
I:  Undepreciated capital stocks, 
labour, fuel, other    inputs 
D: Ownership, plant type, plant 
size, age, fuel type, time trend 
(i) Ownership, plant size and fuel type have 
a significant influence on technical 
efficiency levels.  
(ii) Publicly-owned power plants obtain 
lower average technical efficiencies than 
privately-owned power plants.  
(ii) Larger power plants with more capacity 
and gas-fired power plants tend to be more 
technically efficient than other power 
plants.  
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See and Coelli 
(2014) 
 
Törnqvist index 
numbers 
14 thermal power plants 
in Malaysia, 1975-2005. 
 
O: Electricity delivered to 
residential customers, electricity 
delivered to household customers 
I:  Undepreciated capital stocks, 
labour, fuel, other   inputs 
D: IPP participation, change in 
ownership, plant capacity 
utilisation, time trend 
 
(i) No direct evidence of productivity 
improvements attributable to the industry 
restructuring.  
a DEA: data envelopment analysis, SFA: stochastic frontier analysis 
bO:Output(s), I:Input(s), Ed: Endogenous, Ex: Exogenous, D: explanatory variables 
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2.5 Review of Methodological Framework 
 
 
2.5.1   Background 
The concept of technology in general, and production function in particular, is one of the foundations of 
contemporary microeconomic theory. The neoclassical economics assumption is hinged on the premise that 
all decision-making units are producing the maximum possible output, minimising cost or maximising profit 
given the limited input, and that producers are always efficient. However, in real terms, producers are not 
always fully efficient, and even some proponents of the rational choice theory admit there are cases in the 
real world where some firms perform better than others. Thus, in reality some firms produce more with less. 
This difference may be explained both in terms of efficiency, as well as by unforeseen exogenous shocks 
outside the firm’s control. 
 
In welfare economics, the Pareto-Koopmans concept of efficiency (Pareto (1909), Koopmans (1951)) says 
“A DMU (decision-making unit) is fully efficient if and only if it is not possible to   improve any input or 
output without worsening some other input or output (Cooper et al. (2007)”. Koopmans (1951) in his rather 
technical monograph provided a definition of technical efficiency whereby “A possible point in the 
commodity space is called efficient whenever an increase in one of its coordinates (the net output of one 
good) can be achieved only at the cost of a decrease in some other coordinate (the net output of another 
good).” Thus, a technically inefficient producer could produce the same outputs with less of at least one 
input, or could use the same inputs to produce more of at least one output.  
 
Debreu (1951) adopted this definition to develop a measure of efficiency, or, quoting his words: “A 
numerical evaluation of the "dead loss" associated with a non-optimal situation (in the Pareto sense) of an 
economic system is sought. Use is made of the intrinsic price systems associated with optimal situations of 
whose existence a noncalculus proof is given. A coefficient of resource utilization yielding measures of the 
efficiency of the economy is introduced. The treatment is based on vector-set properties in the commodity 
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space”. The overarching idea of this measure is to determine the distance between the produced output and 
the output that could have been produced given the inputs. Shephard (1953) used the same concept of 
distance functions, yet he stated it as a problem if a producer uses too many inputs to produce a certain 
amount of outputs.  
 
This can thus be viewed as a dual orientation of the technical component of economic efficiency, which is 
output augmenting and input conserving. With an output augmenting orientation their measure is defined as 
the maximum radial expansion in all outputs that is feasible with a given technology and inputs. With an 
input conserving orientation their measure is defined as (one minus) the maximum equiproportionate (i.e. 
radial) reduction in all inputs that is feasible with a given technology and outputs. In both orientation, a 
value of unity indicates technical efficiency because no radial adjustment is feasible, and a value different 
from unity indicates the severity of technical inefficiency. 
 
Farrell (1957), drawing from the work of Koopmans (1951) and Debreu (1951), explains how to define 
efficiency and productivity and how to calculate the benchmark technology and efficiency measures. His 
work on efficiency measures is based on radial uniform contractions or expansions from inefficient 
observations (observed) to the frontier (unobserved). The production frontier is specified as the most 
pessimistic piecewise linear envelopment data (the function being as close as possible to the observations) 
and the frontier is calculated solving a system of linear equations, obeying the two conditions on the unit 
isoquant (slope not positive and no observed point lies between it and the origin; input-oriented approach). It 
introduced a method to decompose the overall efficiency of a production unit into its technical and allocative 
components.  
 
2.5.2   Efficiency and Productivity  
In measuring the economic performance of a producer, it is commonplace to describe them as being more or 
less “efficient,” or more or less “productive.” They reflect the overall performance of the production unit. 
Basically, productivity examines the relationship between input and output in a given production process 
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(Coelli, Rao et al. 1998). Thus, productivity is expressed in an output versus input formula for measuring 
production activities. It does not merely define the volume of output, but output obtained in relation to 
resources employed. This ratio is easy to calculate if the producer uses a single input to produce a single 
output. In the more likely event that the producer uses several inputs to produce several outputs, the outputs 
in the numerator must be aggregated in some economically sensible way, as must the inputs in the 
denominator, so that productivity remains the ratio of two scalars. The concept of productivity is closely 
related to that of efficiency. While the terms productivity and efficiency are often used interchangeably, 
efficiency does not have the same precise meaning as productivity. 
 
However, efficiency of a producer means comparison between observed and optimal values of its output and 
input. This involves comparing observed output to maximum potential output obtainable from the input, or 
comparing observed input to minimum potential input required to produce the output, or some combination 
of the two. In these two comparisons the optimum is defined in terms of production possibilities, and 
efficiency is technical. It is also possible to define the optimum in terms of the behavioural goal of the 
producer. In this event efficiency is measured by comparing observed and optimum cost, revenue, profit, or 
whatever goal the producer is assumed to pursue, subject, of course, to any appropriate constraints on 
quantities and prices. In these comparisons the optimum is expressed in value terms, and efficiency is 
economic (Fried et al, 2008).  
 
The productivity of a firm can be improved by producing goods and services with fewer inputs or producing 
more output for the same input. Therefore, increasing productivity implies either more output is produced 
with the same amount of inputs or that fewer inputs are required to produce the same level of output (Roger, 
1998). The highest productivity (efficient point) is achieved when maximum output is obtained for a 
particular input level. Hence, productivity growth encompasses change in efficiency, and increasing 
efficiency definitely raises productivity (Roger, 1998). 
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2.5.3   Type of Efficiency 
The literature often distinguishes between the two types of productive efficiency: technical and allocative. 
The technical component refers to the ability to avoid waste by producing as much output as input usage 
allows, or the ability to obtain the maximum potential firm performance (output) from a given set of input. 
In contrast, allocative efficiency reflects the firm’s ability to use optimal quantities, given their respective 
prices and technologies adopted; it mainly depends on the prices related to the factors of production.  
Allocative and technical efficiency combine to provide an overall economic efficiency measure. When a 
firm archives maximum output from a particular input level, with the utilisation of input at least cost, it is 
considered an overall efficient firm. Generally, the term efficiency refers to technical efficiency which is 
considered as a basic measurement for determining the level of adoption in innovative technology, and over 
production efficiency (Lambarra, et al., 2007).   
 
Debreu (1951) and Farrell (1957) introduced a measure of technical efficiency. Their measure is defined as 
one minus the maximum equiproportionate reduction in all inputs that still allows continued production 
given outputs. A score of unity indicates technical efficiency because no equiproportionate input reduction is 
feasible, and a score less than unity indicates technical inefficiency. Following Farrell (1957), measuring 
technical efficiency can be obtained by using input and output quantity without introducing prices of these 
inputs and outputs. Technical efficiency can be decomposed into three components: scale efficiency (the 
potential productivity gain from achieving optimal size of a firm), input congestion (increase in some input 
and decrease in some) and pure technical efficiency. To decompose technical efficiency into its three 
components it is required to relax the long run assumptions, allowing for variable returns to scale (increasing 
or decreasing) and situations of weak disposability where an increase in one input can lead to a decrease in 
output. 
 
Suppose that a firm produces a single output (Y) by using two inputs (𝑋1 and 𝑋2) under the assumption of 
constant returns to scale. In figure 2.1 below, the SS’ curve denotes the amount of 𝑋1  and 𝑋2 to produce an 
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identical amount of Y, which represents the isoquant of fully efficient firms could allow measurement of 
technical efficiency. Therefore, efficiency is determined by the points B and E located on the SS’ curve.  All 
things being equal, every combination along the isoquant (for instance, point B and E) is considered efficient 
while any point above is considered as technical inefficiency since the producer can contract the use of input 
without reducing the output level. Isocost line WW’ represents the proportion of the input prices. A producer 
attains minimum cost at point E where line WW’ is tangent to the curve SS’. Assuming a producer uses 
quantities of inputs 𝑋1
∗ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑋2
∗  at point A to produce a unit of output is technically inefficient, and the 
technical inefficiency of the firm could be represented by the distance AB. The technical efficiency (TE) of 
a producer is most commonly measured by the ratio: 
 
           TE =  𝑂𝐵 𝑂𝐴⁄  
    
 Figure 2.1: Technical and allocative efficiency 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             
 
The ratio has a value between zero and one, and thus indicates the degree of technical efficiency of the 
productive unit. A value of one is an indication of full technical efficiency of the producer. For example, a 
producer is technically efficient at point B because it is a fully efficient point which is located on the 
isoquant curve SS’. This implies the producer chooses the right input mix. Given the input price ratio, 
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represented by the slope of isocost line WW’, the allocative inefficiency can be estimated since by moving 
from B to E, the same level of output could be produced at a lower cost through adjustment of input use until 
the ratio of marginal products equal the ratio of input prices. The allocative efficiency of a productive unit 
operating a point A is measured by the ratio: 
 
AE =  𝑂𝐶 𝑂𝐵⁄  
 
If the producer is economically efficient, i.e. both technically and allocatively efficient, the total economic 
efficiency is given by the ratio: 
 
EE = 𝑂𝐶 𝑂𝐴⁄ .  
 
This ratio is termed Farrell as the overall efficiency of the producer is measured by the product of technical 
and allocative efficiency. Farrell laid a foundation for the efficient frontier as a benchmark for measuring the 
relative performance of a productive unit. In Farrell’s approach, the measurement of economic efficiency is 
linked to the use of a frontier production function, in opposition to the notion of average performance 
underlying most of the econometric literature on the production function up to the time of Farrell’s 
contribution. 
 
2.6   Efficiency Measurement Techniques  
A number of analytic techniques have been developed to estimate production frontiers and the associated 
inefficiency of individual organisations. These techniques can be broadly categorised into two; parametric 
methods which use econometric techniques to estimate the parameters of a pre-defined functional form, and 
non-parametric methods which place no conditions on the functional form, but the efficiency level is 
calculated from the sample observation. The parametric methods include deterministic frontier analysis 
(DFA) and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), which are similar to the conventional regression analysis.  
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2.6.1   Non-Parametric Technique  
The non-parametric methods or the mathematical programming technique is mainly data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) which deals with multiple input and multiple output production technologies. The 
methodology was introduced by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978). DEA applies operational programs to 
construct a piecewise linear production possibility frontier. DEA uses a linear combination of inputs and 
outputs of best practices producers to come up with an efficient frontier. The producers that lie on the 
frontier are the efficient ones while those that do not lie on the frontier can be considered as inefficient and 
individual inefficiency scores will be calculated for each one of them. The main advantage of DEA is that no 
explicit specification functional form needs to be imposed on the data, and DEA can easily accommodate 
multiple outputs. Moreover, a DEA model does not require any assumption about the distribution of 
efficiency scores, as in the case of stochastic frontier analysis. This implies that efficiency estimates may be 
biased under the production process which is largely involved stochastic elements.  
 
2.6.2   Parametric Technique  
Parametric frontier techniques are models in which a parametric functional form for the production frontier 
function is assumed.  There are various methods of estimating the production frontier function, and the 
choice of method may depend on whether distribution assumptions on the error components are made or not. 
Parametric frontiers can be broadly classified into two approaches. One approach is not to make specific 
distribution assumptions on the error components and this approach is labelled as the deterministic frontier 
analysis. Another is to impose very specific distribution assumptions on the error components, and apply 
maximum likelihood (ML) methods, and this approach is labelled as the stochastic techniques frontier 
analysis. Unlike the DEA or other non-parametric models where the efficient frontier is calculated from the 
data sample, the parametric frontier is econometrically estimated based on the notion that a functional 
mathematical relationship exists between inputs and output. Parametric frontiers can be broadly classified 
into deterministic and stochastic techniques. 
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2.6.2.1   Deterministic Frontier Analysis 
In deterministic frontier analysis, variation resulting from noise and inefficiency are lumped together and are 
attributed to inefficiency. Aigner and Chu (1968) generalise the work of Debreu and Farrell by providing 
deterministic approach to the measurement of technical efficiency. They suggest linear and quadratic 
programming as estimation methods that would constrain the ‘residuals’ to be positive. Alternatively, OLS 
can be used since the slope parameters are estimated consistently. Two econometric methods are introduced 
in deterministic frontier analysis; corrected ordinary least squares (COLS), by Winsten (1957), and modified 
ordinary least squares (MOLS) deterministic frontier analysis, by Afriat (1972) and Richmond (1974). Both 
models estimate parameters by OLS in the first step and adjust the intercept parameter in the second step.  
 
Adopting cross-sectional models and supposing that output is completely determined by the inputs used via 
a production function that is the same for all producers in an industry, then the production frontier can be 
written as   
 
                                          𝑦𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖;  𝛽)                                                                                                           (2.1) 
 
Where 𝑦𝑖 is the scalar output of producer 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, … 𝑁, 𝑥𝑖  is a vector of K inputs used by the producer 𝑖, 
𝑓(𝑥𝑖;  𝛽) represents the production function (e.g a Cobb-Douglass or transcendental logarithm production 
function, and 𝛽 is a vector of technology parameters to be estimated which is equal to all the producers. The 
𝛽 can be estimated by carrying out a regression of 𝑦 on 𝑥𝑖. This regression is expected to give a good fit 
since a complete determination is assumed. In this model, all producers produce exactly the output that is 
predicted by the amount of input and the production function. If efficiency is included in the model, the 
producers may produce less than the value predicted in Equation (2.1). This can be done through 
multiplication of the right-hand side of the Equation by a parameter that has a value between zero and one. 
The production frontier model can be re-written as 
 
                                               𝑦𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖;  𝛽). 𝑇𝐸𝑖                                                                                               (2.2) 
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In equation (2.2), the  𝑇𝐸𝑖 is the output-oriented technical efficiency of producer 𝑖.  The production function 
𝑓(𝑥𝑖;  𝛽)  is deterministic as no stochastic error component is involved. The slack between an observed level 
of output and the frontier is attributed solely to inefficiency. If the producer lies on the frontier, the 
efficiency term is equal to one, and is fully efficient. However, if the efficiency term is less than one, it will 
provide a shortfall between the observed output and the maximum feasible output, hence the producer is 
inefficient. Therefore, the output-oriented technical efficiency  𝑇𝐸𝑖 can be defined as the ratio of actual 
output level to maximum level of output feasible under the current technology used. 
 
                                               𝑇𝐸𝑖 =  
𝑦𝑖
𝑓(𝑥𝑖;  𝛽)
                                                                                                          (2.3) 
  
In equation (2.3), the entire shortfall of observed output from maximum feasible output is attributed to 
technical inefficiency. Moreover, the production function with its parameters is needed in other to estimate 
the technical efficiency component (TE) and for estimating the parameters of the production function, TE is 
needed. A deterministic frontier can be estimated by re-writing (2.3) as 
 
                                             𝑦𝑖 = 𝑓(𝒙𝒊;  𝜷). 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑢𝑖)                                                                                     (2.4)                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
Since 𝑇𝐸𝑖 =  𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑢𝑖), this can be transformed into logarithms as ln𝑇𝐸𝑖 = −𝑢𝑖, and subsequently gives 
𝑢𝑖 = −𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐸𝑖  ≈ 1 − 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐸𝑖 .   
 
By adopting logarithms in both sides, the deterministic production frontier model becomes 
 
                                        ln 𝑦𝑖 = ln𝑓(𝒙𝒊;  𝜷)−𝑢𝑖                                                                                              (2.5) 
 
Having parameterised the production technology, both corrected least square (COLS) and modified ordinary 
least squared (MOLS) can be employed to estimate the parameter vector and to obtain the estimates of  𝑢𝑖. 
Then estimates of firm specific technical efficiency can be derived by 𝑇𝐸𝑖 =  𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑢𝑖)   
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However, a deterministic frontier assumes deviations from the production frontier are under the control of 
the firm. Attributing all deviations from the production frontier to inefficiency is conceptually unappealing. 
Statistical noise such as favourable or unfavourable external events (luck, weather, regulatory-competitive 
environments and other random conditions) would be inappropriately treated as inefficiency, suggesting that 
deterministic measures of inefficiency are subject to severe distortions. This approach is also criticised in so 
far as no allowance is made for measurement error and other statistical noise as error arising from specifying 
an appropriate functional form is also regarded as inefficiency by deterministic techniques.  
 
2.6.2.2   Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
Stochastic frontier analysis is an alternative approach that addresses the criticism of the deterministic 
frontier approach by allowing the specification of both inefficiency and random error. The approach makes 
an observed firm face the production frontier which is randomly constructed by incorporating random 
conditions such as luck, sampling and mis-specification errors, which might be outside the firm’s control, 
but which are lumped together and are attributed to inefficiency in the deterministic approach (Førsund and 
Jansen, 1977; Greene, 2009).  SFA has the potential of capturing the effects of random unobserved firm 
specific factors. Moreover, it also allows hypothesis testing and inferences to made on the parameters and 
the inefficiency term of the model4. However, SFA requires a number of assumptions, which often make it 
less-flexible and restrictive. Proponents argue in favour of stochastic frontier models because of the superior 
conceptual treatment of noise.  
 
Following the seminal paper of Farrell (1957), stochastic frontier analysis has its origins in two papers 
independently and simultaneously proposed by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), and Meeusen and van 
don Broeck (1977), followed by Battese and Corra (1977). These three original works develop a concept of 
the composed error: a conventional symmetrically distributed stochastic component that is known as random 
error term (as it captures the all the statistical noise, measurement error and exogenous shocks outside the 
control of the producers over their production) and a stochastic, component with a one-sided distribution 
                                                          
4  Although this property is not only peculiar to SFA but also COLS approach.  
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error term, which represents the inefficiency. Since then, the SFA has been developed by several 
collaborators and there have been a vast range of applications in the literature5: Schmidt and Lovell (1979), 
Jondrow et al. (1982), Greene (1980), Stevenson (1980), Lee (1983), Koop and Diewert (1982), Pitt and Lee 
(1981), Schmidt and Sickles (1984), Cornwell, Schmidt and Sickles (1990), Kumbhakar (1990) Battese and 
Coelli (1992), among other researchers. 
 
Beginning with a cross-sectional data set, consider the stochastic production frontier equation 
 
                                              𝑦𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖;  𝛽). 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑣𝑖). 𝑇𝐸𝑖                                                                                 (2.6) 
 
where [𝑓(𝑥𝑖;  𝛽). 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑣𝑖) ]  represents the stochastic production frontier.  
 
Since 𝑇𝐸𝑖 =  𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑢𝑖) , producer’s actual output can be written as  
 
                                                𝑦𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑥𝑖;  𝛽). 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑣𝑖−𝑢𝑖)                                                                                (2.7) 
 
The logarithm transformation of the production technology can be written  
 
                                            ln 𝑦𝑖 = ln𝑓(𝒙𝒊;  𝜷) + 𝜀𝑖                                                                                        (2.8) 
 
                                                     𝜀𝑖 =  𝑣𝑖−𝑢𝑖                                                                                                     (2.9) 
 
Where 𝜀𝑖 is a composed error consisting of two components 𝑣𝑖 and 𝑢𝑖 .  𝑣𝑖  represents the two-sided noise 
component and 𝑢𝑖 is the nonnegative technical inefficiency term. The noise component 𝑣𝑖 is assumed to be 
independently, identically distributed and symmetrically distributed independently of 𝑢𝑖. Thus, the error 
term is not symmetrical, since 𝑢𝑖 ≥0. Suppose that 𝑣𝑖 and 𝑢𝑖  are distributed independently of 𝑥𝑖 , 
estimation of equation (2.8) by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) gives consistent estimates of the parameters 
except 𝛽0, since E(𝜀𝑖) = −𝐸( 𝑢𝑖) ≤ 0. Producer specific estimates of inefficiency can be achieved by 
Jondrow, Lovell, Materov and Schmidt (1982) who suggested estimating the expected value of the 
                                                          
5 For literature surveys see Greene (1993) 
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inefficiency component conditional on the measured overall error. This procedure requires distributional 
assumptions on both error components. If distributional assumptions are made about 𝑣𝑖 and  𝑢𝑖, therefore, 
the technical inefficiency term  𝑢𝑖 can be extracted from the estimates of  𝜀𝑖. 
 
The assumption made about the distribution of the noise term 𝑣𝑖 is 𝑣𝑖~𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑉
2). However, there is no 
consensus about the assumption for the distribution of the technical inefficiency term  𝑢𝑖 .  Aigner, Lovell 
and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and van don Broeck (1977) proposed two type of distributions i.e. half-
normal and exponential distribution, a later extension generalised these distributions into truncated normal at 
zero as proposed by Stevenson (1981) and Gamma distribution proposed by Green (1990). In the case of a 
normally distributed noise term, inefficiency term, and a half-normally distributed inefficiency term, the 
stochastic production frontier model given in equation (2.8) is assumed to have the following distribution 
assumption. 
i) 𝑣𝑖~𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑉
2) 
ii) 𝑢𝑖~𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝑢
2), i.e., a nonnegative half normal; 
iii)  𝑣𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑢𝑖   are distributed independently of each other, and of the regressors. 
 
Following a half normal distribution, the density function of u≥0 is given by the function  
 
                                𝑓(𝑢) =
2
√2𝜋𝜎𝑢
. exp {−
𝑢2
2𝜎𝑢2
}                                                                                             (2.10) 
 
The density function of v is  
                             𝑓(𝑣) =
1
√2𝜋𝜎𝑣
. exp {−
𝑣2
2𝜎𝑉
2}                                                                                                  (2.11) 
 
Building on the independence assumption, the joint densities function of 𝑣𝑖 and 𝑢𝑖, is the product of their 
individual density function and is given as 
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                               𝑓(𝑢, 𝑣) =
2
2𝜋𝜎𝑢𝜎𝑣
. exp {−
𝑢2
2𝜎𝑢2
−
𝑣2
2𝜎𝑣2
}                                                                                 (2.12) 
 
Given that ε = v-u, the joint density function of u and ε is 
                
                            𝑓(𝑢, 𝜀) =
2
2𝜋𝜎𝑢𝜎𝑣
. exp {−
𝑢2
2𝜎𝑢2
−
(𝜀 + 𝑢)2
2𝜎𝑣2
}                                                                        (2.13) 
 
By integrating 𝑢 out of 𝑓(𝑢, 𝜀), the marginal density function of 𝜀𝑖 is obtained as follows;  
 
    𝑓(𝜀) = ∫ 𝑓(𝑢, 𝜀)𝑑𝑢
∞
0
  =
2
√2𝜋𝜎
. [1 − Φ (
𝜀𝜆
𝜎
)] . exp {−
𝜀2
2σ2
}                                         
 
                                   =
2
𝜎
. ø (
𝜀
𝜎
) . Φ (−
𝜀𝜆
𝜎
) ,                                                                                                       (2.14) 
 
 
Where 𝜎 = (𝜎𝑢
2 + 𝜎𝑣
2)1/2, 𝜆 = 𝜎𝑢 𝜎𝑣⁄  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛷[. ] 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ø[. ] are the standard normal cumulative distribution 
and density functions. 
 
The asymmetry of the distribution of the error term is a central feature of the frontier model. A central 
parameter in normal -half normal distribution can be represented by the asymmetry parameter: 
 
                                                                            𝜆 =  
𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑣
                                                                                      (2.15)   
 
The larger λ is, the more marked the asymmetry will be. On the other hand, if λ is equal to zero, then the 
symmetric error component dominates the one-side error component in the determination of 𝜀𝑖. Thus, the 
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composed error term is explained by the random disturbance 𝑣𝑖 , which follows a normal distribution. εi 
therefore has a normal distribution. The distribution parameters 𝜎𝑢,  𝜎 𝑣 and 𝜆  are estimated along with the 
technology parameters 𝛽 by maximum likelihood.  To test the hypothesis that λ = 0, we can compute a Wald 
statistic or likelihood ratio test both based on the maximum likelihood estimator of λ6.  Coelli (1995) tests as 
equivalent hypothesis 𝛾 = 0  against the alternative 𝛾 > 0, where  
 
                                                         𝛾 =  
𝜎𝑢
𝜎𝑢 + 𝜎𝑣
                                                                                             (2.16) 
 
A value of zero for the parameter 𝛾 indicates that the deviations from the frontier are entirely due to noise, 
while a value of one would indicate that all deviations are due to technical inefficiency. 
 
The technical inefficiency can be obtained after obtaining the estimates of the technology parameters.  
Estimation of  𝑢𝑖   is the central focus of the analysis. With parameter estimates in hand, one can obtain a 
direct estimate of 𝜀𝑖 =  𝑣𝑖−𝑢𝑖 . An estimate of 𝑢𝑖 can be obtained from the conditional distribution of 𝑢𝑖 
given 𝜀𝑖 as it contains whatever information concerning 𝑢𝑖  𝑖𝑛 𝜀𝑖. Jondrow et al. (1982) and Battese and 
Coelli (1988) proposed two estimators widely used in the literature. 
 
Jondrow, Lovell, Materov and Schmidt (1982) showed that if  𝑢𝑖 ∼ 𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝑢
2), the conditional distribution 
of u given 𝜀 is  
                             𝑓(𝑢⎹𝜀) =  
𝑓(𝑢, 𝜀)
𝑓(𝜀)
=  
1
√2𝜋𝜎∗
. 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−
(𝑢 − 𝜇∗)
2
2𝜎∗2
} [1 − 𝛷 (−
𝜇∗
𝜎∗
)]⁄                                  (2.17) 
 
Where 𝜇∗ =  −𝜀 𝜎𝑢
2 𝜎2⁄  and 𝜎∗
2 =  𝜎𝑢
2𝜎𝑣
2 𝜎2⁄ .  They posit that since 𝑓(𝑢 𝜀⁄ ) = is distributed as 
𝑁+(𝜇∗, 𝜎∗
2), the mean of the distribution can serve as a point estimator of  𝑢𝑖. This is given by 
 
                                                          
6 Coelli (1995) shows that the likelihood ratio test is asymptotically distributed as a mixture of Chi squared distributions 
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      𝐸(𝑢𝑖⎹𝜀𝑖) = 𝜇∗𝑖 + 𝜎∗ [
ø(− 𝜇∗𝑖 𝜎∗⁄ )
1 − 𝛷(− 𝜇∗𝑖 𝜎∗⁄ )
]  =  𝜎∗ [
ø(𝜀𝑖𝜆 𝜎⁄ )
1 − 𝛷(𝜀𝑖𝜆 𝜎⁄ )
−  (
𝜀𝑖𝜆
𝜎
)]                                              (2.18) 
 
Thus, the estimate of  𝑢𝑖 can be obtained from  
 
                                                     𝑇𝐸𝑖 = exp(−û𝑖) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝐸(𝑢𝑖⎹𝜀𝑖) )                                                           (2.19)                                           
 
Battese and Coelli (1988) proposed the alternative point estimator for 𝑇𝐸𝑖: 
 
                𝑇𝐸𝑖 = 𝐸(exp −𝑢𝑖)⎹𝜀𝑖) = [
1 − 𝛷(𝜎∗ − 𝜇∗ 𝜎∗⁄ )
1 − 𝛷(− 𝜇∗ 𝜎∗⁄ )
] . exp  {−𝜇∗ +  
1
2
𝜎∗
2}                                       (2.20)  
 
 
Note that the estimator is the expected value of the inefficiency term given an observation on the sum of 
inefficiency and the firm specific heterogeneity.  Their estimator is preferred to the JLMS estimator because 
1− 𝐸(𝑢𝑖⎹𝜀𝑖) only includes the first order term in the approximation of the power series exp(−𝑢𝑖⎹𝜀𝑖) . 
Therefore, the B&C estimator can be viewed as the exact expression of the mean of the distribution of 
technical efficiency, whereas the JLMS estimates are the exact expressions of the central tendencies of a 
first order approximation to the distribution of technical efficiency7.  
 
Regrettably, these estimators suffer a major drawback as they are not consistent estimators of 𝑢𝑖 , even 
though they are unbiased since, regardless of N, the variance of the estimate remains zero. In addition, there 
are two more drawbacks for cross-sectional stochastic production frontier models. There is a problem of 
assumption that technical inefficiency is independent of the inputs and the assumptions on the distributional 
forms of statistical noise and technical inefficiency. 
 
 
 
                                                          
7 See Green (1993) for detail 
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2.6.2.3   Frontier Panel Data Model 
The panel data framework allows us to resolve many drawbacks associated with the cross-sectional 
stochastic frontier models as noted by Schmidt and Sickles (1984). One advantage of using panel data is that 
it gives an opportunity to examine and model behaviour of technical efficiency over time. The three 
problems can be corrected by using panel data. In particular, panel data allows relaxation of the assumption 
of independence and avoidance of distribution assumptions (or testing them when they are imposed). 
Furthermore, with panel data it is possible to construct estimates of the efficiency levels of each producer 
that are consistent as the number of observations per producer increases. This means that inefficiency can be 
estimated more precisely. Repeated observations on a sample of producers in panel data estimation 
techniques help to correct all these limitations.  The general panel data model can be given as: 
 
                              𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖  + 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝜷  +  𝑣𝑖𝑡−𝑢𝑖𝑡         𝑖 = 1, . … … … … , 𝑁;  𝑡 = 1 … … … … 𝑇.                      (2.21) 
 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡 represents the log output of producer,  𝑥𝑖𝑡 denotes the vector of independent variables (e.g. 
inputs), 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝜷  represents a linear parameter technology, 𝑣𝑖𝑡 represents random noise,  𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the nonnegative 
technical inefficiency term and 𝛼𝑖 represents the individual effect.   
 
In a panel data production frontier model, there is a distinction concerning the time dimension of the 
inefficiency term. In the first case technical efficiency can vary across producers, but is assumed to be kept 
constant over time for each producer, whereas in the second case, technical efficiency not only is allowed to 
vary across producers but also allowed to change over time for each producer. 
 
2.6.2.3.1   Time-Invariant Technical Efficiency 
In this section a model with time-invariant inefficiency will be presented. 
Equation (2.21) can be rewritten as follows: 
 
                                 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = α + 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝜷  +  𝑣𝑖𝑡−𝑢𝑖          𝑖 = 1, . … … … … , 𝑁;  𝑡 = 1 … … … … 𝑇.                      (2.22) 
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 By defining 𝛼𝑖 = α − 𝑢𝑖  we have the standard panel data model 
 
                                  𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖   + 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝜷  +  𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                                                                  (2.23) 
  
It is assumed that the v is 𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑁 (0, 𝜎𝑉
2),  and is uncorrelated with the inputs x. This last assumption is needed 
for the consistency of the within and generalised estimators of the parameter vector β, which are derived 
from the OLS estimation of equation (2.23) under a fixed effect model and a random effect model 
respectively. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
2.6.2.3.2   The Fixed-Effects Model 
The fixed effects model in the frontier modelling framework is based on Schmidt and Sickles’s (1984) 
treatment of the linear regression model.  The model assumes no distributional assumption about the 
inefficiency  𝑢𝑖 and therefore, 𝑢𝑖 is allowed to be correlated with the inputs or with the random noise 𝑣𝑖𝑡 . 
The inefficiency  𝑢𝑖 (and therefore the intercept 𝛼𝑖) is treated as fixed, as simple producer specific intercept 
parameters to be estimated which can be estimated consistently and efficiently by ordinary least squares. 
 
The basic framework is a linear model can be written as equation (2.23), 
 
                 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼  + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝜷  + 𝑣𝑖𝑡             𝑖 = 1, . … … … … , 𝑁;  𝑡 = 1 … … … … 𝑇   
 
Where 𝛼𝑖 = α − 𝑢𝑖  is reinterpreted and treated as the producer specific intercept or inefficiency term. 
Estimation is accompanied in three equivalent ways: 1) by suppressing the constant term and adding a 
dummy variable for each of the N producers, or 2) by keeping the constant term and adding (N-1) dummies, 
or 3) using the within transformation, in which all the data will be expressed in terms of deviation from 
producer means and the N intercepts are recovered as means of the producer specific residuals. Each variant 
is referred to as least square with dummy variable (LSDV for short).  
 
By applying ordinary least squares estimation to the model (2.23) combined for all T observations for each 
producer, the within estimator is derived. It can be shown to be consistent as either N or T goes to infinity. 
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Once the within estimator is available, an estimate of the intercept terms 𝛼𝑖    is possible, by employing 
normalisation, 
 
                                                            ?̂? =  𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖 ?̂?𝑖                                                                                       (2.24) 
 
 and then ?̂?𝑖 can be estimated as 
 
                                    ?̂?𝑖 =  ?̂? − ?̂? 𝑖 ,                              𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁                                                                (2.25) 
 
 
which ensures that  ?̂?𝑖 ≥0. Therefore, the producer-specific but time-invariant technical inefficiencies are 
then given as: 
                                                                          𝑇𝐸𝑖 =  exp (−?̂?𝑖)                                                                            (2.26) 
 
This means that the production frontier is normalised in terms of the best producer in the sample and 
technical efficiency of other producers is measured relative to the efficient producer. A significant advantage 
of the fixed effects model lies in the fact that the statistical properties of the estimators obtained do not 
depend on the assumption of uncorrelatedness of the regressors with the firm effects. A necessary condition 
for the estimate of the intercept ?̂? 𝑖 to be consistent is that the time period is very large, T →∞, whereas to 
have an accurate normalisation and a consistent separation of intercept α from the one-sided inefficiency 
terms 𝑢𝑖 , a large number of production units N →∞ is required. This means that if N is small it is only 
possible to compare efficiencies across production units, but not to an absolute standard (100%). In contrast 
to the MLE cross-sectional model, the fixed-effects panel data model provides the consistent estimates of 
producer specific technical efficiency. 
 
A major problem associated with the within estimation of fixed-effects is that if important time-invariant 
regressors are included in the frontier model, these will show up as inefficiency in equation (2.22). Thus, the 
estimated fixed effects ( 𝑢𝑖) , will capture both variation across producers in time-invariant technical 
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efficiency and all phenomena that vary across producers but are time invariant for each producer. 
Unfortunately, this occurs whether or not the other effects are included as regressors in the model. This 
problem can be solved if one makes assumptions about the uncorrelatedness of effects and regressors and/or 
about the distribution of the effects, which leads us to the random-effects panel data model. 
 
2.6.2.3.3   The Random -Effects Model 
The first developments in the sphere of random effect models were the work of Pitt and Lee (1981). The 
authors considered a model with distributional assumptions about the error term where 𝑣𝑖𝑡  ~ 𝑖𝑖𝑑 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
 2) 
represents noise, 𝑢𝑖  ~ 𝑖𝑖𝑑 𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝑢
 2) represents the distribution of the non-negative component which 
translates the inefficiency of the model and  𝑢𝑖  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑣𝑖  are distributed independently of each other, and of the 
regressors.  
 
As referred in Greene (2003), the random effects model is obtained by assuming that the inefficiency terms 
𝑢𝑖 are treated as one sided i.i.d. random variables, uncorrelated with the regressors  𝑥𝑖𝑡 and the statistical 
noise 𝑣𝑖𝑡  for all t.  This modification allows one to include some time invariant variables in the model. 
However, no distributional assumptions for the effects are made., although they are still assumed to be 
nonnegative. The assumption of the random noise 𝑣𝑖𝑡 is as before. With these modifications of assumptions, 
the model (2.19) is rewritten in a slightly different way, defining: 
 
                              𝛼∗ =  α −  µ, where µ =  E(𝑢𝑖)  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑢𝑖
∗  =  𝑢𝑖 −  µ     
 
                                 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = [α − E(𝑢𝑖)] + 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝜷  +  𝑣𝑖𝑡− [𝑢𝑖 −  E(𝑢𝑖)]  
 
                                       = 𝛼∗   + 𝑥𝑖𝑡𝜷  +  𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖
∗                                                                                      (2.27) 
 
The parameters are estimated by generalised least squares (Greene, 2003). If further distributional 
assumption on the error components is tenable (e.g. normal and half normal distributional assumption used 
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in Pitt and Lee, 1981 and normal and truncated normal distributional assumption used in Kumbhakar, 1987 
and Battese and Coelli, 1988), the parameters are estimated. 
 
Then random-effects producer specific technical efficiency can be estimated either by using the two-step 
generalised least square (GLS) method, or by the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) method if further 
distributional assumption on the error components is tenable (e.g. normal and half normal distributional 
assumption used in Pitt and Lee, 1981 and normal and truncated normal distributional assumption used in 
Kumbhakar, 1987 and Battese and Coelli, 1988). In the case of no distributional assumption made on the 
error component, GLS is the appropriate method of estimating the producer specific technical efficiency. 
This method involves, at first stage, OLS estimation to obtain parameters estimates.  Schmidt and Sickles 
(1984) show that when N is small, GLS is useless unless 𝜎𝑣
 2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜎𝑢
2  are known a priori. They also illustrate 
that when both N and T are large, GLS is feasible, but less efficient than the within estimator. Therefore, in 
the unrealistic case when the covariance matrix of the error 𝑣𝑖𝑡 −  𝑢𝑖
∗ is known, that is, 𝜎𝑣
 2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜎𝑢
2 are 
known, the GLS estimator for ?̂?∗ and 𝛽′ is BLUE (best linear unbiased estimator), and consistency is 
ensured either when N → ∞ or when T → ∞. However, in the more realistic case that  𝜎𝑣
 2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜎𝑢
2  are not 
known, it is appropriate to use the feasible generalised least square method (FGLS) to estimate the variance 
of the compound error ?̂?[ɛ] = ?̂?[𝑢𝑖] + ?̂?[𝑣𝑖] = ?̂?𝑢
 2 + ?̂?𝑣
 2.  The FGLS estimator is still consistent as N → ∞, if 
it is based on the consistent estimates of 𝜎𝑣
 2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜎𝑢
2 . Estimates of the producer specific technical efficiency 
are then obtained by 
                                                                      TE𝑖 = exp{−?̂?𝑖}                                                                                    (2.28)  
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ ?̂?𝑖 = max{ ?̂?𝑖
∗} −  ?̂?𝑖
∗ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑢𝑡
∗ resulting from the average values residuals of FGLS estimation: 
 
                               ?̂?𝑖
∗ =  
1
𝑇
 ∑ (𝑦𝑖𝑡 −𝑡  ?̂?
∗ −  ?̂?x𝑖𝑡)                                                                                         (2.29)  
 
                         where 𝛼∗ =  𝛼 − µ 
In these conditions, the estimate obtained for individual inefficiency translates, just as in the case of the 
fixed effect model, the distances between the intercept of each productive unit and the greatest intercept 
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relating to the productive unit considered efficient. The frontier is then moved to the greatest intercept 
estimated in the sample. The BLUP (best linear unbiased predictor) by Lee and Griffiths (1979) is an 
alternative estimator of ?̂?𝑖
∗ and is given by: 
 
                               ?̂?𝑖
∗ =  − [
?̂?𝑢
2
𝑇?̂?𝑢2 +  ?̂?𝑣2
] . ∑(𝑦𝑖𝑡 −
𝑡
 ?̂?∗ −  ?̂?x𝑖𝑡)                                                                         (2.30) 
 
The GLS estimator for both estimates from the above two alternative methods are consistent when 
simultaneously N and T → ∞ and the variances of the two components of the error term are known. When 
these are unknown, it is necessary that T → ∞ for the variance of u to be estimated consistently and that N 
or T → ∞   for the FGLS estimator of the variance.   
 
The advantages off ered by the FGLS estimator are that it allows the inclusion of time-invariant variables 
and gives more efficient estimates than the within estimator of the fixed. Nevertheless, the efficiency 
advantage depends on the orthogonality of the regressors and the inefficiency term, a condition which is 
often rejected by the data; in addition, the gain in terms of efficiency vanishes as T → ∞. For this reason, 
Schmidt and Sickles (1984) point out that the random eff ects model is more suitable for short panels in 
which correlation is empirically rejected. Hausman and Taylor (1981) developed a test, based on Hausman 
(1978), for the hypothesis that the error terms are uncorrelated with the regressors. If the null hypothesis of 
non-correlation is accepted, a random-eff ects model is chosen, otherwise a fixed-eff ects model is 
appropriate. The Hausman test is a test of the orthogonality assumption that characterises the random eff ects 
estimator, which is defined as the weighted average of the between and the within estimator. 
 
The main advantage in using panel data is that it allows relaxation of the strong assumptions required in the 
estimation of a cross-section, namely assumptions on the independence of the components of the error term 
and the regressors, and distributional assumptions on the inefficiency and statistical noise. However, it is still 
possible to make these assumptions in the panel data context and therefore a maximum likelihood estimator 
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of the parameters of the model can be obtained. Thus, MLE can be used to estimate the time-invariant 
producer specific technical efficiency. 
 
2.6.2.3.4   Time-Varying Technical Inefficiency 
The earlier models (Pitt and Lee, 1980; Schmidt and Sickles, 1984; Kumbhakar, 1987; among others) treated 
technical efficiency as time invariant. The fixed effect, random effect and maximum-likelihood models 
share the assumption of time invariance in the component of technical inefficiency i.e. technical inefficiency 
is constant over time. This assumption is restrictive, and it seems quite implausible to assume that technical 
efficiency would remain constant over a prolonged period of time when the environment is competitive. 
When the panels are short, it may make sense to assume time invariant technical efficiency.  However, when 
there are sufficient data observed on the same productive unit in various period time lengths, it is more 
appropriate to consider the time effect on this component error while analysing the efficiency of a 
productive process. In these circumstances, it is improbable that the productive unit continues to present a 
constant measurement of inefficiency in all the periods of observing their production.  Thus, subsequent 
researchers allowed technical efficiency to vary over time, but they model efficiency as a systematic 
function of time (Kumbhakar, 1990; Cornell, Schmidt and Sickles, 1990; Battese and Coelli, 1992; Lee and 
Schmidt, 1993). 
 
Cornwell et al. (CSS) (1990) and Kumbhakar (1990) were among the first to propose a stochastic production 
frontier panel data model with time variation technical efficiency. Suppose the assumption of a time 
invariant inefficiency term is relaxed, the model to be examined is then given as: 
 
                                 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 −  𝛽x𝑖𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                                                                  (2.31) 
 
Where 𝛼𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑡 −  𝑢𝑖𝑡 and 𝑢𝑖𝑡  ≥ 0. Given that it is possible to estimate 𝛼𝑖𝑡, the following estimate of 
inefficiency term can be obtained: 
 
                                  ?̂?𝑖𝑡 =  ?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?𝑖𝑡                                                                                                            (2.32) 
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where  ?̂?𝑡 =  𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖 (?̂?𝑖𝑡). 
 
As in the time-invariant panel data models, the estimation of time-varying panel data models also involves 
two stages just as in the time-invariant panel data models.  In the first stage the objective is to estimate the 
parameters describing the structure of production technology, while in the second stage producer specific 
technical efficiency is obtained. The problem with the specification above is that with an N × T panel, it is 
impossible to estimate all of the N · T intercepts, the K slopes and 𝜎𝑣
 2. To avoid this problem, Cornwell, 
Schmidt and Sickles (1990) replace 𝛼𝑖𝑡 with a flexible parameterized function of time with parameters that 
vary over time. The quadratic form of this is: 
 
                                  𝛼𝑖𝑡 =  𝜃𝑖1 +  𝜃𝑖2𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖3𝑡
2                                                                                            (2.33) 
 
As a result, only N.3 intercepts need to be estimated with this setup. Additionally, the ratio of parameters to 
be estimated to the number of observations is  
(3N+K+1)
𝑁
𝑇. 
 
Analogous to time-invariant panel data model, either fixed-effects or random-effects approach can be used 
to model the time-varying technical efficiency. If the distributional assumption is tenable, maximum 
likelihood approach can be pursued as well. The FE model has two methods for obtaining technical 
efficiency depending on the size of  
𝑁
𝑇
. In the first attempt suggested in CSS (1990), If the ratio is relatively 
large, it provides a path to allow technical efficiency to vary both over producers and over time, then the 
𝑢𝑖𝑡’s are deleted from equation (2.26). The slopes are estimated from the residuals, and the residuals are 
regressed on a constant, t and 𝑡2 to obtain the estimates of 𝜃𝑖1,  𝜃𝑖2 and 𝜃𝑖3. This procedure will produce a 
value for ?̂?𝑖𝑡 being 
 
                             ?̂?𝑖𝑡 =  θ̂𝑖1 + θ̂𝑖2𝑡 + θ̂𝑖3𝑡
2                                                                                                  (2.34) 
In the second procedure, as suggested by Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), if  
𝑁
𝑇
 is relatively small, then the 
𝑢𝑖𝑡’s are included in the model. In this case, the parameters of equation (2.34) are estimated as the 
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coefficients of dummies interacted with t and 𝑡2. This will give a similar estimated form of the intercepts. 
The estimated intercepts determine  ?̂?𝑖𝑡, which is equal to 
 
                               ?̂?𝑖𝑡 =  𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖 (?̂?𝑖𝑡) − ?̂?𝑖𝑡                                                                                                   (2.35) 
 
Finally, technical efficiency be estimated by using the analogous procedure provided for time-invariant 
fixed-effects model for a specific producer in period t,  
 
                                𝑇𝐸𝑖 =  exp (−?̂?𝑖)                                                                                                           (2.36) 
 
Similar to the time-invariant fixed-effects model, the time-varying fixed-effects model cannot handle the 
potential existence of time-invariant regressors. As a result of this, CSS also produce a time-varying 
random-effects model to incorporate the time-invariant regressors. The RE model is estimated in almost 
exactly the same manner as the time invariant case. The GLS estimator is used and consistency hinges on 
the uncorrelatedness of u, v and the regressors. For a large T, it has the same properties as the time invariant 
model and is less efficient than the FE method. There are alternative formulations for modelling the time 
varying 𝑢𝑖𝑡. Lee and Schmidt (1993) specify 𝑢𝑖𝑡 as 
 
                                    𝑢𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼(𝑡)𝑢𝑖                                                                                                               (2.37) 
 
where 𝛼(𝑡) is a function of a set time dummy variables. Varying technical efficiency can be estimated using 
both fixed- and random-effects models, in which 𝛼𝑡s are treated as coefficients of the (fixed or random) 
effects 𝑢𝑖  .  Once the 𝛼𝑡s and the 𝑢𝑖 are estimated, 
 
                                ?̂?𝑖𝑡 =  𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖 (?̂?𝑡?̂?𝑖) − ?̂?𝑡?̂?𝑖                                                                                           (2.38) 
 
Thus, 𝑇𝐸𝑖 =  exp (−?̂?𝑖)   can be obtained from the equation. The specification has the advantage of 
allowing technical efficiency to vary over time and it is more flexible than the CSS model since it does not 
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restrict 𝑢𝑖𝑡 to any particular parametric term. The problem with this approach lies in the fact that it is 
nonlinear and requires a more complicated estimator.  
 
Kumbhakar (1990) specifies a form of 𝛼(𝑡) to be  
 
                         𝛼(𝑡) = [1 + exp(𝛾𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡2)]−1                                                                                         (2.39) 
 
                    where 0 ≤ 𝛼(𝑡) ≤ 1 
 
and 𝛼(𝑡) can be monotonically increasing or decreasing, concave or convex depending on the signs and 
magnitudes of the parameters 𝛾 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛿. Principally, Kumbhakar’s specification only requires two additional 
parameters to be estimated, γ and δ, compared to N ⋅3 additional parameters in CSS model and T-1 
additional parameters in Lee and Schmidt model.  
 
Kumbhakar (1990) and Battese and Coelli (1992) proposed alternative parameterization which specify a 
form of  𝛼(𝑡)  to be 
 
                             𝛼(𝑡) = [exp −𝜂(𝑡 − 𝑇)]                                                                                                      (2.40) 
 
where 𝛼(𝑡) is non-negative and decreasing at an increasing rate if 𝜂 > 0, increasing at an increasing rate if 𝜂 
< 0 and constant if 𝜂 = 0. The case in which 𝜂 is positive is likely to be appropriate when producers improve 
their level of technical efficiency over time. The exponential specification of the behaviour of the producer 
effects over time (equation (2.40) is a rigid parameterization in that technical efficiency must either increase 
at a decreasing rate (𝜂 > 0), decrease at an increasing rate (𝜂 < 0) or remain constant (𝜂 = 0). In order to 
allow greater flexibility in the nature of technical efficiency, a two-parameter specification would be 
required. An alternative two-parameter specification of 𝛼(𝑡) proposed by Battese and Coelli (1992) allows 
the nonmonotonic variation of technical efficiency and is defined as: 
 
                          𝛼(𝑡) = 1 + 𝜂1(𝑡 − 𝑇) +  𝜂2(𝑡 − 𝑇)
2                                                                               (2.41) 
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where 𝜂1and 𝜂2 are unknown parameters. This model permits firm effects to be convex or concave, but the 
time-invariant model is the special case in which 𝜂1 = 𝜂2 = 0. 
 
2.6.2.3.5   Model That Separate Firm Heterogeneity from Inefficiency 
A notable drawback of the above time-invariant and time-varying panel data models is their limitation in the 
presence of unobserved time-invariant heterogeneities. In the time-varying fixed- and random-effects model, 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 is supposed to capture all but only time-invariant and time-varying inefficiency. In the presence of any 
time-invariant heterogeneity, they will be absorbed into 𝑢𝑖𝑡. Thus, any time-invariant heterogeneity will be 
pushed into α𝑖 and ultimately into ?̂?𝑖 .  Like the time-invariant fixed-effects model, the time-varying fixed-
effects model cannot include any time-invariant heterogeneity due to the LSDV estimator as well. Therefore, 
the above panel data models must be modified to address the presence of time-invariant heterogeneities.  
Greene (2005a, b) explored the issue by reformulating the stochastic frontier specifically with the 
introduction of the ‘true’ (in his term) fixed-effects and random-effects model for panel data. The proposed 
models, viz., the ‘true-fixed’ and ‘true random’ effects frontier models separate producer effects (fixed or 
random) from inefficiency, where inefficiency can either be iid or can be a function of exogenous variables8.  
 
The ‘true’ fixed-effects following Greene (2005) is written as 
 
                                        𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖   + 𝜷𝑥𝑖𝑡   +  𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                               (2.42) 
where  𝛼𝑖   is the producer specific intercept intended to capture all the time-invariant heterogeneities. This 
form retains the distributional assumptions of the stochastic frontier model, allows for freely time varying 
inefficiency, and allows the heterogeneity term to be correlated with the included variables. Regressors, 
inefficiency term and random error term are mutually uncorrelated. Within groups the least squares 
estimation of this model still produces consistent estimates of β, but loses the important information in the 
model about 𝑢𝑖𝑡 . Maximum likelihood estimation is considered for the estimation of the model. Unlike the 
                                                          
8 Battese and Coelli (92) or Greene (2005) models have become popular among researchers because they are less restrictive in that they both 
allow inefficiency to change over time. 
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usual fixed-effects specification, in which the fixed effects are interpreted as inefficiency, the fixed effects in 
Greene’s model represent the unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
An alternative proposed by Greene (2005) is a ‘true’ random effects form. It is specified as 
 
                               𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼  +  𝜔𝑖+𝜷𝑥𝑖𝑡   +  𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                         (2.43) 
 
𝑢𝑖𝑡, 𝑣𝑖𝑡 and 𝜔𝑖 are assumed to be uncorrelated with each other. In the “true” random-effects model,  𝜔𝑖 
(which is assumed to have an iid normal distribution) is a time- invariant and producer-specific random term 
variable meant to capture unobserved heterogeneity or producer specific heterogeneity. Time variation in 
inefficiency is achieved by removing restrictions on 𝑢𝑖𝑡 and allowing it to vary unsystematically through 
time9  
 
The model of Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson10 (1993) is essentially that in equation (2.43). However, their 
interpretation and estimation method differ substantially. While in Greene’s ‘true’ random-effects model, 
MLE is used straightforwardly to estimate all the parameters Each of our formulations reinterprets the time 
invariant term as firm specific heterogeneity, rather than as the inefficiency. If, in fact, the inefficiency for 
any firm is time invariant, or nearly so, the models will accommodate that without assuming it. Kumbhakar 
and Hjalmarsson (1993) use a two-stage estimation strategy in which within group (LSDV) OLS or feasible 
GLS is used to estimate parameters followed by MLE of 𝑣𝑖𝑡 and 𝑢𝑖𝑡  with distributional assumption 
provided.  
 
2.6.2.3.6   Model Separate Persistence and Time-Varying Inefficiency  
Although some of the models discussed above (Greene (2005) The “true fixed effect” and “true random 
effect” models) can separate firm-heterogeneity from time-varying inefficiency, these models fail to 
consider persistent technical inefficiency. Recognizing the extent of persistence inefficiency is essential, 
                                                          
9 Detailed steps of MLE estimation are provided in Greene (2005:24-25). 
10 See Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000 for detail. 
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particularly in short panels, because it shows the effect of input like management (Mundlak, 1961) as well as 
other unobserved inputs which vary across firms but not over time. Therefore, provided there is a change 
that affects the management style of individual firms, such as a change in government policy toward the 
industry, a change in firm-ownership etc., it is improbable that the persistent inefficiency components will 
change. By contract, the residual components of inefficiency might change over time without any change in 
the operation of the firm. Hence, a clear distinction between persistent and residual components of 
inefficiency is important in efficiency analysis in that a utility generator might eliminate part of its 
inefficiency by removing some of the short-run rigidities, while some other sources of inefficiency might 
stay with the firm over time.  Unless persistent inefficiency is reduced, utility generators might not be able to 
survive in the long run, especially if competitors are more efficient.                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
Kumbhakar, Lien and Hardbaker (2014), (KLH, hereafter) deals with the persistent inefficiency by 
specifying a four-way error component model. The model separates time-invariant (persistent) inefficiency 
components from time-invariant heterogeneity. The model is a modified and extended version of a model 
proposed by Kumbhakar, and Heshmati (1995), in which technical inefficiency is assumed to have a 
persistent firm-specific (time-invariant) component and a time-varying residual component. The extended 
model includes separate four components; two which are stochastic inefficiency terms (residual and 
persistent inefficiencies) and the other two are time invariant heterogeneity and idiosyncratic error terms. 
The four-way error component model written as follows; 
 
                                     𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝐱′𝑖𝑡𝜷 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                   (2.44)         
 
where 𝜇𝑖, is the inter-firm unobserved heterogeneity, which is a time-invariant random error assumed to be a 
zero mean, constant variance normally distributed random variable, 𝜇𝑖~𝑁𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎𝜇
2),  𝑣𝑖𝑡  is the idiosyncratic 
error, which is a time-varying random error assumed to be a zero mean, constant variance normally 
distributed random variable, 𝑣𝑖𝑡~𝑁𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎𝑣
2).  𝜂𝑖 is time-invariant inefficiency, which is a time-invariant 
random error assumed to be a zero mean, constant variance normally or exponentially distributed random 
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variable truncated below at zero, 𝜂𝑖~𝑁𝑖𝑑
+(𝜇, 𝜎𝜂
2) or 𝑓(𝜂) = 𝜎𝜂𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝜎𝜂
2𝜂). 𝑢𝑖𝑡 time-varying inefficiency, 
which is a time-varying random error assumed to be a zero mean, constant variance normally or 
exponentially distributed random variable truncated below at zero, 𝑢𝑖𝑡~𝑁𝑖𝑑
+(𝜇, 𝜎𝑢
2) or 𝑓(𝑢) =
𝜎𝑢𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝜎𝑢
2𝑢).  
 
2.6.2.3.7   Stochastic Frontier Models with Heteroscedasticity  
The original half normal model of Aigner et al. (1977) is based on the assumptions that the 𝑣𝑖𝑡 and the 
pretruncated 𝑢𝑖𝑡 are homoscedastic, that is, both parameter 𝜎𝑣
2 and 𝜎𝑢
2 are constant. However, there may be 
no reason to assume that this is so in reality. Heteroscedasticity can appear in either of the error components, 
and it affect inferences concerning production technology parameters, as well as the parameters of either 
error component. Wang and Schmidt (2002) posit that unlike a classical linear regression model in which 
heteroscedasticity affects only efficiency of the estimators and not their consistency, ignoring 
heteroscedasticity leads to inconsistent parameter estimates. The summary of the consequences of ignoring 
the heteroscedasticity as discussed in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, section 3.4) are as follows: (a) ignoring 
heteroscedasticity of the symmetric error term 𝑣𝑖𝑡 gives consistent estimates of the frontier function 
parameters (β). Heteroscedasticity refers to models in which variances are functions of covariates that are 
both firm specific and time varying, except that the intercept (𝛼) is downward biased. Estimates of technical 
efficiency will also be biased. (b) ignoring heteroscedasticity of the one-sided technical inefficiency error 
component 𝑢𝑖𝑡  causes biased estimates of both the parameters of the frontier function and the estimates of 
technical efficiency. Moreover, the idiosyncratic error component might be heteroscedastic if the sources of 
noise vary with the size of the producers, and the inefficiency error component might be heteroscedastic, as 
expected, if the sources of the inefficiency vary with the size of producers. Thus, it is desirable to examine 
the sources of consequences of heteroscedasticity in ether of the error component.  
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Extending the half normal model of Aigner et al. (1977) to allow for heteroscedasticity in both the one-sided 
technical inefficiency error component and in the symmetric noise term. This model is frequently termed the 
doubly heteroscedastic model in the literature. It is specified as; 
                                                  𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 −  𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                         (2.45)        
                𝑢𝑖𝑡~ 𝑁
+(𝜇, 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2) =  𝑁+(𝜇, exp ( 𝜔𝑢0 + 𝒛𝑢,𝑖𝑡
′  𝝎𝒖 ))                                                               (2.46)   
                           𝑣𝑖𝑡~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣,𝑖𝑡
2 ) =  𝑁(0, exp ( 𝜔𝑣0 + 𝒛𝑣,𝑖𝑡
′  𝝎𝒗 ))                                                      (2.47)   
In the variance function  𝜔𝑢0  is a constant term, the 𝒛𝑢,𝑖𝑡
′  vector includes exogenous variables associated 
with variability in the technical inefficiency function, and  𝝎𝒖 is the corresponding coefficient vector. 
Similarly,  𝜔𝑣0  is the constant term, the vector 𝒛𝑣,𝑖𝑡
′  includes exogenous variables (that can be time varying) 
associated with variability in the noise term, and  𝝎𝒗 is the corresponding coefficient vector. 
 
Caudill and Ford (1993); Caudill et al. (1995); Hadri (1999) propose that heteroscedasticity                                     
can be parameterised by a vector of observable variables and associated parameters. This involves using 
possible to use (2.45)–(2.47) and changing (2.46) to  𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 
                                         𝑢𝑖𝑡~ 𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2) =  𝑁+(0, exp ( 𝜔𝑢0 + 𝒛𝑢,𝑖𝑡
′  𝝎𝒖 ))                                        (2.48) 
            
Alternatively, we can consider a further generalization in which both the mean and variance of 𝑢  are 
functions of 𝑧 variables (Wang 2002) 
 
          𝑢𝑖𝑡 ~ 𝑁
+( 𝜇𝑖𝑡, 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2) =  𝑁+( 𝛿0 + 𝒛𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛿, (exp ( 𝜔𝑢0 + 𝒛𝑢,𝑖𝑡
′  𝝎𝒖 ))                                                    (2.49) 
Wang (2002) showed that parameterizing both the mean and variance of the one-sided technical inefficiency 
error component allows non-monotonic efficiency effects, which can be useful for understanding the 
relationships between the inefficiency and its exogenous determinants. The models of Huang and Liu (1994) 
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and Battese and Coelli (1995), in which variances are assumed to be constant, are special cases of the Wang 
model.  
 
2.6.3   Distance Functions 
The methodological review of the frontier techniques above is centred on the production technology 
specification with one output and multiple inputs. However, when there are many outputs, another approach 
that has proved useful to the multiple output production function is provided by the distance function. An 
advantage of using the distance function is that it does not require price data or explicit behavioural 
assumptions. This can be compared with another alternative approach where output prices and behavioural 
assumptions are used to estimate a multiple output production function by modelling both technical and 
allocative efficiency (Kumbhakar et al, 2015). The two approaches to modelling distance functions are the 
input distance function and output distance function, which are discussed below. 
 
2.6.3.1   Input Distance Function 
The input distance suggests the degree to which an input exceeds the input requirement for production of 
output. Shephard's (1953) input distance function can be algebraically expressed as: 
 
                                            𝐷𝐼(𝒚, 𝒙) = {𝜌 ∣ 𝑓(𝒙 𝜌⁄ ) ≥ 𝑦}𝜌
max                                                                         (2.50)         
 
 
It is clear that  𝐷𝐼(. ) ≥ 1.  Also,    𝐷𝐼(. ) is homogenous of degree 1 in 𝒙, and concave in 𝒙. If there are 
multiple output and input, the input distance function is defined as;  
 
                                              𝐷𝐼(𝒚, 𝒙) = {𝜌 ∣ 𝑓(𝒙 𝜌⁄ )  ∈  𝐿(𝒚)}𝜌  
max                                                                 (2.51)         
 
Where 𝐿(𝒚) is the input requirement set.  McFadden (1978) indicates that in order for the technology to 
qualify for an input-oriented distance frontier, the following regularity properties must ensures:  𝐷𝐼(. ) must 
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be non-decreasing in 𝒙, homogeneity of degree 1 in feasible input vector 𝒙, concave in 𝒙 and non-increasing 
in y. Figure 2.2 illustrates the case of  two inputs and a single output. 
 
  Figure 2.2: Input Distance Function: Two Inputs and a Single Output 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
The input distance function is a function of x and y which can be only be separated by the imposing the 
homogeneity restriction. One way of imposing these restrictions is to normalize the function by one of the 
inputs Thus, for example, 𝐷 = 𝑓(𝒚, 𝒙) is an input distance function if it homogenous degree of one in 𝒙. 
This can be written as; 
 
                                                                   
𝐷
𝑥1
= 𝑓 (
𝑥2
𝑥1
, … ,
𝑥𝑘
𝑥1
, 𝒚)                                                                           (2.52) 
 
Specifying input distance function in translog functional form we can write the distance function  𝐷 = (𝒚, 𝒙) 
as; 
                                      𝐷𝐼𝑥1
−1 = 𝑓(𝑥,̃ 𝑦)        where ?̃?  (
𝑥2
𝑥1
, … ,
𝑥𝑘
𝑥1
)                                                             (2.53)   
𝒙2 
𝐿(𝒚) 
𝒙1 
𝒙
𝜌
 
A 
𝐎 
B 
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Taking the log of both sides give ln𝐷𝐼 − ln𝑥1 =  ln𝑓(𝑥,̃ 𝑦). Assuming a translog functional form on 𝑓(𝑥,̃ 𝑦) 
yields 
 
                                  ln𝐷𝐼 − ln𝑥1 = 𝛼0 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=2
ln?̃?𝑘 + ∑ 𝛼𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1
ln𝑦𝑚   
                 + 
1
2
[∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑙ln?̃?𝑘ln?̃?𝑙 +
𝑙𝑘
∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑚𝑛ln𝑦𝑚ln𝑦𝑛
𝑛𝑚
]  
                                                           + ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝑚 ln?̃?𝑘ln𝑦𝑚
𝑚𝑘
                                                                              (2.54)                
 
where ?̃?𝑘 = 𝑥𝑘 𝑥1⁄  
The required symmetry restrictions for the translog function are.  
𝛽𝑘𝑙 = 𝛽𝑙𝑘, 𝑘, 𝑙 = 1,2, … 𝑘  , and 𝑦𝑚𝑛 = 𝑦𝑛𝑚, 𝑚, 𝑛 = 1,2, … 𝑀   
To make this distance function stochastic a random error term, v, is added. Furthermore, denoting ln𝐷𝐼 =
𝑢 ≥ 0 and re-arranging it to the right-hand side of the equation yields an estimable equation in which the 
error term is   𝑣 − 𝑢. 
                                           −ln𝑥1 = 𝛼0 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=2
ln?̃?𝑘 + ∑ 𝛼𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1
ln𝑦𝑚  
       + 
1
2
[∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑙ln?̃?𝑘ln?̃?𝑙 +
𝑙𝑘
∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑚𝑛ln𝑦𝑚ln𝑦𝑛
𝑛𝑚
]  
                                                       + ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝑚 ln?̃?𝑘ln𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑘 +  𝑣 − 𝑢                                                             (2.55)    
Having expressed  −ln𝐷𝐼 =  𝜀 = 𝑣 − 𝑢 shows that the distance term may be interpreted as a traditional 
frontier disturbance term. Implying that the distances in a distance function (which are the radial distances 
between the data points and the frontier) could be due to either noise (𝑣) or technical inefficiency (𝑢).  
Therefore, this model can be estimated using the standard production function approach subject to the 
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imposing of symmetry restriction in the above translog function. The properties of the input distance 
function are non-decreasing in inputs (𝜕ln𝐷𝐼 𝜕ln𝑥1⁄  ≥ 0) and non-increasing in outputs (𝜕ln𝐷𝐼 𝜕ln𝑦𝑚⁄  ≤
0). The inputs and outputs partial elasticities imply that the estimated distance function is increasing in input 
and decreasing in output respectively. Therefore, a marginal increase in outputs given all other variables 
unchanged implies an improvement in efficiency i.e. a decrease in distance. 
 
2.6.3.2   Output Distance Function 
The output distance function measures the distance between an observed level of output relative to the 
maximum attainable output (on the frontier), using a given input requirement set. In other words, the output 
distance suggests the degree to which output falls short of what can be produced with a given input vector. 
Output distance function for a single output case can be algebraically defined as;  
   
                                            𝐷𝑂(𝒚, 𝒙) = {𝜃 ∣ (𝒚 𝜃⁄ )  ≤ 𝑓(𝒙)}.𝜃
min                                                                  (2.56)         
 
It is clear that   𝐷𝑂(. ) ≤ 1. For multiple outputs and multiple inputs, the output distance function is defined 
as; 
 
                                          𝐷𝑂(𝒚, 𝒙) = {𝜃 ∣ (𝒚 𝜃⁄ ) 𝜖 𝑉(𝒙)}.𝜃
min                                                                      (2.57)         
 
where 𝑉(𝒙) denotes the sets of output vectors that are feasible for each input vector 𝒙.   
 
The output distance function seeks the largest proportional increase in the observed output vector 𝒚 provided 
that the expanded vector (𝒚 𝜃⁄ ) is still an element of the original output set (Grosskopf et al 1995).  𝐷𝑂(𝒚, 𝒙) 
is homogeneous of degree 1 in outputs, and is a convex function in 𝒚 . The properties of  𝐷𝑂(. ) are as 
follows non-decreasing in 𝒚, homogeneity of degree 1 in feasible input vector 𝒚, concave in 𝒚 and non-
increasing in 𝒙.   
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Figure 2.3: Output Distance Function: Single Input and Two Outputs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
                                   
Figure 2.3 illustrates the case of a single input and two outputs 𝒚, concave in 𝒚 and non-increasing in y.  
Like the input distance function, the output distance function of 𝒙 and 𝒚, the only way to separate them is 
through the homogeneity restriction. One way of imposing these restrictions is to normalize the function by 
one of the outputs Therefore, given 𝐷 = 𝑓(𝒚, 𝒙) is output distance if we impose linear homogeneity 
restriction on 𝒚 and it is written as; 
 
                                                              
𝐷
𝑦1
= 𝑓 (𝒙,
𝑦2
𝑦1
, … ,
𝑦𝑚
𝑦1
)  ,                                                                        (2.58) 
 
Having imposed linear homogeneity conditions, we can re-write the distance function  𝐷 = (𝒚, 𝒙) as 
                           𝐷𝑂𝑦1
−1 = 𝑓(𝑥, ?̃?)                              where ?̃? = (
𝑦2
𝑦1
, … ,
𝑦𝑚
𝑦1
)                                           (2.59) 
 Taking the log of both sides gives   ln𝐷𝑂 − ln𝑦1 =  ln𝑓(𝑥, ?̃?). Assuming a translog functional form on 
𝑓(𝑥, ?̃?) yields 
 
 
𝒚2 
B 
𝒚1 
𝒚
𝜽
 
A 
𝐎 
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              ln𝐷𝑂 − ln𝑦1 = 𝛼0 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘ln𝑥𝑘
𝑘
+ ∑ 𝛼𝑚ln?̃?𝑚
𝑚
 
                                         + 
1
2
[∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑙ln𝑥𝑘ln𝑥𝑙 +
𝑙𝑘
∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑚𝑛ln?̃?𝑚ln?̃?𝑛
𝑛𝑚
]  
                                         + ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝑚 ln𝑥𝑘ln?̃?𝑚
𝑚𝑘
                                                                                                   (2.60) 
 
       where ?̃?𝑚 = 𝑦𝑚 𝑦1⁄  
The required symmetry restrictions for the translog function are   
𝛽𝑘𝑙 = 𝛽𝑙𝑘, 𝑘, 𝑙 = 1,2, … 𝐾  , and 𝑦𝑚𝑛 = 𝑦𝑛𝑚, 𝑚, 𝑛 = 1,2, … 𝑀   
Like input distance function, we use the translog output distance function can be made stochastic by the 
idiosyncratic error term v.  In addition, denoting  ln𝐷𝑂  ≤ 0 by −𝑢 and moving it to the right-hand side of 
the equation results in an estimable equation in which the error term is   𝑣 + 𝑢. 
 
                                      −ln𝑦1 = 𝛼0 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑘ln𝑥𝑘
𝑘
+ ∑ 𝛼𝑚ln?̃?𝑚
𝑚
 
                                             + 
1
2
[∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑙ln𝑥𝑘ln𝑥𝑙 +
𝑙𝑘
∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑚𝑛ln?̃?𝑚ln?̃?𝑛
𝑛𝑚
]  
                                            + ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝑚 ln𝑥𝑘ln?̃?𝑚
𝑚𝑘
 + 𝑣 + 𝑢 
                                                                                                                                                                     (2.61) 
where the 𝑣 is assumed to be independently and identically distributed (iid) as 𝑁(0, 𝜎2), intended to capture 
statistical noise.  𝑢 = − ln𝐷𝑂 is a non-negative random variable, intended to capture technical inefficiency. 
The output distance function is non-decreasing in output and non-increasing in input with an associated 
negative sign for the output elasticities and positive signs of input elasticities. These are interpreted to mean 
that the distance function is increasing in outputs and decreasing in inputs. 
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2.7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter documents the literature review of the thesis under two broad categories; the overview of power 
sector reform and the methodological framework. The discussions on the overview of power sector reform 
cover theoretical descriptions, structures, as well as the review of empirical studies on electricity market 
reform. Specifically, the empirical review shows a wide range of studies based on econometric approach and 
efficiency and productivity analysis. The methodological framework touches on the concept of efficiency 
and the various efficiency measurement techniques. In particular, it focuses on the detail discussions of 
stochastic frontier models, especially the latest development in panel data stochastic frontier models which 
form the bedrock of the empirical study.  Overall, it is revealed by a good number of studies on efficiency 
and productivity analysis that the impact of deregulation on efficiency has been largely mixed. Indeed, this 
may have been caused by how the models employed in the studies are structured to capture inefficiency. At 
any rate, in the next three chapters, we revisit the debate on the impact of power sector reform on production 
and cost efficiency. 
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Chapter 3: Efficiency and Productivity of Cross–Country Electricity     
                   Generation:  A Distance Function Approach 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Electricity plays an essential role the nation's economy. Its versatility is unparalleled enabling consumers to 
power homes, offices, and industries; it provides communications, entertainment, and medical services; 
powers computers, technology, and the internet; and it runs various forms of transportation. Not only is 
electricity the cleanest, most flexible, and most controllable form of energy, it’s the only energy type that 
allows for easy and relatively cheap transportation over long distances and convertibility to other types of 
energy needed at the point of consumption: thermal or mechanical (Vaninsky, 2008). The reliability of 
electric power supply is one of the primary motivating factors for technical innovation and change in market 
organization (Chen & Yee, 2013). 
 
The electricity sector is categorised based on the features of the constituent activities, namely generation, 
transmission, distribution and supply, and they are differentiated technologically and economically. Prior to 
the advent of power market reform, the power industry was characterised by vertical integration of these 
constituent segments within individual electric utilities, usually publicly owned and run by government. The 
firm that generates electricity also transmits it over high voltage lines and retails it to end users. These 
utilities in turn had, in actual fact, exclusive franchises to supply electricity to residential, commercial and 
industrial retail consumers within a defined geographic area (Delmas & Tokat, 2005; Joskow, 2008). The 
initial structural arrangement of the electric utility industry was hinged on the supposition that a central 
source of power supplied by efficient, low-cost utility generation, transmission, and distribution was a 
natural monopoly. 
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Electricity supply industry reform which began in Chile and UK in the earlier 1980s has gained international 
acceptance, and more than half the world’s countries have introduced institutional policy reform agendas in 
their electricity sectors. These power sector policy reform instruments have included deregulation, 
restructuring, privatization and the introduction of incentive-based regulation by independent regulatory 
agencies (Newbery 2002). The market reform leads to an opening-up of certain segments such as generation 
and retail to competition which have been regarded as potentially competitive segments, whilst the 
transmission and distribution networks are viewed as natural monopoly activities that need to be regulated. 
Different compelling rationales have been widely recognized as driving the implementation of power sector 
reform in developed and developing countries. In developed economies the primary aim of electricity sector 
reform is to increase economic efficiency of a well-developed industry by competition. Conversely, the 
objectives for power policy reforms in developing countries typically extend beyond the concern for 
economic efficiency gains that characterises the developed countries to include, among other things, the 
poor performance of state-owned power companies, low service quality, low collection rate, the need to 
expand electrification, high network losses, the need to reduce or eliminate the fiscal stress from state 
involvement and the desire to increase mobile financing through the sale of power companies (Zhang et al., 
2008,  Ghanadan and Williams, 2006; Bacon and Besant-Jones, 2001).  
 
According to economic theory, market oriented reforms will generate considerable efficiency gains for an 
economy as competition energizes firms to seek productive efficiency gains and produce at lowest unit 
costs. These arguments usually focus on allocative efficiency while the implications of competition for 
technical efficiency are less clear (Fabrizio et al, 2007) as the ex-post deregulation impacts have been 
contentious. X-inefficiency theory asserts that under conditions of less-than-perfect competition, firms will 
not operate on an outer-bound production possibility surface consistent with their resources because of 
workers' utility-maximizing trade-off between effort and leisure. However, under perfect competition firms 
can maximize efficiency and improve productivity (Leibenstein, 1966). This is also related to agency theory 
which recognises the interplay of asymmetric information and regulation with the tendency of inducing 
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inefficiency, whereas market competition makes firms residual claimants to cost-savings, thereby increasing 
incentives for efficiency-enhancing effort (Laffont and Tirole, 1993).  The monopolistic utilities (the agents) 
have private information about their ability to transform inputs into outputs. As society (the principal) wants 
a guaranteed service at the lowest price possible, the utilities can extract information rents. Property rights 
theory equally argues that the ownership of assets matters as it provides decision-makers with different 
rights to the use of economic resources, thereby reducing transaction costs in exchange and production, and 
encouraging investment to promote overall economic growth (Alchian, 1965; Libecap, 1989). Thus a change 
in allocation of property rights will affect incentive structure, and hence, efficiency. However, whether 
power market reform guarantees a technical efficiency gain in the electricity industry still remains an 
empirical question. As noted by Bauer et al. (1998), policy makers are more particularly concerned about the 
potential impact of their decisions on performance of firms. Thus, an inefficient firm is viewed as wasting 
inputs as maximum attainable output is not produced at a given quantity of inputs used. 
 
Given that electricity deregulation has evolved over the last three decades, there are still some mixed 
feelings regarding its impact on technical efficiency and productivity. Efficiency and productivity analyses 
of the industry which incorporates an analysis of deregulated and regulated countries is vitally important to 
help make informed and evidence–based decisions about reform impacts. We evaluate the performance of 
electricity generation and examine input requirement efficiency of 91 countries using stochastic input 
distance function. In addition, we investigate the impact of cross country specific characteristics to 
determine whether low efficiency countries can adopt deregulation policies of high efficiency countries by 
benchmarking their efficiency scores in order to improve their efficiency. We decompose the total 
productivity change in order to evaluate the impact of technical change, efficiency change and scale change. 
Efficiency measurement provides relevant information to the electricity supply industry and the 
policymakers. Therefore, it could serve strategic tool to identify best practices and success cases and to 
monitor performance.  
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The following section is a review of literature on the performance of electricity supply industry. Section 3.3 
highlights the methodology and econometrics specification for the study. In Section 3.4 we present the 
overview of data used in the study. Section 3.5 gives the main findings of the empirical analysis. Section 3.6 
discusses the conclusion and policy implications. 
 
3.2 Literature Review  
 An attempt has been made by a good number of studies across the world to establish the benefits of market 
reform in the electricity sector. Several empirical studies have investigated the resulting impact on economic 
performance. Indeed, efficiency and productivity analysis as a measurement of firm performance has gained 
considerable traction in the literature. Different alternative approaches for estimating firm efficiency are 
stochastic frontier analysis (Hattori, 2002; Farsi and Filippini, 2004; Barros and Managi, 2009; Barros and 
Peypoch, 2007, 2008; Barros and Antunes, 2011; Kopsakangas-Savolainen and Svento, 2011; See and 
Coelli, 2012),  data envelopment analysis, DEA, (Vaninsky, 2006; Nakano and Managi, 2008; Arocena, 
2008; Zhou and Ang, 2008, Barros, 2008; Briec et al., 2011; Sueyoshi and Goto, 2011; Jaraite and Di Maria, 
2012), and lately Stochastic Non-Smooth Data Envelopment, StoNED (Kuosmanen, 2012; Mekaroonreung 
and Johnson, 2012; Saastamoinen and Kuosmanen, 2015). Of course, there is a plethora of literature 
providing empirical analyses of firm efficiency based on parametric, non-parametric and semi parametric 
frontier approaches. A broad review of literature of these studies on firm performance and the SFA 
technique has been undertaken in Chapter 2. Here we will only focus on studies dealing with the 
performance of electricity generation sector.   
 
Empirical analysis of efficiency performance within the electricity generation segment has been widely 
studied across the world. These studies include, among others, Arocena & Waddams-Price, 2002 on Spain, 
Barros (2008) on Portugal, Meibodi, 1998 on Iran; Coelli, 2002 on Australia, Coelli, 2012, See and Coelli 
(2012) on Malaysia, Vaninsky, 2006 on United State, Lam and Shiu (2004), Du et al. 2013 and Chen et al. 
2015 on China, Domah, (2002) on 16 Small Island Economies; Jaraite and Di Maria (2012) on the European 
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Union and Chen et al 73 countries. While their findings have been mixed, most of these studies focus on 
investigating efficiency using plant level data.  See and Coelli (2012) measure the technical efficiency levels 
of Malaysian thermal power plants and investigated the degree to which various factors influence efficiency 
levels in these plants using SFA from 1998 to 2005. The results indicate that ownership, plant size and 
energy type have a significant influence on technical efficiency levels. They also concluded that publicly-
owned power plants obtain average technical efficiencies of 0.68, which is lower than privately-owned 
power plants, which achieve average technical efficiencies of 0.88.  In the same vein, Du et al. (2013) 
evaluate the TFP of Chinese fossil-fired power plants using conventional SFA and conclude that the market 
reform in the electricity sector had significantly improved the efficiency. By contrast, Arocena & Waddams-
Price (2002) examine generating efficiency of Spanish public and private electricity generators using data 
from 1984 – 1997. The research findings challenge some of the conventional wisdom on productive 
efficiency in the public and private sectors under both cost of service and incentive regulation as publicly 
owned generators were more efficient under cost of service regulation; private (but not public) firms 
responded to incentive regulation by increasing efficiency, bringing their productivity to similar levels.  
 
Vaninsky (2006) estimated the efficiency of electric power generation in the United States for the period of 
1991 through 2004 using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Their results point to a relative stability in 
efficiency from 1994 through 2000 at levels of 99–100% with a sharp decline to 94–95% in the years 
following. Barros (2008) estimated changes in total productivity on the hydroelectric energy generating 
plants of Portugal Electricity Company by means of data envelopment analysis (DEA). He concluded that 
some plants experienced productivity growth while others experienced a decrease in productivity. Meibodi 
(1998) estimated technical efficiency in electricity generation using Iranian data and data from the World 
Bank and arrives at a similar conclusion. The study suggested that market reforms, such as privatisation 
were not a good choice to resolve their industry’s problems and to reach the production frontier.  
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Focusing on cross country efficiency gains Jaraite and Di Maria (2012) measure the environmental 
efficiency and the productivity growth registered in public power generation across the EU over the 1996–
2007 period using Data Envelopment Analysis methods. Their results suggest an increase in environmental 
efficiency and a shift outward of the technological frontier. More recently, Chen et al. (2013) find that Asia 
enjoys the highest and European countries suffer from the lowest technical efficiency among Europe, Asia, 
and America continents. However, Domah, (2002) conducts a comparative technical efficiency analysis of 
electricity generators in 16 small island economies using panel data, both DEA and SFA. The results 
indicate neither apparent differences in the production structure between islands and non-islands electric 
utilities, nor any evidence suggesting that they are less technically efficient.  
 
It is commonplace to use samples of domestic utilities as efficiency analysis requires comparability of firms. 
However, international comparative analysis has been recognised as a veritable channel to evaluate the 
performance of national utilities within the larger context of international practice (See Jamasb, 2002). 
Therefore, regardless of the contribution of the recent efficiency studies of impact of deregulation electricity 
generation, there appears a scope for broader analysis at the level of a cross country. More specifically, it 
would also seem that there is potential for disentangling unobserved heterogeneity from technical efficiency 
so as to measure the efficiency of each country relative to the frontier country. For this reason, this study 
considers national electricity generation data of 91 countries which makes our estimation results more 
inclusive and reliable. In addition to the traditional SFA models (Battese and Coelli, 1992; Pit and Lee, 
1981), the paper employs the Greene (2005a) ‘true fixed effect and true random effect model’ to estimate the 
efficiency of electricity generation. The models have the advantage of separating unobserved heterogeneity 
among sample countries from technical inefficiency. Estimating country level efficiency will serve as a 
policy guide to development institutions for policy formulation and efficiency benchmarking. More 
specifically, the significance of our research is that it allows us to find out whether deregulation is being 
measured by unobserved heterogeneity rather efficiency components, thus a compelling insight into the 
understanding of efficiency gains from electricity deregulation reforms. 
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3.3 Methodology  
 
 
3.3.1 Modelling relative efficiency 
First introduced by Aigner et al (1977) and Meesuen and van den Broeck (1977), stochastic frontier 
approach (SFA) has been widely used in the efficiency literature. These models allow for technical 
inefficiency, while acknowledging the fact that random shocks outside the control of producers can affect 
the output of the producer. By incorporating a composed error term, they separate the traditional two-sided 
error term which captures random noise from the one-sided error term which measures technical 
inefficiency. The performance of the electricity generation sector is given as the ability of the electricity 
generation plant to transform input resources into output. The efficiency measures are relative in nature, 
such that each efficiency measure reveals how well a country is performing as opposed to other countries. 
Using SFA allows the construction of a best-practice frontier and an evaluation of the degree to which a 
country could potentially reduce input resource use relative to the efficient frontier, holding output constant. 
Given that we are concerned with the potential input saving, we consider an input distance function11. The 
choice of an input distance function rather than an output distance function is driven by the nature of 
production and regulation in the electricity generation industry12. 
                                                                     
A production technology may be defined using the input set, 𝐿(𝑦), denotes all those input vectors, 𝑥, that are 
technologically feasible which can produce the output vector 𝑦, i.e. 
 
                  𝐿(𝑦) =  { 𝑥  +
𝐾: 𝑥 can produce y}                                                                                       (3.1) 
  
                                                          
11 An output distance function measures efficiency by taking an output orientation where efficiency is improved by increasing output at a given 
level of exogenous inputs (see Saal et al., 2007)  
12 This modelling choice is consistent with Coelli et al (2003), which argue that input distance functions are the appropriate specification in 
network industries, where it is common for demand to be directly outside of the control of managers. 
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Suppose a country employs K input vector  𝐱+
𝐾
  to produce M output vector 𝐲+
𝑀
. We represent the 
production technology that satisfies the standard axiom such as convexity, strong disposability, closedness 
and boundedness in Fare and Primont (1995) at time t by the input distance function as, 
 
                                𝐷𝐼𝑖(𝒚, 𝒙, 𝒕) = {𝜌 ∣ 𝑓(𝒙 𝜌⁄ )  ∈  𝐿(𝒚)}𝜌  
max                                                                                 (3.2) 
 
𝐷𝐼(𝒚, 𝒙, 𝒕) is non-decreasing, positively linearly homogenous and concave in x and increasing in 𝑦 (Coelli 
and Perelman 1999).  𝜌  is the scalar distance by which the input vector can be deflated. 
Since the value of the input distance function equals one if a country is on the efficient production frontier, 
and exceeds one where the country is inefficient, , 𝐷𝐼  ≥ 1 and so,  
 
                                   𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐼𝑖(𝒚, 𝒙, 𝑡) − 𝑢 = 0,                                                                                             (3.3) 
                                     𝑢 ≥ 0,    
 
The inverse of the input distance function 𝐷𝐼 is a measure of Farrell input based efficiency of the countries. 
The non-negative variable 𝑢 ≥ 0 corresponds to the inefficient slack in the use of inputs by the country 
relative to other countries; it is the feasible contraction in inputs which will project an inefficient producer 
on to the efficient frontier of the input requirement set.  
 
  Following McFadden (1978:32) and Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000:32), in order for the technology to 
qualify for an input-oriented distance frontier, the following regularity properties must be satisfied; 
 (i). non-decreasing in x,  ∂ln𝐷𝐼/ ∂ln𝑥𝑘 ≡  𝑒𝑥𝑘  ≥  0, 𝑘 = 1 …K, where 𝑒𝑥𝑘 is the kth input     elasticity 
(ii) homogeneity of degree one in x,  𝐷𝐼(𝒚, 𝒙/𝑥𝑘, 𝑡) =  𝐷𝐼(𝒚, 𝒙, 𝑡)/𝑥𝑘   
(iii) concave in x  
(iv) non-increasing in y, ∂ln𝐷𝐼/ ∂ln𝑦𝑚 ≡  𝑒𝑦𝑟 ≤  0, r = 1…R, where 𝑒𝑦𝑟 is the mth output          
      elasticity 
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(iv) scale elasticity of the production technology is at time t is  
            𝐸𝑡 = − ( ∑ ∂ln𝐷𝐼/ ∂ln𝑦𝑚
𝑘=𝑀
𝑘=1
)
−1
≡  − ( ∑ 𝑒𝑦𝑚
𝑘=𝑀
𝑘=1
)
−1
 
 
3.3.1.1 Translog Input Distance Function 
Following Coelli and Perelman (1999), I use the translog functional form13 with M output (y), K inputs (x) 
and time t, t = 1, 2,…, T, and written as: 
 
              ln𝐷𝐼𝑖 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1
ln(𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡)  +  
1
2
 ∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑚𝑛ln(𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡)
𝑀
𝑛=1
𝑀
𝑚=1
ln(𝑦𝑛𝑖𝑡) 
                           + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1
ln(𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡) +  
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑙
𝐾
𝑙=1
𝐾
𝑘=1
ln(𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡)ln(𝑥𝑙𝑖𝑡)  
                         + ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1
ln(𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡)ln(𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡)
𝐾
𝑘=1
+ 𝜓𝑡𝑡 +    
1
2
𝜓𝑡𝑡
2  
                    +   ∑ 𝜑𝑘𝑡ln(𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡)𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1
 + ∑ 𝜃𝑚𝑡ln(𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡)𝑡
𝑀
𝑚=1
 +  ∑ 𝜋𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝒛𝑗𝑖𝑡                                                            (3.4) 
 
Where 𝐷𝐼𝑖  represents an input distance, (i= 1, 2,…,N). T is a time trend variable that captures the time 
varying effect across an individual country in a specified time period.  𝒛𝑖𝑡 denotes the exogenous 
characteristics which are assumed to have a direct linear influence on the production structure. In other 
words, each firm faces a different production frontier at each period given the effect of exogenous factors. 
The regularity properties as mentioned above require translog input distance function in equation (3.4) to be 
symmetric and homogeneous of degree +1 in input, viz., 
                                                          
13 In order to provide a good approximation to the input distance function while preserving the availability of degrees of freedom, and to avoid 
multicollinearity problems, the choice of the functional form in which the input distance function is specified should obtain a balance between 
flexibility and parsimony.  While the Cobb-Douglas specification is acknowledged to be too restrictive, the first-best option is to consider a 
translog flexible functional form, because it represents a second-order approximation of any arbitrarily chosen function, as well as being 
theoretically possible (See Berndt and Christensen, 1973).   
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                                     ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1
= 1;          𝑘, = 1,2, … 𝐾                                                                   (3.5a)    
                                               ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑙
   𝐾
𝑘=1
= 0  ;       𝑘, = 1,2, … , 𝐾                                                                                               
                                      ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑚 =
𝐾
𝑘=1
0          𝑚, = 1,2, … , 𝑀                                                                   (3.5b)   
 
those required for symmetry are: 
 
                             𝛼𝑚𝑛 = 𝛼𝑛𝑚 𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝛽𝑘𝑙 = 𝛽𝑙𝑘                                                                                        (3.6) 
 
The property of homogeneity of degree 1 in inputs restriction is empirically imposed by normalising all but 
one of the inputs in equation (3.4) by the remaining input which yield the following; 
   
      ln(𝐷𝐼𝑖 𝑥𝐾𝑖𝑡⁄ ) = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1
ln(𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡)  +  
1
2
      ∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑚𝑛ln(𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡)
𝑀
𝑛=1
𝑀
𝑚=1
ln(𝑦𝑛𝑖𝑡)    
                    + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1
ln (𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡 𝑥𝐾𝑖𝑡⁄ )  +  
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑙
𝐾
𝑙=1
𝐾
𝑘=1
ln (𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡 𝑥𝐾𝑖𝑡⁄ )ln (𝑥𝑙𝑖𝑡 𝑥𝐾𝑖𝑡⁄ )  
+ ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1
ln (𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡 𝑥𝐾𝑖𝑡⁄ )ln(𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡)
𝐾
𝑘=1
+ 𝜓𝑡𝑡 +    
1
2
𝜓𝑡𝑡𝑡
2  
                                         +   ∑ 𝜑𝑘𝑡ln (𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡 𝑥𝐾𝑖𝑡⁄ )𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1
 + ∑ 𝜃𝑚𝑡ln(𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡)𝑡
𝑀
𝑚=1
 +  ∑ 𝜋𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝒛𝑗𝑖𝑡                                   (3.7) 
  The equation above can be re-arranged by moving ln𝐷𝐼𝑖 the right-hand side of the equation yielding a 
dependent variable in the regression analysis of −ln𝑥𝐾𝑖𝑡 
 
99 
 
 
    −ln 𝑥𝐾𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1
ln(𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡)  +   
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑚𝑛ln(𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡)
𝑀
𝑛=1
𝑀
𝑚=1
ln(𝑦𝑛𝑖𝑡)             
                                + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1
ln (𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡 𝑥𝐾𝑖𝑡⁄ )  +  
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑙
𝐾
𝑙=1
𝐾
𝑘=1
ln (𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡 𝑥𝐾𝑖𝑡⁄ )ln (𝑥𝑙𝑖𝑡 𝑥𝐾𝑖𝑡⁄ )  
+ ∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1
ln (𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡 𝑥𝐾𝑖𝑡⁄ )ln(𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡)
𝐾
𝑘=1
+ 𝜓𝑡𝑡 +    
1
2
𝜓𝑡𝑡𝑡
2  
                                        +   ∑ 𝜑𝑘𝑡ln (𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡 𝑥𝐾𝑖𝑡⁄ )𝑡
𝐾
𝑘=1
 + ∑ 𝜃𝑚𝑡ln(𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡)𝑡
𝑀
𝑚=1
 +  ∑ 𝜋𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝒛𝑗𝑖𝑡 − ln𝐷𝐼𝑖                    (3.8) 
 
Thus, by appending a symmetric error term 𝑣𝑖𝑡 to account for statistical noise, and rewriting ln𝐷𝐼𝑖   as  𝑢𝑖𝑡 , 
the stochastic output distance function can be obtained as follows; 
 
                                         −ln 𝑥𝐾𝑖𝑡 = 𝑇𝐿(𝑦, 𝑥 𝑥𝐾⁄ , 𝑡)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋
′𝒛𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                    (3.9) 
 
where 𝑇𝐿(𝑦, 𝑥 𝑥𝐾⁄ , 𝑡)𝑖𝑡 denotes the technology as the translog approximation to the distance function; 𝜋
′𝒛𝑖𝑡 
captures the cross-country heterogeneity, where 𝒛𝑗𝑖𝑡 represents the exogenous factors;  𝑣𝑖𝑡  denotes the 
conventional idiosyncratic error term incorporating sampling error, measurement error and specification 
error; and (𝑢𝑖𝑡) is the inefficiency component of the disturbance error
14.  
 
3.3.1.2 Model Specification 
In modelling inefficiency measurement, u is treated as a random variable distributed across producers with a 
known asymmetrical probability density function. However, there is a debate whether the distribution should 
be time-invariant or time-varying. Greene (2005a) argues that time-invariance may be a property of latent 
heterogeneity amongst the firms or countries, and that inefficiency should be time-varying. First, we 
                                                          
14 See Section “2.6.3.1 Input distance function” for the interpretation of input and output partial elasticities. 
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investigate the issue of observed heterogeneity and its impact on technical efficiency. To achieve this, we 
consider the Battese and Coelli (1992) time varying model which relaxes the time invariant assumption of 
the inefficiency i.e. the persistency of inefficiency is a function that is constant across firms. The 
inefficiency is firm-specific and is allowed to vary through time, which follows pattern of temporal variation 
in the one-sided error term  𝑢𝑖𝑡 expressed as follows; 
 
                                        −ln 𝑥𝐾𝑖𝑡 = 𝑇𝐿(𝑦, 𝑥 𝑥𝐾⁄ , 𝑡)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋
′𝒛𝑖𝑡  + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
                                           𝑢𝑖𝑡 =  𝑢𝑖𝑓(t)                                       
                                       𝑓(t) =  exp (−𝜂(𝑡 − 𝑇)) 
                                      𝑣𝑖𝑡 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2)                                                                                           (3.10) 
                                                                                                                                                                    
where 𝑢𝑖 is assumed independently and identically distributed as  𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝑢
2) distribution and 𝜂 is a 
parameter to be estimated. If  𝜂 is not statistically significant, it can be constrained to zero so as to maximize 
the degree of freedom by estimating more parameters than needed. However, the time-varying pattern of 
inefficiency is the same for all individuals, so the perennial problem of inseparable inefficiency and 
individual heterogeneity remains.  
 
While Battese and Coelli (1992) addresses the issue of time invariant inefficiency, none of the two models 
could account for unobserved heterogeneity. Greene (2005b) pointed out that if latent heterogeneity exists 
and not is adequately accounted for, all time-invariant heterogeneities will be pushed into the intercept term 
𝛼0 and finally into the inefficiency term. Thus, the inefficiency is picking up latent cross-country variation 
that is not in any way related to inefficiency. The inability of these models to estimate individual effects in 
addition to the inefficiency effect would bias efficiency scores. This drawback is addressed by the ‘true’ 
fixed-effect model and the ‘true’ random-effects model proposed by Greene (2005b). The purpose of the 
model is to disentangle firm heterogeneity or firm effect from technical efficiency. The True-Fixed Effects 
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model specifies separate intercept dummy variables for each unit in the sample, and specifies the 
asymmetric half normal distribution for the inefficiency component of the random error and the normal 
distribution for the idiosyncratic error component. The True-Random Effects model does not use dummy 
variables at all, but treats the regression constant term as a random parameter comprising the usual intercept 
and a random component. Thus, these models can be written as; 
 
                                           −ln 𝑥𝐾𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑇𝐿(𝑦, 𝑥 𝑥𝐾𝑖𝑡⁄ , 𝑇)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜋
′𝒛𝑖𝑡  +  𝑣𝑖𝑡 − 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
                                            𝑢𝑖  ~ 𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝑢
2) 
                                           𝑣𝑖𝑡 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2)                                                                                                    (3.11)       
 
where  𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the time-varying inefficiency. If one treats 𝛼𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 as fixed parameters which are not 
part of inefficiency then the above model becomes the ‘true fixed-effect’ panel stochastic model (Greene, 
2005a). The model is called the true random effects stochastic frontier model when 𝛼𝑖 does not correlate 
with the regressors. Thus, the stochastic term 𝛼𝑖 is expressed as follow: 
 
                                                             𝛼𝑖 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝛼
2) 
 
The models are estimated by maximum likelihood.  Within the framework of the normal-half normal model, 
Jondrow et. al.’s (1982) conditional estimator of 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is often used for estimation of inefficiency, 𝑢𝑖𝑡;  
        
                                                        ?̂?𝑖𝑡 =  E[𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝜀𝑖𝑡]                                                                                                 (3.12)                                                                                         
 
The predictions of technical efficiency15 index of individual country in each period is calculated as: 
                                           
                                                            𝑇𝐸 = exp (−𝑢𝑖𝑡)                                                                          (3.13) 
 
                                                          
15 The predicted values of technical efficiency lie between zero and one. The value of one implies that the firm lies on the boundary of the 
production possibility set 
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3.3.2 Parametric Total Productivity Growth 
Building on the specification of the input distance function, our study aims at investigating changes in 
productivity growth over time using generalized Malmquist productivity index. We compute returns to 
scale, technical inefficiency, and productivity change from the estimated parameters. Productivity change, 
when there are multiple inputs, is measured by total productivity change.  Orea (2002) notes that a TFP 
index which is generalized from the case of one input and one output should satisfy four properties: (i) 
identity, (ii) monotonicity, (iii) separability and (iv) proportionality. Identity requires that if inputs and 
outputs do not change the TFP index is unity. Monotonicity requires that the weighted output growth rates 
and input growth rates are chosen so that higher output and lower input unambiguously improve TFP. 
Separability, which is a property of the chosen technology set, permits the generalization to the multiple-
output multiple-input case. Proportionality requires that the weights in the output and input growth indices 
sum to unity. Using a quadratic identity lemma to the input distance function (see Caves et al. 1982) and 
setting the negative log of the input distance as the technical efficiency i.e. −ln𝐷𝐼(𝑡) =  ln𝑇𝐸𝐼 ,  we obtain 
the expression which decomposes the TFP change into a scale component, a technical change component 
and a technical efficiency change component.  
 
             lnTFPC = [ln𝑇𝐸𝐼,𝑡+1 − ln𝑇𝐸𝐼,𝑡] +
1
2
[(𝜕ln𝐷𝐼,𝑡+1 𝜕𝑡)⁄ + (𝜕ln𝐷𝐼,𝑡 𝜕𝑡)⁄ ]
+ [
1
2
∑ ((𝑒𝑦𝑚,𝑡+1
𝑚=𝑀
𝑚=1
𝑆𝐹𝑡+1
𝐼  ) + (𝑒𝑦𝑚,𝑡𝑆𝐹𝑡
𝐼)(𝑙𝑛(𝑦𝑚,𝑡+1/𝑦𝑚,𝑡))]                                    (3.14) 
 
TFPC  is total factor productivity change; 𝑒𝑦𝑚,𝑡 is the column vector of the mth output elasticities at time t; 
The first term; [ln𝑇𝐸𝐼,𝑡+1 − ln𝑇𝐸𝐼,𝑡] measures efficiency change, the second term; 
1
2
[(𝜕ln𝐷𝐼,𝑡+1 𝜕𝑡)⁄ +
(𝜕ln𝐷𝐼,𝑡 𝜕𝑡)⁄ ] captures the technical change and the last term represents scale change. The post estimation of 
technical change and scale change are based on the coefficients of estimated parameters of the input distance 
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function i.e. the first order and second order elasticities and scale parameter. The time derivatives of the 
translog distance function (3.9) for the computation of technical change is obtained as:  
                                    
𝜕ln𝐷𝐼,𝑡
𝜕𝑡
=  𝜓𝑡 + 𝜓𝑡𝑡𝑡 +  ∑ 𝜑𝑘𝑡ln
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝑥𝑘𝑖𝑡 𝑥𝐾𝑖𝑡⁄ + ∑ 𝜃𝑚𝑡ln𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑀
𝑚=1
 
𝑆𝐹𝑡
𝐼 is the input scale factor at time and it is defined as   
                   𝑆𝐹𝑡
𝐼 = ( ∑ 𝑒𝑦𝑚,𝑡
𝑚=𝑀
𝑚=1
+ 1 ∑ 𝑒𝑦𝑚,𝑡
𝑚=𝑀
𝑚=1
 ⁄ ) = 1 −  𝐸𝑡                                                                            (3.15) 
 
In other words, the decomposition of the TFP change into components of technical efficiency change, EC, 
technical change, TC, and scale change, SC in the Eq (3.14) can be expressed as; 
 
              TFPC =EC +TC+SC                                                                                                                  (3.16) 
 
 Equation (3.16) provides a meaningful decomposition of total factor productivity change into three 
independent factors. The term EC measures changes in the value of the input distance function from one 
period to the next i.e. the term measures changes in technical efficiency. The term TC captures the shift in 
technology between two periods evaluated at two different observed output and input vectors. The term SC 
measures the contribution of return to scale economies to productivity growth.   
 
3.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics  
Data used for the study were collected from different international databases for a period from 1980 to 2010. 
Years 1980 and 2010 represent, respectively, the earliest and the last year for which data are available at the 
time data obtained. The sample countries in the study covered 91 countries and are determined by data 
availability.  Due to missing observations, our panel data is unbalanced. Pooled Ordinary Least Squares 
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(OLS) was carried out to remove the outliers in the data in order to avoid biased estimate16. The data was 
primarily extracted from the US Energy Information Agency, EIA, Euromonitor International, the 
International Energy Agency, IEA, and the World Development Indicators, WDI.  As with most of the 
modelling work in stochastic frontier analysis which involves the use of software such as STATA, 
LIMDEP-NLOGIT, and Frontier, this study was undertaken using STATA to obtain the maximum 
likelihood estimates of the parameter of the models and efficiency measures. The data in the fitted 
regression are logged and mean-corrected for each variable, i.e. expressed as deviations from the sample 
mean so as to interpret the first order coefficients in the model as elasticities at the sample mean.     
 
The importance of variable selection underscores any research findings as the reliability of the outcomes 
depend primarily on the input and output variables used in a model. Modelling of electricity generation of 
electrical power requires three basic inputs: capital, labour and energy. Building on Coelli et al., (2013), 
Jaraitė & Di Maria (2012), among others, this paper considers three groups of input variables: net installed 
electrical capacity, labour and energy inputs. Output is the annual net electricity produced by each country 
unit, measured in gigawatt hours (GWh). Capital is measured in megawatts (MW) of installed capacity. Net 
installed capacity is used as a proxy for capital stock as electricity generation capital stock data are not 
available for electricity17 Installed capacity in this study is defined as the maximum amount of thermal 
electricity that a station can produce at any given point in time. It describes the maximum capacity that a 
system is designed to run at. The measurement of electrical generating capacity in units of maximum 
potential output is standard engineering practice and has been carried over to the economics literature from 
the early days of the peak load pricing theory.  
 
                                                          
16 The presence of outliers is critical for any efficiency analysis that compares individual firms/countries since most of efficiency analyses are 
based on the identification of the most efficient firm(s)/countries. 
17 The net installed capacity is used as the measure of the services of capital input. The use of installed capital as a proxy for capital stock is 
consistent with literature (see Jaraitė & Di Maria (2012).  Although, a potential issue is that some parts of the installed capital of a generator 
(conventionally measured as the electrical power rating of the capacity) may not in practice have been part of the ‘used and useful’ capital 
stock, as defined by US public service regulators. However, industry wide practice is to use installed capacity in the engineering sense as the 
comparable measure of the stock of capital services. 
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Labour data refers to the economically active population in utilities supply industry18, and is measured in 
thousands of employees. This is used as a proxy for labour since there is no available disaggregated data that 
represents precise number of employees in the electricity sector.  Energy inputs are measured in kilotonnes 
of oil equivalent (ktoe), and include all varieties of energy utilised by the generation plants: coal, oil, gas, 
hydro, nuclear and biomass. As energy input data are available in the same measurement units, we 
aggregated them into one indicator. This allows for the different energy intensity of different generation 
technologies. Data for net electricity generation, installed capacity and energy are obtained from IEA. 
Labour input is obtained from Euromonitor International.  
 
We include vector of cross-country variables that shift the production frontier. They include capacity factor 
which is an indicator for capacity utilisation which measures how often an electricity generator runs for a 
specific period. It compares how much electricity a generator actually produces with the maximum it could 
produce at continuous full power operation during the same period. Therefore, a higher load factor usually 
indicates more output and a lower cost per unit. Conversely, a lower load factor is often associated with 
higher unplanned and planned outages, which implies higher repairs and maintenance costs, thus resulting in 
a lower technical efficiency level (Hiebert, 2002; Khanna et al., 1999). Capacity factors vary greatly 
depending on the type of energy that is used and the design of the plant. Capacity factor is computed by 
taking the ratio of gross electricity generated divided by installed capacity multiply by the number of hours 
in a year. GDP per capita gives a measure of the general level of economic development and tends to 
influence electricity generation efficiency. An increase in GDP per capita is indicative of greater energy 
demand and this could encourage the country to be more efficient in electricity generation in order to bridge 
the energy demand gap via higher technology innovation and R&D effort in energy saving and energy 
efficiency improvement process. It is obtained from Penn World Table (PWT) 7.1. 
 
                                                          
18 In the Section “6.3 Limitations of the research”, we acknowledge the problem associated with using economically active population in the 
utility sector industry as a proxy for labour. 
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Electricity consumption per capita strongly correlates with the economic structure of a country. Countries 
with a high per capita electricity consumption are expected to have lower energy costs, thus resulting in a 
high technical efficiency level. Population density indicates the spatial presence of urban conurbation as 
measured in people per sq. km of land area. The rural urban shift will result in a move of energy use and 
consequently increases the demand for electricity consumption, thus inducing higher investment by utilities. 
Other control variables such as allows us to assess the impact of changing economic structure on production 
efficiency. It is defined as the industrial sector share of value added. Electricity consumption per capita, 
population density and industry value added are obtained from WDI. 
 
To account for the degree of democracy, data on the ranking of political rights and civil liberty within the 
country are obtained from Freedom House. Political rights involve participation in the establishment or 
administration of a government and are usually held to entitle the adult citizen to exercise of the franchise, 
holding of public office, and engage in other political activities. Civil rights include the fundamental human 
rights enjoyed by every person regardless of sex or religion (such as freedoms of expression and belief, 
associational and organizational rights). Political rights and civil liberty variables are indicators for country 
institutional factors which measure political interference of government on the utility company and ability of 
the government to carry out an institutional restructuring reform in the power industry. Freedom House 
ranks countries on political rights and civil liberties on integers range from 1 (most freedom) to 7 (least 
freedom). From the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research and data market, we obtain data on 
Temperature which accounts for weather differentials across country. Nilsson and Pollitt (2010) found that 
more extreme climate factors have a negative impact on efficiency of utility firms. Given that market reform 
of the electricity sector is an on-going process that affects many dimensions of industry competition and 
structures, reform score is a potentially important variable although it only provides an indication of reform 
progress, rather than reform success. This variable is taken from a dataset in Erdogdu (2013)19. The score 
ranges from 1 to 8 (nonnegative integer values), and is assigned to countries based on their reform status.  In 
other words, the data is constructed for countries which have introduced at least one of the following reform 
                                                          
19 See appendix 1 for the table on reform scores by country 
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step: (1) introduction of independent power producers, (2) corporatization of state-owned enterprises, (3) 
law for electricity sector liberalization, (4) introduction of unbundling, (5) establishment of electricity 
market regulator, (6) introduction of privatization, (7) establishment of wholesale electricity market, and (8) 
choice of supplier.  The electricity market reform score assigns a score to each country based on the reform 
status of that country. A country with electricity market reform score of 8 has undertaken all the 8 reform 
steps while a country with score 1 has only implemented 1 reform step. For more details on this electricity 
market reform score see Erdogdu (2013).  Table 3.1 gives the descriptive statistics of the variables used in 
the study. 
 
Table 3.1:  Descriptive Statistics  
           
 1786 Observations Variable Mean SD Min Max 
      
Output Variable      
Electricity generation (GWh)      y 155645.95 458782.4 62 4156745 
Input Variables      
Installed capacity (MW)      𝑥1 37818 109132 130 1039062 
Labour (‘000 people)      𝑥2 141.21 376.32 0.93 3101.50 
Energy (ktoe)      𝑥3 30969.38 99932.37 21 897292 
Environmental Variables 
 
    
Capacity factor* (ratio)      𝓏1 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.18 
GDP per capita (2005 US$)      𝓏2 15551.77 14775.19 335.56 136248.10 
Elect consumption per capita (kWh)      𝓏3 4525.23 5391.52 18.65 51439.91 
Industrialisation (% of GDP)      𝓏4 25.21 9.15 4.43 68.497 
Pop. density (ppl per sq. km of land)      𝓏5 167.88 613.10 1.47 7252.429 
Temperature (Degree Celsius)      𝓏6 16.09 8.66 -8.74 32.73 
Political rights (Index)      𝓏7 2.50 1.85 1 7 
Civil liberty (Index)      𝓏8 2.70 1.60 1 7 
Reform score (Index)      𝓏9 6.07 2.05 1 8 
*the minimum value reveals the unused generating capacity which is out of service or operating at a reduced output for 
part of the time, possibly due to equipment failures or routine maintenance.  
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3.5     Empirical Analysis 
 
3.5.1 Estimation results 
 
The parameter estimates of the Battese and Coelli (1992), Greene (2005) True Fixed Effect and True 
Random Effect specifications, and their associated t-statistics allow us to determine the effect that the output 
and the inputs have on the distance functions, and also whether the magnitude corresponding to direct partial 
elasticity is statistically significant or otherwise. Since data are expressed as deviations from the overall 
sample mean, the elasticities can be evaluated at the mean by directly analysing the first order parameters. 
The elasticities in each one of these models are estimated as the information provided by the elasticity 
estimations are also a tool in order to check for the regularity conditions of the models, as well as a tool in 
order to estimate technical change and economies to scale. Therefore, to confirm monotonicity properties, 
the coefficient of output should be negative in relation to the input, capital and labour inputs are expected to 
show a positive sign in relation to energy input at the sample mean. The results show that the estimated input 
distance function is well behaved with all input coefficients positive and output coefficient negative.  
 
Table 3.2:  Monotonicity outside the sample mean 
       
Variable elasticity  BC (92)  TFE  TRE 
Generation ey 100    100    100 
  
    
Capital ex1 100    100    100 
  
    
Labour ex2 54.5    62.2    58.2 
      
 
In addition, the percentages of elasticities outside the sample mean satisfy the regularity conditions of 
monotonic properties in Table 3.2. On the whole, we can say that the monotonicity condition is satisfied.  
 
 
 
109 
 
Table 3.3: Estimated input distance function parameters   
 
Variable Model 1 -BC (92)   Model 2-FTE   Model 3-TRE   
  Coef. t-stat.   Coef. Std. error   Coef. Std. error   
         
 
Generation   -0.919***  -118.00 
 
-0.969***   -88.356 
 
-0.963***   -294.968 
Capital   0.974***   93.539 
 
 0.969***   131.230 
 
 0.997***    142.664 
Labour   0.014**     3.038 
 
 0.008**       2.384 
 
 0.008*        2.290 
Generation Squared  -0.014***   -9.050 
 
-0.006***      -3.493 
 
-0.007***       -8.521 
 
Capital Squared  -0.087*** -21.818 
 
-0.023***      -4.940 
 
-0.036***      -9.021 
 Labour Squared  -0.004   -1.618 
 
-0.001      -0.477 
 
-0.004**      -2.321 
 Capital × Labour  -0.100***   18.381 
 
-0.028***       4.642 
 
-0.045***       9.277 
 Generation × Capital   0.085***   31.008 
 
 0.017***       3.920 
 
 0.029***       8.168 
 Generation × Labour  -0.006*   -2.286 
 
-0.003     -1.293 
 
-0.006***      -3.369 
         Time  -0.006***  -6.328 -0.001**    -2.718 -0.001***     -4.473 
Time Squared   0.000**    1.969 
 
 0.000      0.108 
 
 0.000      -0.360 
Generation × Time   0.000   -0.418   0.000      1.127   0.000       1.212 
Capital × Time  -0.001*    1.948 
 
 0.000      0.314 
 
 0.000       0.129 
         Labour × Time  -0.001***   -4.448 
 
 0.000**     -2.745 
 
-0.001**      -3.147 
Capacity Factor  18.365***  60.859 
 
 20.13***    78.483 
 
20.281***      83.012 
GDP per capita  0.065***    6.053 
 
 0.026**      2.769 
 
 0.042***       5.563 
         Elect. Consumption -0.071***   -6.774 
 
-0.036**     -3.107 
 
-0.056***     -8.503 
         Industrialisation -0.016**   -2.099 
 
-0.006      0.944 
 
 0.004      0.595 
         Pop. density -0.012**   -2.223 
 
 0.015     -0.845 
 
-0.019***     -6.720 
Temperature   0.001    0.567 
 
 0.001      0.591 
 
  0.001      0.826 
         Political rights  0.003   1.543 
 
0.005***     3.590 
 
0.005***     3.706 
         Civil liberty  0.001   0.306 
 
0.000   -0.002 
 
-0.001    -0.314 
         Reform score  0.007   1.580 
 
-0.003     0.574 
 
-0.004    -1.082 
         Eta (𝜂)  0.015***   6.060 
              Mu (𝜇)  0.181***   5.260 
 
 
  
   
Sigma_𝑢 
   
0.033     24.31 
 
0.032***     25.43 
Sigma_𝑣 
   
0.018      20.91 
 
 0.020***  
Lambda (𝜆) 2.345*** 
 
1.845    939.25 
 
1.627***    
Constant  0.266*** 8.989   0.315***      4.27 
Log Likelihood  2927.98   3485.73   3259.30  
         AIC -5799.96 
  
-6741.47 
  
-6466.70 
    *, **, *** Denote statistical significance at the 5, 1 and 0.1 % levels, respectively 
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Table 3.3 presents the obtained maximum likelihood estimates of the alternative stochastic models. In the 
BC model, electricity generation elasticity is -0.919, capital elasticity is approximately 0.974, and labour 
elasticity is 0.014. The TFE and the TRE models show the electricity generation elasticities of -0.969 and -
0.963 respectively with same magnitude of capital and labour capital elasticities. The apparent similarities in 
the parameter estimates of the TFE and TRE models are occasioned by the facts both models account for 
unobserved heterogeneity.  A negative sign is associated with electricity generation parameters across all the 
models (a marginal increase in generation output given all other variables unchanged implies an 
improvement in efficiency i.e. a decrease in distance) while capital and labour elasticities are both positive. 
These estimates are all significantly different from zero in all the models specified. A negative effect 
corresponding to time variable implies an upward shift of the distance function, and ultimately a decline an 
increase in inefficiency. In other word, the statistically significant time parameter suggests that the annual 
technical change declines across the models. This finding may be due to low investment in technological 
capacity in driving growth in the generation sector, especially in the developing countries that constitute the 
major chunk of the sample. Overall, the capital elasticities are particularly large which is consistent with our 
expectations that increase in the volume of capital stock is the most significant driver of input requirement in 
the capital-intensive electricity generation industry.  
 
Considering the impact of the exogenous variables on input requirements, the coefficients of capacity factor, 
GDP per capita, electricity consumption per capita and political rights are fundamental factors influencing 
technical efficiency of the country. The parameters literally show a comparable level of statistical 
significance and corresponding signs in the three models.  For example, capacity factor is positive and 
significant in all the models which suggest that an increase in capacity factor will lower input requirements 
as higher capacity factors indicates larger scale economies and a lower cost per unit of electricity generation. 
This is in line with a priori expectation that the more efficient a plant is, the higher the capacity factor.  
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This result is largely consistent with those of Pollitt (1995) and Lam and Shiu (2004). Similarly, GDP per 
capita implies that as people become richer and improve on their standard of living, they will require more 
energy to fulfil their needs. Therefore, higher GDP per capita could potentially support an efficiency-
inducing drive by bridging energy demand gap via higher technology innovation and R&D effort in energy 
saving and energy efficiency improvement process. 
 
However, electricity consumption per capita is negative and significant in all the models which suggests that 
increased electricity consumption per capita results in higher input requirements to generate higher 
electricity.  Moreover, population density reveals that population density is negative and significantly 
different from zero across three models with increased impact of input requirements on production 
technology. This implies that high population density as a consequence of urbanisation leads to increase in 
electricity usage and therefore results higher input requirements for electricity generation.  
 
Our analysis also reveals that the estimated parameters of temperature and electricity market reform score 
respectively are not statistically significant in any of the models. One possible explanation to the apparent 
insignificance of the reform score variable may be due to the fact that deregulation has not been well 
measured as the electricity reform score data only considers reform progress and not reform success. 
Interestingly, political rights which controls for institutional factor of political freedom of individuals as 
allowed by incumbent government is positive and significant across two models i.e. true fixed effect and 
true random effect models. This suggests that an increase in political rights in a country results in reduced 
input requirements. Therefore, we consider this a robust evidence that democratic institutional endowments 
of a country which is accounted for by political rights adequately captures electricity deregulation’s 
influence on technical efficiency.  
 
 The estimated coefficient of output for each model is less than one in absolute terms indicating increasing 
returns to scale at the sample mean which for the parametric stochastic input distance function is computed 
as the inverse of the negative of this value. The estimated returns to scale are 1.088, 1.032 and 1.044 for the 
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BC (92), TFE and TRE models respectively and t-statistics show they are statistically different from zero. 
Following the returns to scale estimation as shown in Table 3.4, it can be inferred that electricity production 
show mild increasing returns to scale at the sample mean. 
 
Table 3.4:  Scale elasticity 
       
Variable   BC (92)  TFE  TRE 
Parameter  1.088***   1.032***  1.044*** 
 
     
Standard error  0.008   0.011   0.002 
 
     
t-ratio  246.39   179.51   872.69 
      
*** t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
 
 
3.5.1.1 Estimates of Technical Efficiency  
An efficiency score of 100% for BC (92), for example, would indicate that a country is doing the best that it 
can to generate electricity using observed input quantities relative to other countries in the sample. The 
efficiency score estimates as shown in Table 3.5 reveals that efficiency estimates are sensitive to the choice 
of frontier models.  
 
 
Table 3.5: Summary of the Efficiency Score  
       
               BC (92)   TFE  TRE  
 Mean                                 0.806     0.968  
                 
0.964  
 Std. Dev                                 0.092     0.026  
                 
0.033  
 Min                                 0.624     0.775  
                 
0.788  
 Max                                 0.990     0.982  
                 
0.981  
 
 
The average efficiency score for the BC (92) model across the 91 countries is 81% and the average 
efficiency the TFE & TRE models are 97% and 96% respectively. It is apparent that the distributions of 
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efficiency scores from model 1 and models 2–3 differ greatly. For TFE & TRE models effect that 
distinguishes between inefficiency and latent heterogeneities the average efficiency scores are relatively 
higher, whereas for model 1 has a lower average efficiency score as the individual-specific difference is 
considered as part of inefficiency. We measure reform effects by distance of each country from the frontier. 
Arguably, we expect deregulation to push the most efficient country close to the frontier with an efficiency 
score of 100% for electricity generation, which implies that the country is doing the best it can to reduce 
input requirements for electricity generation, relative to another country in the sample.  
 
Table 3.6 shows the efficiency scores 91 for countries categorise as OECD and Non-OECD countries. The 
three highest efficiency scores for BC (92) model are Malta-99%, El Salvado-98% and Zambia-98%. For the 
True FE model, the best three efficient countries are Qatar -98%, Macedonia - 98% and Brazil -98%.  
Germany-98% ranks as the most efficient country in the True RE model, followed by Greece-98% and 
Turkey-98%. However, the least efficient countries in BC (92) model are Italy-62%, Nigeria -65% and 
Spain-66. For True FE model, the least efficient countries are Luxembourg -78%, Tanzania- 90% and 
Moldova-91%.  Luxembourg -79% and Tanzania-79% also rank as the least efficient countries in the True 
RE model followed Bostwana-85%. 
 
Interestingly, the efficiency score shows that most of the OECD European countries are among the top 20 
most efficient countries in True FE and True RE as opposed to BC (92) model. This is not surprising as the 
result for True FE and True RE capture time invariant heterogeneities in each country’s operating 
characteristics that are not otherwise controlled for in the model. Thus, the result is highly consistent with 
the statistically significant deregulation variable indicated by political rights in the True FE and True RE 
models where we detect the influence of market reform on the efficiency score.   
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Table 3.6: Efficiency Scores 91 for countries 
 
Countries BC (92)                         True FE True RE 
  Eff. Score Rank   Eff. Score Rank Eff. Score Rank 
   
       OECD   Countries 
   Australia 0.670 88   0.977 47 0.977 33 
Austria 0.700 84   0.973 56 0.972 51 
Belgium 0.746 63   0.981 20 0.980 11 
Canada 0.727 69   0.981 25 0.979 16 
Chile 0.783 47   0.972 58 0.965 69 
China 0.862 30   0.979 34 0.978 27 
Czech Republic 0.789 46   0.981 22 0.979 18 
Denmark 0.713 76   0.969 68 0.969 61 
Estonia 0.971 4   0.944 80 0.937 85 
Finland 0.764 55   0.972 61 0.966 66 
France 0.708 79   0.980 27 0.979 23 
Germany 0.755 60   0.982   6 0.981 1 
Greece 0.748 62   0.981 11 0.981 2 
Hungary 0.796 44   0.982 9 0.980 10 
Iceland 0.939 12   0.965 73 0.944 82 
Ireland 0.735 66   0.970 66 0.971 56 
Israel 0.779 50   0.981 12 0.980 8 
Italy 0.624 91   0.978 42 0.977 36 
Japan 0.727 68   0.979 33 0.978 28 
Luxembourg 0.871 28   0.775 91 0.788 91 
Mexico 0.726 71   0.981 17 0.980 12 
Netherlands 0.718 75   0.981 15 0.980 7 
New Zealand 0.842 33   0.980 28 0.976 42 
Norway 0.829 34   0.980 31 0.969 63 
Poland 0.823 35   0.958 77 0.955 74 
Portugal 0.722 72   0.977 46 0.977 34 
Slovakia 0.813 38   0.981 16 0.979 20 
Slovenia 0.809 40   0.978 40 0.978 31 
Spain 0.659 89   0.978 41 0.977 35 
Sweden 0.770 51   0.981 13 0.980 6 
Switzerland 0.768 52   0.981 23 0.980 5 
Turkey 0.707 80   0.982 7 0.980 3 
United Kingdom 0.720 73   0.981 14 0.980 13 
USA 0.815 37   0.981 21 0.979 15 
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Table 3.6: Efficiency Scores 91 for countries (cond.) 
 
Countries BC (92)                         True FE True RE 
  Eff. Score Rank   Eff. Score Rank Eff. Score Rank 
 
  
  Non-OECD Countries 
  Albania 0.953 8   0.938 85 0.919 87 
Algeria 0.752 61   0.978 43 0.975 45 
Argentina 0.690 86   0.938 86 0.944 83 
Belarus 0.733 67   0.982 10 0.969 62 
Bolivia 0.873 24   0.978 39 0.978 25 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0.877 21   0.973 55 0.971 54 
Botswana 0.947 11   0.922 88 0.850 89 
Brazil 0.683 87   0.982  3 0.980 9 
Bulgaria 0.791 45   0.981 24 0.979 19 
Colombia 0.697 85   0.977 44 0.977 39 
Costa Rica 0.936 13   0.979 35 0.977 38 
Croatia 0.815 36   0.977    45 0.976 40 
Cuba 0.757 58   0.980 30 0.978 26 
Cyprus 0.896 19   0.980 29 0.978 32 
Dominican Republic 0.782 48   0.943 81 0.943 84 
Ecuador 0.812 39   0.966 72 0.965 68 
El Salvador 0.977 2   0.972 57 0.952 75 
Ethiopia 0.908 18   0.962 76 0.960 71 
Georgia 0.799 41   0.950 79 0.951 77 
Ghana 0.867 29   0.972  60 0.972 53 
Honduras 0.951 10   0.972  62 0.970 59 
India 0.797 43   0.981  18 0.980 4 
Indonesia 0.726 70   0.940 83 0.952 76 
Iran 0.768 53   0.982   4 0.979 22 
Jamaica 0.878 20   0.930 87 0.923 86 
Jordan 0.873 25   0.978  38 0.977 37 
Kenya 0.877 22   0.963  75 0.958 73 
Latvia 0.846 32   0.939 84 0.945 81 
Lithuania 0.746 64   0.966 71 0.967 65 
Macedonia 0.954 7   0.982 2 0.978 30 
Malaysia 0.743 65   0.975 50 0.976 43 
Malta 0.990 1   0.981 19 0.968 64 
Moldova 0.911 17   0.919 89 0.901 88 
Mongolia 0.959 6   0.982    8 0.979 21 
Morocco 0.780 49   0.971   63 0.971 55 
Nicaragua 0.929 15   0.964  74 0.959 72 
Nigeria 0.654 90   0.942  82 0.947 80 
Pakistan 0.756 59   0.972  59 0.970 57 
Panama 0.914 16   0.969  67 0.949 78 
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Table 3.6: Efficiency Scores 91 for countries (cond.) 
Countries BC (92)                         True FE True RE 
  Eff. Score Rank   Eff. Score Rank Eff. Score Rank 
 
  
       Non-OECD Countries 
  Peru 0.766 54   0.975 51 0.974 49 
Philippines 0.710 77   0.971 64 0.970 60 
Qatar 0.952 9   0.982 1 0.980 14 
Romania 0.702 83   0.978 37 0.976 41 
Russia 0.703 82   0.979 32 0.978 29 
Senegal 0.873 26   0.950 78 0.948 79 
Serbia 0.871 27   0.982     5 0.979 24 
Singapore 0.762 56   0.977 48 0.974 48 
South Africa 0.762 57   0.976 49 0.976 44 
Sri Lanka 0.860 31   0.974 52 0.972 50 
Tanzania 0.965 5   0.901 90 0.792 90 
Thailand 0.719 74   0.974 53 0.974 47 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.875 23   0.979 36 0.975 46 
United Arab Emirates 0.707 81   0.973 54 0.972 52 
Uruguay 0.933 14   0.967 69 0.966 67 
Venezuela 0.709 78   0.970 65 0.970 58 
Vietnam 0.799 42   0.981 26 0.979 17 
Zambia 0.976 3   0.967 70 0.961 70 
 
This is not surprising as there is widespread knowledge that the European electricity market liberalisation 
which began in early 1990s has a central objective of increasing the efficiency in production, transportation 
and distribution of electricity. This liberalisation directive can be adduced to the widespread efficient score 
recorded from that region. 
 
It is intriguing to note that Germany ranks as the most efficient European country in both models. Arguably, 
Germany has seen an impressive growth of electricity generation mix, especially from renewables during the 
1990s due to a feed-in mechanism laid down in the first German feed-in system (Mitchell et al. 2006). This 
is aided by the liberalisation and deregulation of the German power market driven by the EU Electricity 
Directive, which has continuously increased the diversity within the group of energy producers coupled with 
the modification of the feed-in-tariff.  However, Qatar is ranked the most efficient country in the True FE 
model, although the power sector was reformed in 2000 by separating power generation from transmission 
and distribution, with the entry some independent power producers (see KAPSARC, 2017). 
117 
 
Furthermore, contrary to expectation at the bottom end of the efficiency rank is Luxembourg, despite being 
an EU member, it doubly ranks as the least efficient country in both True FE and True RE models. 
Nevertheless, consistent with a capital-intensive industry, Luxembourg by itself does not have much 
installed capacity as the electricity wholesale market is highly interconnected with, and dependent on, 
foreign electricity supply. Most is power imported from its neighbouring countries (Al-Sunaidy and Green, 
2006). Arguably, high electricity imports have a negative effect on power plant efficiency level. The 
inadequate power generation capacity and decrepit power plants in Nigeria also explain the country’s 
inefficient score in BC (92) model as self-electricity generation is generally common in the country, which 
is projected to be between 4,000-8,000 MW (Eberhard and Gatwick, 2012). This has resulted in incessant 
blackouts and rationing; outrageous tariff increases and inadequate investments to realise a sustainable 
expansion in order to meet electricity demand. Finally, countries such as Italy and Spain are inefficient in 
BC (92) model electricity generation. The result is highly consistent with those of Chen & Yee (2013) which 
reported power plant inefficiency for most of these countries, potentially due to dwindling economic power 
and an associated reduction in electricity demand.  It is not immediately clear why the ranking of efficiency 
scores across three models indicate that few regulated countries attain some level of efficiency in the 
models. Nevertheless, this finding shows the facts that efficiency scores are model specific to a large extent, 
as so me the countries are seen to be efficient in one model and otherwise in another model. In general, 
these efficiencies ranking results should be treated with some caution, especially given the large sampled 
countries with certain degree of diversity among them. 
 
3.5.2   Intercept results 
Our study further investigates whether deregulation is being measured by unobserved heterogeneity rather 
efficiency components, so we generated different intercepts by country for the fitted true fixed effect model. 
The choice of the model is based on the model selection test using Akaike’s information criterion indicates 
The Akaike information criterion clearly confirms that the true fixed effect model best fits our data. The 
estimate of the intercept for each country for the true fixed effect is shown in Table 3.7 
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 Table 3.7: Intercept by country - True Fixed Effects Model 
 
 
Country Model 1- All variables 
 
Country Model 2- Deregulation variable 
     
  Coefficient t-statistic     Coefficient t-statistic 
Malta 0.167** 2.388 
 
Botswana 0.822*** 11.744 
Tanzania 0.154*** 2.948 
 
Honduras 0.768*** 18.891 
El Salvador 0.148*** 8.222 
 
Jamaica 0.686*** 20.343 
Iceland 0.140** 2.341 
 
Zambia 0.671*** 28.411 
Panama 0.117*** 3.520 
 
El Salvador 0.663*** 19.801 
Macedonia 0.117*** 5.996 
 
Ethiopia 0.660*** 12.455 
Albania 0.113*** 6.053 
 
Kenya 0.657*** 18.545 
Moldova 0.105*** 3.778 
 
Iceland 0.641*** 14.331 
Norway 0.104* 1.895 
 
Senegal 0.640*** 11.660 
Cyprus 0.103*** 3.444 
 
Tanzania 0.637*** 14.763 
Jamaica 0.096*** 3.919 
 
Ghana 0.637*** 24.761 
New Zealand 0.094* 1.922 
 
Qatar 0.617*** 16.615 
Singapore 0.093 1.492 
 
Nicaragua 0.581*** 12.799 
Costa Rica 0.091*** 3.896 
 
Estonia 0.571*** 12.625 
Botswana 0.087 1.534 
 
Costa Rica 0.563*** 19.946 
Honduras 0.081*** 2.873 
 
Panama 0.540*** 17.291 
Uruguay 0.081*** 2.633 
 
Uruguay 0.539*** 22.365 
Mongolia 0.079 0.881 
 
Albania 0.535*** 16.037 
Zambia 0.077 1.454 
 
Cyprus 0.483*** 7.996 
Slovenia 0.073*** 5.211 
 
Luxembourg 0.473*** 6.199 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.069 1.390 
 
Malta 0.436*** 7.502 
Nicaragua 0.068 1.643 
 
New Zealand 0.397*** 22.760 
Qatar 0.067*** 2.594 
 
Moldova 0.388*** 10.008 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0.066*** 2.804 
 
Bolivia 0.363*** 10.417 
Kenya 0.066 1.481 
 
Chile 0.345*** 22.789 
Finland 0.065 1.318 
 
Latvia 0.340*** 8.059 
Sweden 0.063 1.339 
 
Norway 0.330*** 10.596 
Ghana 0.0589*** 1.734 
 
Macedonia 0.295*** 9.104 
Hungary 0.056** 2.351 
 
Ecuador 0.285*** 13.405 
Senegal 0.054 1.222 
 
Dominican Republic 0.266*** 7.949 
Chile 0.053 1.056 
 
Peru 0.216*** 13.232 
Ethiopia 0.053 0.929 
 
Jordan 0.214*** 7.642 
Czech Republic 0.049** 2.061 
 
Slovenia 0.202*** 9.735 
Jordan 0.048* 1.775 
 
Cuba 0.200*** 6.249 
USA 0.046 0.518 
 
Netherlands 0.157*** 8.535 
Japan 0.044 1.225 
 
Croatia 0.150*** 7.056 
Slovak Republic 0.044*** 2.651 
 
Trinidad and Tobago 0.134*** 3.850 
Ecuador 0.043 1.290 
 
Belarus 0.128*** 3.413 
Netherlands 0.043 2.353 
 
Georgia 0.072** 1.961 
Serbia 0.041* 1.660 
 
Ireland 0.071*** 4.295 
Indonesia 0.040 0.788  Austria 0.066*** 3.840 
Estonia 0.039 1.888  Colombia 0.058*** 3.512 
Sri Lanka 0.038 1.004 
 
Mongolia 0.055 1.123 
Croatia 0.038** 2.089 
 
Brazil 0.025 0.658 
Bolivia 0.037 0.547 
 
Nigeria 0.024 1.096 
Bulgaria 0.035 1.055 
 
Viet Nam 0.019 0.926 
Switzerland 0.035** 2.264 
 
Portugal 0.019 1.560 
Dominican Republic 0.033* 1.695 
 
Canada 0.008 0.214 
Israel 0.029 0.756 
 
Finland 0.008 0.433 
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Table 3.7: Intercept by country - True Fixed Effects Model (cond.) 
 
Country Model 1- All variables 
 
Country Model 2- Deregulation variable 
     
  Coefficient t-statistic     Coefficient t-statistic 
Greece 0.029 1.085  Venezuela  0.001 0.069 
Portugal  0.028 1.363  Switzerland -0.003 -0.161 
Poland  0.028 0.752  Denmark -0.006 -0.295 
Canada  0.027 0.273  Bosnia-Herzegovina -0.017 -0.503 
Denmark  0.025 1.262  Israel -0.017 -1.024 
France  0.025 0.568  Serbia -0.048* -1.737 
Germany  0.025 0.671  Singapore -0.053** -1.967 
Belgium  0.021 1.429  Sri Lanka -0.055*** -0.768 
Argentina  0.020 0.296  Morocco -0.079*** -4.080 
Peru  0.020 0.346  Malaysia -0.082*** -5.826 
Ireland  0.018 0.821  Turkey -0.084*** -4.499 
United Kingdom  0.017 0.547  Lithuania -0.096*** -4.060 
China  0.014 0.194  Philippines -0.105*** -7.095 
India  0.012 0.196  Sweden -0.108*** -4.194 
Malaysia  0.010 0.314  Hungary -0.110*** -7.117 
Austria  0.010 0.395  Greece -0.115*** -7.475 
Turkey  0.002 0.049  Belgium -0.118*** -6.224 
Morocco  0.002 0.056  Slovak Republic -0.122*** -8.343 
Philippines  0.000 -0.004  Pakistan -0.124*** -4.763 
Pakistan -0.002 -0.049  Russia -0.156*** -2.567 
Viet Nam -0.003 -0.081  Argentina -0.158*** -8.704 
Venezuela -0.005 -0.093  Indonesia -0.163*** -8.530 
Brazil -0.005 -0.064  Mexico -0.174*** -7.522 
Spain -0.006 -0.144  Algeria -0.186*** -9.599 
Colombia -0.009 -0.166  Thailand -0.187*** -10.211 
Lithuania -0.015 -0.542  USA -0.193*** -2.562 
South Africa -0.017 -0.356  South Africa -0.206*** -7.904 
Russia -0.017 -0.179  Bulgaria -0.211*** -9.484 
Latvia -0.018 -0.488  Japan -0.212*** -4.405 
Thailand -0.025 -0.797  Czech Republic -0.221*** -12.286 
Mexico -0.027 -0.648  United Arab Emirates -0.232*** -7.973 
United Arab Emirates -0.028 -1.119  United Kingdom -0.232*** -7.727 
Romania -0.028 -0.759  Germany -0.251*** -6.797 
Italy -0.031 -0.993  Italy -0.256*** -9.035 
Australia -0.036 -0.385  Poland -0.267*** -10.949 
Belarus -0.046   Spain -0.279*** -11.289 
Algeria -0.050 -0.826  Australia -0.289*** -11.942 
Cuba -0.051* -1.668  France -0.299*** -8.537 
Iran -0.053 -1.254  China -0.305*** -4.618 
Nigeria -0.066 -1.449  India -0.323*** -7.770 
Georgia -0.085*** -2.712  Romania -0.350*** -15.740 
Luxembourg -0.199*** -4.310  Iran -0.355*** -12.225 
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We estimated the intercepts by controlling for all the exogenous variables as reported under model 1, while 
model 2 accounts for only the deregulation variable. The approach enables us to draw parallels between the 
rank order of the fixed effect for all variables and the rank order of the fixed effect for the deregulation 
variable. Intuitively, higher intercepts correspond to countries with lowest distance below the frontier. One 
striking result that emerges from this analysis is that almost 90% of the coefficients of the intercepts in 
model 2, after controlling for the deregulation impact, are statistically significant as against 33% for the 
model 1. This reinforces the important influence of political rights to reform measurement.   
 
We find that the countries at the top 20 rank of the country intercepts after controlling for the deregulation 
variable are countries from Latin America and a few African countries. This is likely as a result of the 
marked liberalisation wave, especially for the Latin American countries, which has pushed them close to the 
frontier. Similarly, most of the African countries are democratic countries. For instance, Botswana is rated 
the country with the highest political rights index in Africa, although the country has undertaken little 
meaningful reform of its power sector. However, in 2007, the government of Botswana amended the energy 
supply act to facilitate the participation of independent power producers in the electricity sector and plans to 
restructure the electricity supply industry in accordance with Botswana’s membership in the Southern Africa 
Power Pool (Vagliasindi and Besant-Jones, 2013). Iran ranks as the least efficient country after controlling 
for the deregulation variable. This finding confirms our expectation as the Iranian state owned vertically 
integrated utility is still responsible for electricity generation, transmission and distribution. Finally, most of 
the OECD countries gain less efficiency when controlled for political rights. Presumably, one plausible 
argument for this is that since these countries are already close to the frontier and politically advanced in 
their own right, the fixed effect is picking up some of the influence of the reform score on the Latin 
American and African countries which are increasingly becoming politically strong and reform oriented. 
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3.5.3   Productivity Change result 
 The indices for average productivity growth which is made up of the three aspects: efficiency, scale and 
technological change for the true fixed effect model over the period of 1981–2010 are shown in Table 3.8. 
The estimate for average efficiency changes indicates the “catch up” of productivity, while technical change 
reveals the frontier shift at the input level and mix of each country.   
 
Table 3.8: Annual Average Generalised Malmquist Productivity Indices and its Components 
 
 Year* Technical Change Efficiency Change     Scale Change Productivity Change 
1981 0.999 0.993 1.000 0.993 
1982 0.999 1.002 1.000 1.002 
1983 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.999 
1984 0.999 0.996 1.000 0.996 
1985 0.999 1.003 1.000 1.003 
1986 0.999 1.001 1.000 1.001 
1987 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.999 
1988 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.999 
1989 1.000 1.006 1.000 1.006 
1990 1.000 1.005 1.000 1.005 
1991 1.000 0.996 1.000 0.996 
1992 1.000 0.996 1.000 1.003 
1993 1.000 1.003 1.000 0.997 
1994 1.000 0.997 1.000 0.999 
1995 1.000 1.003 1.000 1.002 
1996 1.000 0.999 1.000 0.999 
1997 1.000 1.003 1.000 1.003 
1998 1.000 0.998 1.000 0.998 
1999 1.000 0.998 1.000 0.997 
2000 1.000 0.999 1.000 0.999 
2001 1.000 1.006 1.000 1.006 
2002 1.000 0.999 1.000 1.006 
2003 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
2004 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 
2005 1.000 0.999 1.000 0.998 
2006 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 
2007 1.000 1.001 0.999 0.999 
2008 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.999 
2009 1.000 0.994 1.000 0.994 
2010 1.000 1.001 0.999 1.000 
* Note that 1981 refers to the change between 1980 and 1981, etc. 
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The table reveals that over the whole sample period, there has been no technological deterioration except for 
1981 which show evidence of technological regression. The table also reveals that the sample period is 
characterised by constant returns to scale of technology. Meanwhile the period experiences a mix of 
relatively small decline and a marginal increase in average efficiency changes. For the sake of brevity these 
results are summarised in Figure 3.1.  
 
Figure 3.1:  Total factor productivity decomposition 1980-2010 
 
 
 
On the whole figure 3.1 reveals that productivity has been quite unstable through the sample period. A slight 
improvement occurred during 2001–2003. Tellingly, the decomposition shows that TFP wanders through the 
sample period. Efficiency change also meanders considerably mirroring the pattern of TFP change. The 
indices for average productivity growth show that average efficiency changes account for a large amount of 
the growth in productivity compared to technical change and scale change. Scale change is shown to have 
been generally stable through the sample period coupled with no significant frontier shift as revealed by 
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technical change. Moreover, the plotted scale change in the diagrams above appears consistent with the 
estimated returns to scale of 1.032 in our preferred model, the TFE model. 
 
3.6   Conclusion and policy implications 
This paper uses an extensive panel dataset of 91 countries in the electricity generation sector to measure the 
impact of deregulation in power sector efficiency and total productivity change. Three specific issues are 
addressed in the study: the relationship between deregulation and technical efficiency, the extent of the rank 
correlation of the country intercepts with deregulation via their position on the frontier (?̂?𝑗)  and the trend of 
total factor productivity and its components. The methodology relies on the traditional stochastic frontier 
Battese and Coelli (92) model, and the recently developed Greene (2005) True Fixed Effect and True 
Random Effect models which separate unobserved heterogeneity form the inefficiency.  
 
A number of results follow. Firstly, we establish a positive impact of deregulation on efficiency as revealed 
by the statistically significant political rights variables in both True Fixed Effect and True Random Effect 
models. We also confirm the presence of mild increasing return to scale for electricity generation. 
Comparing the average efficiency scores of the countries in our sample, we gain a far-reaching 
understanding on the country performance with respect to electricity generation. The fitted models show 
different efficiency scores for each country at different levels. In both the true fixed effect and true random 
effect models, most OECD European countries are consistently ranked as highly efficient. This reinforces 
our a priori expectations that deregulation provides truly competitive markets which are efficiency–inducing 
among electricity generators in democratically developed countries.  
 
Secondly, the estimates of the intercepts after controlling for the deregulation variable in our preferred 
model, TFE, show almost 90% of the coefficients of the intercepts in the model are statistically significant. 
This lends credence to the important influence of political rights on reform implementation. The result also 
shows that the deregulation variable has much higher impacts on countries intercepts from Latin America 
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and a few African countries. A plausible explanation for this result is that reform is gradually pushing these 
countries toward the frontier as a result of increasing democratic institution of the countries. It is notable that 
the World Bank and some other international organisations have, often, required that international aid and 
loans for electricity generation are conditional on market reform of the electricity sector. A notable example 
is Latin America (See Estache and Rossi, 2005). This finding underscores the policy conditionality as the 
imposed binding constraint has been empirically proven to be feasible and yields potential benefit. One 
possible policy recommendation is that policymakers should scale up more extensive electricity market 
reform in these countries in order to consolidate on the fledgling efficiency gains and create an independent 
regulatory body to prevent and mitigate against principle-agent problems.  
 
Thirdly, the indices for average productivity growth decomposition shows that TFP wanders through the 
sample period with average efficiency changes accounting for a large amount of the growth in productivity 
compared to technical change during the sample period. We recommend technological innovation within a 
deregulation context as a possible power generation approach to improve productivity. This can be achieved 
through implementation of policies that allow independent power producers and generators to produce 
electricity from various sources such as PV, wind turbine or other energy sources which are technologically 
driven and more efficient. Policies intending to encourage commercialization of new energy technologies 
tend to enhance technological development and ultimately increase total productivity growth in the medium 
to long term. Moreover, policymakers should encourage adoption of cross national policy similarities in 
term of practices and technologies used in the high efficient countries through transnational communication, 
regulatory competition and technological innovation. This will enhance growth in technology and 
productivity such as the feed-in tariffs in Germany which has been adopted in France and the United 
Kingdom. This is evident from the result as these countries show no technological deterioration throughout 
the sample period.  In conclusion, the results analysed hitherto support the assumption that there is a 
difference between countries in technical efficiency and productivity change. More specifically, adopting 
deregulation policy seems to confer performance advantage on deregulated countries.  
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Chapter 4: Cost Efficiency and Electricity Market Structure: A Case Study 
of OECD Countries20   
                    
 
 
 
4.1    Introduction 
Due to the liberalisation and deregulation wave in the electric power industry across most of the countries in 
the world, electricity generation companies, especially in the several OECD countries now act as 
unregulated companies that technically compete to sell power on an open market. An overview of 
experiences in several OECD countries where the generation segment has largely been deregulated while 
transmission and distribution continue to be regulated is provided by Al-Sunaidy & Green (2006); Joskow 
(2008). One compelling reason for the deregulation of electricity generation as against direct economic 
regulation is the lack of a natural monopoly in this segment21 which is the common feature of transmission 
and distribution. This policy choice, along with horizontal restructuring of the segment, has been 
accompanied by an increased number of competing generators which mitigate market power and ensure that 
wholesale markets are reasonably competitive.  
 
The recent history of the electricity generation industry has been characterised in many countries by 
privatization, deregulation and liberalization. Although these changes are often given the convenient overall 
titles of deregulation or open markets, these can be misleading, and these changes can be significantly 
different in scope and meaning. It should be clear that while such policy induced changes can occur 
together, they do not mean the same thing. By privatization, we mean the conversion of state owned or 
publicly owned utilities into investor owned utilities. By deregulation, we mean the decision by government 
to step back from the day-to-day determination of pricing and investment decisions. One alternative to direct 
government control is to appoint a regulatory agency which is independent but accountable to government 
and which is responsible for regulating the natural monopoly aspects of the industry which arise from the 
                                                          
20 An abridged version of this chapter has been published as:  Ajayi, V., Weyman-Jones, T. and Glass, A., 2017. Cost efficiency and electricity 
market structure: A case study of OECD countries. Energy Economics, 65, pp.283-291. 
21 Electricity production is conventionally segmented into generator, (HV) transmission, (LV) distribution and retail supply. 
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importance of economies of scale and scope. By liberalization, we mean the opening of the market to new 
entrants and the permission of incumbents to demerge into competing firms or alternatively to merge or even 
exit the industry. The model here is of a competitive industry where entry and exit are relatively free and of 
low cost, thereby reducing the need for extensive or intensive regulation by a national regulatory authority. 
 
These forms are not synonymous with each other and may occur to varying degrees in the power generation 
industry at different times. In Scandinavian countries publicly-owned utilities exist within a deregulated and 
liberalised market and in Germany there are many municipal level publicly owned utilities within a 
deregulated and partly privatised market for power networks.  
 
Figure 4.1: Public ownership index in OECD countries (1989, 2009)  
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 Figure 4.1 shows the degree of public ownership when electricity market reform was first introduced in 
1989 compared with 2009 in our sample period. The index 0-6 measures the extent of public ownership, 
with 0 representing a fully open deregulated market in which public ownership is low and a score of 6 
denotes a closed market and high state ownership. It is intriguing to note that virtually all the OECD 
countries were state-owned up until 1989. Essentially, this reflects cases where the market power arising 
from economies of scale has been addressed by state ownership rather than regulated investor ownership.  
 
In a regulated environment, firms are often guaranteed a minimum profit as a function of the firm’s capital 
stock. Hence, this often leads to unintended consequences in that a firm may have strong incentives to 
overinvest in capital, such as generation facilities which could potentially result in the electric plants 
operating at decreasing returns to scale owing to overcapitalisation22. However, power generation companies 
operating in a competitive market environment have incentives to reduce costs while maintaining the 
relevant cost savings as profits (Keith and Terrell, 2001). In effect, deregulation may stimulate firms to be 
more efficient in generating electricity, thereby reducing electricity cost with consumers receiving lower 
end-user prices of electricity. 
 
The generation of electricity involves using a different range of technology and fuel. To a great extent, 
fossil-fuel-fired boilers producing steam for turbine generators remain the major electricity generation 
technology. These generation technologies are characterised by quasi-fixed inputs which implies that they 
cannot be immediately adjusted. Another important characteristic of electricity infrastructures is that its 
current technology is a consequence of investment decisions made in the past and whose effects resonate 
over various periods23. Nelson (1985) argues that the nature of the generation facilities in the electric power 
industry could result in the firm not operating on the economic expansion path, since estimations of 
economic of scale in this industry have been based on long-run cost which implicitly or explicitly invoke the 
                                                          
22 This situation is known as the Averch Johnson effect.  Averch and Johnson (1962) argue that when regulators tie profit to capital stock and a 
rate of return that exceeds actual cost of capital, this provides incentives for a profit maximizing firm to employ a capital to labour ratio that is 
too be high to be on the efficient expansion path. See Averch and Johnson (1962) 
 
23 See Díaz-Hernández, et al. (2014) for a similar discussion on ports infrastructure 
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assumption of cost minimization, this assumption will be violated. The need to account for such quasi-fixed 
inputs is therefore important in estimating scale economies to avoid imprecise and biased cost function 
parameters. 
 
Cost efficiency, economies of scale and scope, among other characteristics of multiproduct technologies, 
have important implications for industry structure, design and regulation.  The estimation of scale economies 
plays a vital role in electricity sector policy formulation, and several studies (see Considine (2000), Keith 
and Terrell, (2001), Maloney (2001), Hiebert (2002) and Rungsuriyawiboon and Stefanou (2007) have 
favoured partial or complete deregulation of the electric utility industry as a means of achieving desirable 
competition between electric generating plants. This allows regulator and antitrust officials to utilise the 
information in achieving a balancing act between market power24 and economies of scale, while inducing 
efficient performance. The reliability of efficiency scores and scale economies are crucial for effective 
policy decisions in order to determine the dimensions of industry competition and firm’s operations in the 
generator segment, and how a firm can efficiently compete in a given market.  
 
Analysis of electricity generation cost structure and efficiency is made more imperative in the understanding 
of the behaviour of power generators in relation to environmental and social welfare aspects. Electricity is a 
non-storable commodity which requires the balancing of power generated and consumed on an electric grid 
on a second by-second basis. The ability of these generators to adjust their generating capacity, and hence 
the output at will many times, is constrained and could be slowed down in the presence of suboptimal 
capacity factors like cost associated with such adjustments, administrative regulation, external factors and 
time. Therefore, cost structure analysis may help to reduce technical and economic inefficiency and enhance 
social benefit. This could perhaps necessitate mergers of power generators who are not operating optimally 
in order to reduce operation costs, since success of competition rests on the size and number of generators in 
the market.  
 
                                                          
24 See Keith and Terrell, 2001 for a discussion of market power problem of deregulation 
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One of the major contributors to global greenhouse gas emissions is electric power generation, accounting 
for 42% of the global energy related CO2 emissions and its associated externalities in 2011 (IEA, 2013). 
While focusing on how efficient power utilities are in generating electricity, it is also crucial to understand 
how well they manage to avoid unnecessarily large emission production levels (bad outputs). Carbon 
emissions produced by electricity generators are endogenous in the production process since they are 
considered a joint output of electric power plants alongside electricity generation output. Reducing these 
environmental costs is associated with decreasing generation output at existing input levels, or increases in 
input costs at desired output levels. Power utilities are concerned that commitment to reducing these bad 
outputs would eliminate their profit margins and impede their competitiveness with other generators.  
 
More often than not, charges and levies associated with carbon emissions in the generation process pales 
into insignificance when compared with the cost of technologies for carbon abatement. Hence, these charges 
are usually not sufficient to motivate plant operators to reduce emissions and instead induce output effects as 
they often rationalise their optimal decisions at the expense of environmental optimality, which results in a 
trade-off between electric power output and carbon emission. This variation in costs of mitigation and 
technological investment is central to economies of scope and cost complementarities in the process of joint 
production of the electricity output and undesirable products. Understanding utility cost structure dynamics 
is fundamental to setting relevant environmental policy interventions and regulations.  
 
To this end, this paper attempts to contribute to the sparse empirical literature by assessing the cost 
efficiency and industry structure of OECD power generation sectors. Although deregulation is regarded as a 
flagship of electricity market reform policies, to our knowledge, no empirical study has explicitly 
investigated cost inefficiency, economies of scale and scope, cost complementarity of generation and 
emissions associated with this segment for OECD electricity countries.  The remainder of the paper proceeds 
as follows. Section 4.2 presents the brief literature review and section 4.3 details the methodology used in 
this paper in order to estimate cost functions and efficiency. Section 4.4 presents the data description and 
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section 4.5 provides the results and discussion.  Section 4.6 presents the concluding remarks and policy 
recommendation. 
 
4.2   Literature review 
A large number of studies have attempted to investigate cost structure and efficiency in electricity industry, 
as evidenced by the proliferation of the methodology. This underscores the growing discourse regarding 
deregulation of power sector and its attendant gains as advanced by proponents of market reform. 
Nevertheless, recent empirical findings have shown that cost function parameter estimates in the electricity 
sector differ across many study dimensions such as methodology, data type, model specification, sample 
size etc. While most of these studies have been dominated by the conventional long run cost minimisation 
assumption, little attention has been given to sub optimality of capacity as a result of costly adjustment to 
the time profile of electricity demand. For the handful that have considered cost estimation of the industry 
by taking into account the quasi-fixed input, there is no recognition of the multiproduct nature of the power 
industry where harmful emissions are assumed to be jointly produced with electric power. Most existing 
empirical applications of the short run cost which allows one to relax the assumption of cost minimization 
with respect to all inputs in electricity sector have used different functional forms, with translog functional 
forms being the most common specification.  
 
A search in the literature shows that cost function empirical analyses have been carried out for the different 
stages of the industry, as each of these stages are marked by different levels of competition and regulation in 
varying degrees across countries (See Nelson and Wohar, 1983; Kaserman and Mayo, 1991; Nemoto et al., 
1993). Most of the articles on the generation stage of the industry are in the context of the electricity 
industry in the U.S. which dates back to the work of Christensen and Greene (1976), using a translog total 
cost function to estimate scale economies of electric power generating firms. Other such as Nelson (1985, 
1989), Kraustmaan and Solow (1988), and Hovde et al (1996) employ a variable cost function to estimate 
scale economies. Rhine (2001) estimates economies of scale for fossil fuel and nuclear fuel electricity 
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generation using a variable cost function. The result shows that electric utilities are operating on the 
negatively sloped portion of the long-run average cost curve, indicating either slight economies of scale or 
no economies of scale. iNemoto et al (1993) also specify the variable cost function as a translog form using 
panel data of nine Japanese electric utility firms during the period 1981 to 1985. They find most firms 
experienced scale economies in the short run but diseconomies in the long run, and a certain degree of over-
capitalization. 
 
Some studies, which include Considine (2000), Keith and Terrell, (2001), Maloney (2001), Hiebert (2002) 
and Rungsuriyawiboon and Stefanou (2007), use data on the steam electric power generation source to 
estimate cost structures and the possible savings in the production costs for major investor owned utilities. 
Considine (2000) estimates short-and long-run marginal production cost and returns to scale and finds 
substantial short-run diseconomies of scale at high output levels. Keith and Terrell (2001) use a Bayesian 
stochastic frontier model to measure cost efficiency, price elasticities, and returns to scale of 78 steam 
plants. Their results indicate that plants, on average, could reduce costs by up to 13% by eliminating 
production inefficiency. They show that most plants operate at increasing returns to scale, suggesting further 
cost savings could be achieved through increasing output.  Maloney (2001) applied a translog variable cost 
function to study electricity generation in the United States. The cost function is estimated using a two 
dimensional definition of capacity utilization and the result shows that both dimensions affect average cost, 
which generally declines as capacity utilization increases.  Hiebert (2002) finds increasing scale economies 
in both coal-fired plants and natural gas-fired plants with 20% and 12% scale economies respectively. 
Rungsuriyawiboon and Stefanou (2007) show that most electric utilities underutilized fuel and overutilized 
capital in production. They conclude that states adopting a deregulation plan could improve the performance 
of utilities in terms of the technical efficiency of variable inputs. 
 
More recent studies such as Wang, Xie, Shang & Li (2013) identify measures to improve the performance of 
China’s thermal power industry in view of cost efficiency. Assaf, Barros, Managi (2010) analyse and 
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compare the cost efficiency of electricity generation in Japanese steam power generation utilities using the 
fixed and random effect Bayesian frontier models. The results show that total cost increases significantly 
with input prices and outputs, with the exception of the price of labour and restricting CO2 emissions can 
lead to a decrease in total cost. Akkemik (2009) estimates cost functions and investigates the degree of scale 
economies, overinvestment, and technological progress in the Turkish electricity generation sector for the 
period 1984–2006 using long-run and short-run translog cost functions. Estimations were done for six 
groups of firms, public and private. The results indicate the existence of scale economies throughout the 
period of analysis, hence declining long-run average costs.  
 
Empirical studies on the cost structure for the transmission and distribution stages include the work of 
Kwoka (2005) which use quadratic cost functions to examine whether mergers in the US distribution sector 
which appeared as a consequence of the reforms could enhance cost efficiencies. The findings reveal 
significant economies at low output levels, holding system size and customer density constant, but the cost 
gradient is otherwise modest. It also shows that the scale properties of the wires function are significantly 
stronger than those for the supply function performed by distribution utilities. Yatchew (2000) estimates the 
costs of distributing electricity using data on municipal electric utilities in Ontario, Canada. Their 
specifications comprise semiparametric variants of the translog cost function where output enters non-
parametrically and remaining variables (including their interactions with output) are parametric. The study 
reveals substantial evidence of increasing returns to scale with minimum efficient scale being achieved by 
firms with about 20,000 customers while the large firms exhibit constant or decreasing returns. Giles and 
Wyatt (1993) estimate a total cost function from a sample of 60 New Zealand electricity distributors, 
reporting an efficient scale for a sales range of 500 to 3500 GWh. 
 
Burns and Weyman-Jones (1996) use cost frontier models to estimate the efficiency change for 12 regional 
electricity distributors in the UK. They enumerate factors which determine costs such the maximum demand 
on the system, the number of customers served (the main determinants of distribution operating costs), the 
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type of consumer, the dispersion of the consumers, the size of the distribution area, the total kWh sold 
system security, the length of distribution line and the transformer capacity. Their results indicate significant 
evidence of economies of scale. Kopsakangas-Savolainen and Svento, (2008) examine the cost-effectiveness 
of Finnish electricity distribution utilities employing several panel data stochastic frontier specifications of 
Cobb–Douglas and Translog model. The study points out the importance of the efficient use of the existing 
distribution network with the economies of scale results suggesting that firms could reduce their operating 
costs by using networks more efficiently.  
 
In two different studies of Swiss electricity distribution utilities, Filippini (1996) and Filippini and Wild 
(2001) use a flexible translog by introducing a quasi-fixed cost, representing the impacts of quasi-fixed 
distribution equipment and a linear average cost function, and find evidence of increasing scale economies 
throughout their sample of 39 and 59 utilities respectively. Filippini (1998) also shows the existence of 
economies of density for most output levels for 39 Swiss municipal distribution utilities, while economies of 
scale appear for small and medium-sized utilities. A policy recommendation for mergers among the utilities 
follows. Pollitt et al (2005) examine the relative performance of electricity distribution systems in the UK 
and Japan between 1985 and 1998 using cost-based benchmarking with data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
and stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) methods and suggest that the productivity gain in UK electricity 
distribution has been larger than in the Japanese sector.  
 
Some studies also provide empirical evidence for the whole industry. Arcos and De Toledo (2009) examine 
eleven vertically integrated Spanish utilities and find the presence of economies of scale, the effect of 
technological progress and differences in the efficiency of the different firms within the market. They 
conclude that the Spanish electrical utility industry was not, in fact, characterized by economies of scale, but 
witnessed a great improvement in efficiency within that period. Fraquelli and Vannoni (2005) investigate 
cost savings from generation and distribution of Italian electric utilities. The study finds evidence of both 
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multi-stage economies of scale and vertical economies and suggests that a complete divestiture policy would 
entail efficiency losses. 
 
Considering the theoretical supposition of deregulation which assumes the exhaustion of economies of scale 
for generation25, there is a need to further investigate this argument from the point of view of cross country 
analysis. Thus, the present study contributes to existing literature in threefold. First, unlike previous studies 
which are centred on country level analysis, the present study focuses exclusively on cost estimates at the 
generation segments in OECD countries. The broader geographical coverage enhances a better 
understanding of the cost structures among these estimates in OECD countries electricity generation. 
Second, we investigate the impact of electricity market structure on cost efficiency by incorporating 
electricity reform regulatory indexes in our analysis. Third, unlike previous studies, we extend our model to 
include a multiproduct function by including carbon emissions as part of the outputs of electricity generation 
in order to estimate and provide reliable information on some cost characteristics of generation such as cost 
complementarity, non-jointness etc. 
 
4.3   Methodology 
4.3.1   Theoretical Framework-Cost Function 
An electricity utility produces a vector of outputs 𝒚 = (𝑦𝑟 , 𝑦𝑠)
′ ≥  0, with 𝑦𝑟 the desirable output generated 
in the production process, and 𝑦𝑠 the part of production that constitutes environmental pollution. The output 
of electricity during the production process is dependent upon inputs such as stock of capital from 
generating capacity (K), labour (L) and primary fuels (F). Our analysis is described as follows; 
 
Let 𝒚 𝜖 ℜ+
𝑚 represents an m-dimensional vector of outputs produced from an n-dimensional input 
vector𝒙 𝜖 ℜ+
𝑛 . Outputs are determined exogenously in order to meet market demand. The production process 
can be characterised as 𝑓(𝒚, 𝐱, 𝑡) = 0 where 𝐱 = (𝑥𝐾, 𝑥𝐿 , 𝑥𝐹  )
′ is the vector of inputs and 𝑦 = (𝑦𝑟 , 𝑦𝑠)
′ is the 
                                                          
25 See Landon (1983) and Joskow (1996) for a discussion of the assumption of technology and cost structures of different segments of the 
power sector. 
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vector of output and t denotes the level of technology which uses time as a proxy. Duality theory 
demonstrates a complete reconstruction of the associated minimum cost function for a good from the 
original production function26. Cost minimization assumes that, given the input costs, firms choose the mix 
of inputs that minimizes the costs of producing a given level of output. Given that the factors are purchased 
competitively at price 𝒘 𝜖 ℜ+
𝑛 , we assume the power plant chooses the inputs so as to minimize the long-run 
cost of production, such that: 
 
                             min
𝑥≥0
∑ w𝑖x𝑖
𝑖=𝐾,𝐿,𝐹
    such that  𝑓(𝒚, 𝐱, 𝑡) = 0                                                                           (4.1) 
  
Where 𝐰 = (𝑤𝐾, 𝑤𝐿 , 𝑤𝐹 )
′ is the vector of factor prices. This yields the long-run cost function 𝐶(𝒚, 𝐰, 𝑡) = 
∑ wixi𝑖 (𝒚, 𝐰, 𝑡). 
 
The long-run cost function has to satisfy the following regularity conditions: 
• 𝐶(𝒚, 𝐰, 𝑡)  is nonnegative and a real valued function, non-decreasing in 𝑦 ≥  0 and 𝑤 ≫ 0, strictly 
positive and for nonzero y, twice continuously differentiable and concave in factor prices and  linear 
homogenous of degree 1 in input prices for each y. 
 
Linear homogeneity in factor prices is an important precondition for the existence of the duality relationship 
between cost and production27. Estimating the structure of a cost function requires an explicit assumption 
regarding the state of equilibrium (long run and short run). While the cost function presented above implies 
that electricity utility firms are operating on their long-run expansion paths where all factor inputs can be 
adjusted instantaneously to desired levels during the production process, there is no evidence to support this 
assumption. For instance, there are a number of reasons why power utilities may be non-optimal28.  First, 
adjustments in the capital stock are relatively costly and thus the size of the main power utilities 
                                                          
26 See Varian (1992, pg 83) for a discussion on duality theory 
27 See Caves, Christensen and Tretheway (1980) for a discussion on the regularity conditions and model specification. 
28 See  Faust and Baranzini (2014) for similar reasons for water utilities infrastructures. 
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infrastructures is typically based on demographic and economic forecasts. Second, power utilities are 
obliged to respond to all the demand, and thus they typically dispose of excess capacities to account for 
seasonal and unexpected demand variations. Thirdly, power utilities can be affected by investment 
constraints, regulation or indivisibilities which could make immediate adjustment difficult in the short run. 
These situations reflect the quasi-fixity of capital stock which does not allow for alteration in the short-run, 
but is available at increasing marginal costs in the long-run. Faced with this situation, the economic decision 
of the firm in the industry will, at any given moment, be to minimise cost by only employing the optimal 
quantities of the easily adjustable variables inputs (i.e. labour and fuel) given the existing, possible non 
optimal levels of the fixed input (i.e. capital stock). Therefore, it is important to recognise this fact and 
differentiate between variables and quasi-fixed inputs when evaluating the cost efficiency of electric power 
utility. To account for this peculiar quasi-fixity characteristic of capital stock, we employ a short-run 
equilibrium model which assumes capital as a quasi-fixed input while the utility uses the most efficient level 
of other variable inputs. Moreover, since the adjustment path of capital is unspecified, the model is 
compatible with whatever path capital is adjusted along29.  
 
Therefore, we proceed by differentiating capital stock as an input which is a fixed input in the short run and 
variable in the long run, and symbolise it with 𝑧𝑜 , with input price: 𝑤0. We denote  𝐱 = (𝑥𝐿 , 𝑥𝐹 )
′ as vector 
of variable inputs and 𝐰 = (𝑤𝐿 , 𝑤𝐹  )
′  as the vector of variable factor prices. 
 
Following the arguments in Friedlander and Spady (1981) and Braeutigam and Daughety (1984), we can 
rewrite the long run cost function, with all inputs including capital stock treated as variable, in the form 
 
                                           𝐶(𝒚, 𝒘, 𝑤0, 𝑡) = min
𝒛𝟎,𝑋
{𝑤𝑜𝑧𝑜 + 𝒘
′𝐱 ∶ 𝑓(𝐲, 𝐱, 𝑧𝑜 , t) = 1 }                                        (4.2) 
 
                                                          
29 This assumption is employed by Nelson (1985, 1989), Krautmarm and Solow (1988), and Nemoto et al. (1993). 
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In the short-run, capital input available to the firm is generally assumed to be fixed, implying that the firm 
attempts to minimize cost conditional on a given plant size. The short run cost function is: 
 
                         𝐶𝑠(𝒚, 𝒘, 𝒛𝟎, 𝒕) = {𝑤𝑜𝑧𝑜 + 𝒘
′𝐱 ∶ 𝑓(𝐲, 𝐱, 𝑧𝑜 , t) = 1 }x 
min                                                          
(4.3)                                                                
 
If  𝑧0 is the same as the optimal input 𝑧
∗ that would be chosen in the long run, then 
 
                             𝐶(𝒚, 𝒘𝟎, 𝒘, 𝒕) = 𝐶
𝑠(𝒚, 𝒛𝟎, 𝒘, 𝒕)                                                                                                     (4.4)                                                                                                   
 
The envelope theorem confirms that the long run total cost defines the envelope of short run total cost 
expressed in as the sum of variable cost and fixed cost. If the firm minimizes the variable cost of producing 
a given output, subject to a fixed stock of capital, 𝒛𝟎, the variable cost function could be enveloped to 
determine the long run total cost function. 
 
                       𝐶(𝒚, 𝒘𝟎, 𝒘, 𝒕) =  min
𝒛𝟎
𝐶𝑉(𝒚, 𝒛𝟎, 𝒘, 𝒕)  + 𝑤𝑜𝑧𝑜                                                      
 
                                                   = min
                                                                𝒛𝟎
𝐶𝑠(𝒚, 𝒛𝟎, 𝒘, 𝒕)                                                                                           (4.5)    
                                         
Where 𝐶𝑉(𝒚, 𝒛𝟎, 𝒘, 𝒕) is the variable cost function
30 
 
Equation (4.5) above is the tangency condition between the short and long run total cost curve. Thus, the 
envelope theorem implies that for any slight deviation of the level of the fixed input above or below the 
optimal level, there will be no reduction in total cost. 
 
                                                          
30 The variable cost function includes the stock of capital as explanatory variable instead of the price of capital  
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The short run cost function 𝐶𝑠(𝒚, 𝒛𝟎, 𝒘, 𝒕), differs from the more commonly used long run cost function in 
two ways. First, the dependent variable in the long run cost function is total cost, while the dependent 
variable in the short run cost function is short run total cost. Second, the price of capital stock appears as an 
explanatory variable in the long run cost function, while the stock of capital appears as an explanatory 
variable in the short run cost function. The short run cost function, 𝐶𝑠(.) for electric power generation 
depends upon two variable factor prices: fuel prices and labour prices, conditional upon predetermined 
levels of capital stocks 𝒛𝟎, electricity generation, y and the state of technology t. 𝐶
𝑠(.) is non-negative and 
non-decreasing in y, homogenous of degree one, non-decreasing, and concave in the variable factor input 
prices, and non-increasing and convex in the levels of quasi-fixed factors 𝒛𝟎. 
 
If 𝑧∗ represents the optimal value of fixed inputs which minimises the short run total cost, then 
 
                  (
∂𝐶(𝒚, 𝒘𝟎, 𝒘, 𝒕)
∂𝒛𝟎
)
𝒛𝟎=𝑧
∗
= 0 =  (
∂𝐶𝑉(𝒚, 𝒛𝟎, 𝒘, 𝒕)
∂𝒛𝟎
)
𝒛𝟎=𝑧
∗
+  𝑤𝑜                                                        (4.6)  
 
where 𝑤𝑜 is the price of capital and 𝑧
∗ is the equilibrium stock of capital 
Rearranging Equation (4.6) gives the important interpretation of the shadow price of the capital input 
 
                         (
∂𝐶𝑉(𝒚, 𝒛𝟎, 𝒘, 𝒕)
∂𝒛𝟎
)
𝒛𝟎=𝑧
∗
=  − 𝑤𝑜                                                                                                      (4.7) 
 
Equation (4.7) above implies that, in the long run equilibrium, cost minimisation is accompanied when 
variable cost is saved by substituting the last unit of capital for variable inputs is equal to the price,  𝑤𝑜.  
This allows us to interpret the derivative on the left-hand-side of (4.7), i.e. the effect on the variable cost 
function of a change in the quasi-fixed input of capital as the negative of the shadow price of capital. If the 
derivative is expressed in log or elasticity terms, then it corresponds to the negative of the shadow rate of 
return on capital. This is the core argument of Breautigam and Doherty (1984). 
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 If  
∂𝐶𝑉(𝒚,𝒛𝟎,𝒘,𝒕)
∂𝒛𝟎
  is less than −𝑤𝑜 i.e. negative and greater in absolute value magnitude, it implies suboptimal 
capital whereas if  
∂𝐶𝑉(𝒚,𝒛𝟎,𝒘,𝒕)
∂𝒛𝟎
  is larger than−𝑤𝑜, it means excess capital.  There is a possibility of  
∂𝐶𝑉(𝒚,𝒛𝟎,𝒘,𝒕)
∂𝒛𝟎
  being positive, implying over-investment in capacity generation and could potentially result in a 
situation the where electric power utility does not operate at a long run efficiency position31.    
 
4.3.2 Cost structure  
The cost structure of the electric utility industries has been studied extensively using a single product cost 
function. Since we are interested in the multiproduct cost function as a determinant of power generation 
utility cost, the model allows us to measure both short-run and long-run economies of scale, as well as cost 
complementarity.  
 
4.3.2.1   Economies of Scale 
Traditionally, scale economies are defined in terms of the relative increase in output resulting from a 
proportionate increase in all inputs. According to Hanoch (1975) and Brown and Chachere (1980), it is more 
appropriate to represent scale economies by the relationship between cost and output along the expansion 
path where input prices are held fixed and cost is minimised at every level of outputs. Although 
conventional measures of economies of scale are hinged on the single-product firm, the analysis of scale 
economies for the multiproduct firm is more involved.  The shadow price of the quasi-fixed input is 
important for estimating the degree of scale economies, which is a long run parameter by definition.  Panzar 
and Willig (1977) show the measure of degree ray (or overall) scale economies, r, at output vector y from 
the multi-product firm is derived from the long run cost function as;  
 
                        𝑟 =
𝐶(𝑦,𝑤0,𝑤,𝑡)
∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑀𝐶𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
=  
1
∑ ℇ𝐶𝑦𝑖   
𝑛
𝑖=1
                                                                    (4.8)                                                                                                      
                                                          
31 For a discussion of the interpretation of the enveloped conditions, see Cowing and Holtmann (1983). 
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where 𝐶(𝑦, 𝑤0,𝑤, 𝑡) is the long run total cost, 𝑦𝑖(𝑖 = 1 … . 𝑛) are the single products of vector y, 𝑀𝐶𝑖  is the 
marginal cost32 with respect to the individual output which is obtained as 𝜕𝐶(𝑤, 𝑦, 𝑋) 𝜕𝑦𝑟⁄  and ℇ𝐶𝑦𝑖 are cost 
elasticities of  the individual outputs.  
 
Therefore, ray scale economies are expressed as the proportional increase in total costs that would result 
from a proportional increase in all outputs. As shown above, the degree of overall scale economies for the 
multiproduct firm is obtained as the inverse of the sum of the cost elasticities of single products.   
 
However, studies have shown that there are two distinct methods of deducing the degree of ray scale 
economies (in the presence of quasi-fixed inputs) to determine whether or not scale economies prevail at 
efficient expansion points. The more appealing approach, which is in tandem with our motivation and 
theoretical framework, is the proposition by Friedlander and Spady (1981) and Oum et al. (1991). They 
suggested evaluation at the equilibrium stock of capital, which involves estimating returns to scale by first 
enveloping the short run variable cost function using the prices of fixed factors, to determine the 
corresponding long-run cost function. Therefore, in the presence of a quasi-fixed input, Braeutigam and 
Daughety, (1983) show that scale economies can be calculated from the short run cost function at efficient 
expansion points by adjusting the Panzar and Willig measure by the shadow price of the quasi-fixed input: 
 
            𝑟 ∗= 1 − ∑
∂ln𝐶𝑠(𝒚, 𝒛𝟎, 𝒘, 𝒕)
∂ln𝑧0
𝑚
𝑖=1
⃒𝒛𝟎 = 𝑧
∗  ∑
∂ln𝐶𝑠(𝒚, 𝒛𝟎, 𝒘, 𝒕)
∂ln𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
⁄ ⃒𝒛𝟎 = 𝑧
∗                            (4.9) 
 
where 𝒛𝟎 = 𝑧
∗ is the optimal level of capital stock in for a given output produced. Ray scale economies are 
present when the calculated value of 𝑟 exceeds one, while if 𝑟 equals one there are long run constant returns 
to scale and decreasing returns to scale if 𝑟 is less than one. 
                                                          
32 If the marginal costs are identical for all outputs, the overall measure of scale economies collapse into the conventional single output 
measure of scale economies, see Kim (1987). 
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Caves et al. (1981) also proposed an alternative approach of inferring economies of scale based on the direct 
estimation of the variable cost function, without reference to prices of fixed capital input33 using the 
following derivation; 
 
            𝑟 = 1 − ∑
∂ln𝐶𝑉(.)
∂ln𝑧0
𝑛
𝑖=1  ∑
∂ln𝐶𝑉(.)
∂ln𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1⁄                                                                             
 
                =      𝐶𝑉(𝒚, 𝒛𝟎, 𝒘, 𝒕) −  ∑
∂𝐶𝑉(.)
∂ln𝑧0
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑧0⃒𝒛𝟎 = 𝑧
∗ ∑
∂𝐶𝑉(.)
∂ln𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1⁄  𝑦𝑖⃒𝒛𝟎 = 𝑧
∗                                        (4.10)   
 
The scale economies are calculated using equation (4.10) above and is based on the actual capital stock, 
rather than the optimal value of the fixed capital input. The method makes no attempts to envelop the 
variable cost function to reach the efficient expansion point. In actual fact, this alternative approach 
measures economies of scale at the actual point of operation. However, Braeutigam and Daughety (1983), 
Nelson (1985) and Oum et al. (1991) showed that the two methods are not equivalent and each produce 
different economies of scale values which could potentially lead to conflicting policy recommendations. 
Since the motivation for adopting the variable cost framework is the belief that the firm being studied is not 
necessarily operating on their efficient expansion path, scale economy estimates computed using the second 
method would rarely be expected to coincide with those derived using the first (Vita, 1990). The key point is 
that if the unadjusted Panzar-Willig estimator is applied in variable cost estimation, the result will indicate 
only the curvature of the short run total cost function, which is likely in a capital-intensive industry such as 
electricity generation to be much steeper than the curvature of the long run cost function. Consequently, 
evaluating scale economies is it critical that we make the adjustment for the shadow price of the quasi-fixed 
input. 
 
 
                                                          
33 Cowing and Holtmann (1983) also proposed a similar approach to Caves et al. (1981) for evaluating scale economies from a variable cost 
function without reference to the price of the fixed factor, see Vita (1990) for a detailed discussion 
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4.3.2.2   Cost complementarity 
Baumol et al, (1982) state that cost complementarity implies that the marginal cost of producing one good 
changes when production of the other goods within the product set N increases, indicating economies of 
scope at a given output y. Cost complementarity in products r and s exist, if the following condition holds: 
 
                                                  
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑦𝑟𝜕𝑦𝑠
< 0                                                                                                                 (4.11) 
 
Clark (1988) shows the twice-differentiable cost functions, expressing the translog form in equation (4.13) 
with the following condition as follows; 
  
                  
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑦𝑟𝜕𝑦𝑠
=   (
𝐶
𝑦𝑟𝑦𝑠
) [
𝜕2𝑙𝑛𝐶
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑟𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑠
+ (
𝜕2𝑙𝑛𝐶
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑟
) (
𝜕2𝑙𝑛𝐶
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑠
)]  < 0                                                          (4.12) 
 
This implies that an increase in the level of production of product  𝑦𝑟 reduces the marginal cost of producing 
𝑦𝑠. Thus 
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑦𝑟𝜕𝑦𝑠
< 0  indicates product specific-economies of scope between products 𝑦𝑟 and  𝑦𝑠. However, if 
𝜕2𝐶
𝜕𝑦𝑟𝜕𝑦𝑠
 >0, it means diseconomies of scope between products 𝑦𝑟 and 𝑦𝑠. 
 
Cost complementarities at the sample mean can be tested because with log mean corrected data, they are 
regression coefficients using the non–jointness test. Cost complementarity is a feature of the off-diagonal 
elements34. Applying the estimated translog equation  
 
                          
 𝜕2(𝐶 𝑤𝐾⁄ )
𝜕𝑦𝑟𝜕𝑦𝑠
= (
𝐶 𝑤𝐾⁄
𝑦𝑟𝑦𝑠
) (𝛼𝑟𝑠 + 𝛼𝑟𝛼𝑠)                                                                                         (4.13) 
 
The non-jointness test is expressed as follows; 
                                                          
34 Only the sign of the second bracketed term matters since the first must be positive. 
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𝐻0: 𝛼𝑟𝑠 + 𝛼𝑟𝛼𝑠 = 0 versus   𝐻1: 𝛼𝑟𝑠 + 𝛼𝑟𝛼𝑠 ≠ 0 
 
4.3.3   Econometrics Model 
The studies on stochastic frontier cost (production) decomposes deviations from these frontiers into random 
noise and inefficiency terms while estimating efficiency based on the independent proposition of Aigner et 
al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977).  In order to investigate empirically cost inefficiency in 
electricity generation in OECD countries, we employ a multi-product cost function model. We have the 
following stochastic frontier cost models with: 
 
                               𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  𝑓(𝒚, 𝒛𝟎, 𝒘, 𝒕)𝑖𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡                                                                                             (4.14)   
 
where 𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  is the cost for the ith OECD country national generation at the time t, i = 1,…25  and t = 
1,…30, 𝒚𝑖𝑡 is a vector for the outputs, 𝒘𝑖𝑡 is a vector for the factor prices, 𝒛𝟎𝒊𝒕 is a quasi-fixed input. Since 
the mean of the variables are regarded as the expansion point, costs as well as outputs and factor prices are 
normalised by dividing the variables by their corresponding means. 𝑢𝑖𝑡  represents one-side technical 
inefficiency, whereas 𝑣𝑖𝑡 denotes a two-sided conventional idiosyncratic error term with zero means and 
variance 𝜎𝑣
2. 
  
4.3.3 .1   Translog Cost Function  
Several flexible functional forms have been proposed, which help to address the drawback associated with 
previous inflexible functional forms such as Cobb-Douglas based on constant elasticities of substitution as 
criticized by Uzawa (1962)35. It is worth noting that these functional forms are not parsimonious (in terms of 
the number of parameters) and are more cumbersome to implement empirically36. The most popular and 
widely used specification of these flexible functional forms in stochastic frontier cost literatures has been the 
                                                          
35 Uzawa (1962) proved that it is impossible for any functional form that exhibits constant elasticities of substitution to provide simultaneously 
the capability to attain an arbitrary set of elasticities.  
36 A functional form is parsimonious if it provides a second order approximation using a minimal number of parameters. See Fuss, McFadden, 
and Mundlak (1978) which argue that a growing number of variables leads to more parameter estimates which exacerbate problems of 
multicollinearity. Also, when the sample is small, excess parameters mean a loss of freedom and hence a loss in the precision of estimation. 
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translog form37. Using the transcendental logarithm functional form as an arbitrary second order 
approximation to the multi-product cost function, we fit variable cost functions (i.e. a function for the 
minimum cost required to produce outputs given the input prices), 𝐶(𝑦, 𝑧0, 𝑤, 𝑡) for N country over T 
periods as follows; 
 
                𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑚𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡
𝑚
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑗
+ ∑ ∑ 𝛾𝑚𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑗𝑚
  
+
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑚𝑛𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
𝑛𝑚
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑘𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝑘𝑗
  +  𝜋1𝑙𝑛𝑧0𝑖𝑡  
+  ∑ 𝜌𝑚𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑧0𝑖𝑡
𝑚
+  ∑ 𝜎𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑧0𝑖𝑡
𝑗
+
1
2
𝜋2(𝑙𝑛𝑧0𝑖𝑡)
2              
                              +   𝛿1𝑡 +
1
2
 𝛿2 𝑡
2 + ∑ 𝜃𝑚𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡
𝑚
+ ∑ 𝜇𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑗𝑖𝑡𝑡
𝑗
   +   ε𝑖𝑡   
                                                                                                                                                                         (4.15) 
 
Where 𝑙𝑛𝐶𝑖𝑡  is the natural logarithm of cost, 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡  is the natural logarithm of mth output (m=1, 2); 
 𝑙𝑛𝑤𝑚𝑗𝑡 is the natural logarithm of the jth input price (j=1, 2), 𝑙𝑛𝑧0𝑖𝑡 is the natural logarithm of the quantity 
of the fixed input, and  ε𝑖𝑡 =  𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡. We impose the usual symmetry restrictions on the above cost 
function, viz., 𝛼𝑚𝑙 = 𝛼𝑙𝑚 for all 𝑙 and 𝑚, and 𝛽𝑗𝑘 =  𝛽𝑗𝑘 for all 𝑗 and 𝑘.  Moreover, to ensure linear 
homogeneity of the variable cost function, 𝐶𝑉(. ) in the input prices (i.e. doubling of all factor prices leading 
to doubling of costs), the following restrictions are imposed; 
 
                         ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑗
= 1 ; ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑘
𝑗
= 0 ⩝ 𝑘 ; ∑ 𝛾𝑚𝑗
𝑗
= 0 ⩝ 𝑘 ; ∑ 𝜓𝑗𝑡
𝑗
= 0                                                 (4.16) 
 
 
                                                          
37 See Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1971, 1973) for a discussion on the rationale for preference towards the translog functional form. 
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The condition that the cost function is homogenous of degree one in input prices is imposed by normalising 
cost and labour price by fuel price. The estimated cost function is specified as follows;  
 
           ln
𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑤𝑠
=  𝛼0 + ∑ αm
M
m=1
ln(𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡) +  
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛼𝑚𝑛
𝑀
𝑛=1
𝑀
𝑚=1
(ln(𝑦
𝑚𝑖𝑡
) ln(𝑦
𝑛𝑖𝑡
))  + ∑ 𝛽
𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
ln (
𝑤𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑤𝑠
)
+   
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛽
𝑗𝑘
𝐽
𝑘=1
𝐽
𝑗=1
(ln (
𝑤𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑤𝑠
) ln (
𝑤𝑘𝑖𝑡
𝑤 𝑠
)) + ∑ ∑ 𝛾
𝑚𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
𝑀
𝑚=1
(ln(𝑦
𝑚𝑖𝑡
) ln (𝑙𝑛
𝑤𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑤𝑠
)) 
+  ∑ 𝜎𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
(ln (
𝑤𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑤𝑠
) ln(𝑧0𝑖𝑡)) +  ∑ 𝜌𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1
(ln(𝑦
𝑚𝑖𝑡
) ln(𝑧0𝑖𝑡)) +  𝜋1 ln(𝑧0𝑖𝑡)   +
1
2
𝜋2(ln(𝑧0𝑖𝑡))
2
+  ∑ 𝜃𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1
ln(𝑦
𝑚𝑖𝑡
) 𝑡 + ∑ 𝜇𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
ln (
𝑤𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝑤𝑠
) 𝑡    𝛿1𝑡 +
1
2
 𝛿2 𝑡
2 +  ε𝑖𝑡   
                                                                                                                                                                                         (4.17) 
 
4.3.3.2   Cost Efficiency Estimation 
The cost function in equations (4.17) is estimated using three different stochastic frontier estimation models 
based on the assumptions imposed on the error term (𝜀𝑖𝑡), inefficiency and error term. These models are the 
fixed effects model by Schmidt and Sickles (1984), Greene’s true fixed effects model and the four-way error 
component model (FWEC hereafter) proposed by Kumbhakar, Lien and Hardaker (2014). They are 
summarised in Table 4.1. Model I: TI is the time-invariant fixed effects model proposed by Schmidt and 
Sickles (1984). The model specifies a firm-specific effect 𝑢𝑖, an independent randomly distributed intercept 
and a random noise term 𝑣𝑖𝑡 which is assumed to be identically and independently distributed (iid). The 
advantage of this model is that it avoids making any distributional assumption about the inefficiency term, 
and it permits the inefficiency term to be correlated with the regressors. The disadvantage is the inability to 
distinguish between time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity and cost inefficiency as all time-invariant firm-
specific effects are incorporated into inefficiency. 
 
146 
 
Table 4.1: Econometric specifications of the cost frontier models 
Specification  Model 1 (TI) 
Schmidt-Sickles 
(1984) 
Model 2 (TFE) 
Greene (2005)  
Model 3 (FWEC) 
Kumbhakar-Lien-
Hardaker (2014)  
Error-component model 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖   𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
Idiosyncratic error 𝑣𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2) 𝑣𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2) 𝑣𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2) 
Time-invariant (persistent) 
inefficiency 
Yes   
Fixed Effects, 𝑢𝑖 
No Yes 
𝜂𝑖~𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝜂
2) 
Country-specific latent 
heterogeneity 
No Yes 
Fixed Effects, 𝛼𝑖 
Yes 
Random Effects, 𝛾𝑖 
Time-varying (residual) 
inefficiency 
No Yes 
𝑢𝑖𝑡~𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝑢
2) or 
𝑢𝑖𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑑 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 
Yes 
𝑢𝑖𝑡~𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝑢
2) 
Inefficiency measure    
Persistent (time-invariant) ?̂?𝑖 − Min{?̂?𝑗} 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒      𝐸(𝜂𝑖 |𝜀𝑖𝑡) 
Residual (time-varying) 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝜀𝑖𝑡)      𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝜀𝑖𝑡) 
 
 
A country i’s inefficiency is assumed to be the interval between its estimated fixed effect and that of the 
country on the frontier namely, the minimum estimated fixed effect (min { 𝑢𝑖}). Furthermore, the time 
invariant nature of the inefficiency term assumption is considered restrictive, especially in the presence of 
empirical applications based on long panel data sets. 
 
Model II relaxes the restrictive assumption in model I by allowing time variation in the inefficiency term 
while enabling investigation of the impact of observed heterogeneity on cost and efficiency. If latent 
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heterogeneity exists (such as factors that beyond the firms’ control but may affect their costs) then all the 
time invariant heterogeneity will be pushed to the intercepts and, finally, into the inefficiency term leading 
to a biased efficiency estimate. The unobserved firm-specific heterogeneity can be taken into account with 
conventional fixed or random effects in a panel data model. In order to distinguish external heterogeneities 
from cost efficiency, Greene (2005a) proposed the “true” fixed effect that incorporates an additional 
stochastic term representing inefficiency in both fixed and random effects models. Model II addresses the 
time invariant heterogeneity by specifying separate intercept dummy variables for each unit in the sample 
and follows the asymmetric half normal distribution for the cost inefficiency component and the normal 
distribution for the error term. This model is estimated using the Simulated Maximum Likelihood (SML) 
method. 
 
In model II, the time-invariant component of the inefficiency might be picked up other than through the 
effect of pure heterogeneity.  Model III proposed by Kumbhakar, Lien and Hardbaker (2014) deals with the 
time-invariant inefficiency by separating time-invariant (persistent) inefficiency from time-invariant 
heterogeneity. The model is a modified and extended version of a model proposed by Kumbhakar and 
Heshmati (1995) where technical inefficiency is assumed to have a persistent firm-specific (time-invariant) 
component and a time-varying residual component. Although firm effects are treated as persistent 
inefficiency by Kumbhakar and Heshmati (1995), a random firm effect is included in the Kumbhakar, Lien 
and Hardbaker (2014) model. The extended model includes separate four components; two of which are 
stochastic inefficiency terms (residual and persistent inefficiencies) and the other two are time invariant 
heterogeneity and the idiosyncratic error term. This model is specified as follows; 
 
𝐶𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑜 +  𝑓(𝐲𝑖𝑡′, 𝐰𝑖𝑡′) + 𝜋(𝐳𝒊𝒕) + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                                      (4.18)                                                        
 
Where 𝛾𝑖 are the random firm effects that capture unobserved time-invariant heterogeneities, 𝜂𝑖 time-
invariant (persistent) inefficiency 𝜈𝑖𝑡 is an idiosyncratic error term and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the time-varying (residual) 
inefficiency. The overall cost efficiency is given as the product of time-invariant (persistent) efficiency and 
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time-varying (residual) efficiency. The consideration for model III becomes more relevant in the context of a 
quasi-fixed input to the extent that the inefficiency associated with this input may not be eliminated in the 
short run and tends to remain with the firm over time. This model is estimated using the Pseudo-Maximum 
Likelihood method originally suggested by Fan et al (1996) which involves a four step KLH modelling 
procedure.38  
 
Inclusion of observed heterogeneity in the models is usually done through a variety of ways, either by 
allowing observed heterogeneity to affect the cost frontier or to influence the distribution of the inefficiency 
term39. An alternative approach to analyse the effect of observed heterogeneity on inefficiency is obtained 
by scaling its distribution40. The observed heterogeneity in the inefficiency model is expected to include any 
factors that help explain the extent to which the cost observations exceed the corresponding stochastic 
frontier cost values. These variables include the electricity consumption per capita, industry value added, 
overall electricity market closeness, entry barriers, vertical integration and public ownership. 
 
The cost efficiency score for each country can be estimated from the point estimates of the cost inefficiency 
(𝑢𝑖𝑡)
41 as the ratio of observed cost 𝐶𝑖𝑡 to frontier or minimum cost  𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝐹: 
 
                                                  𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 =  
𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝐹 = exp (−𝑢𝑖𝑡)                                                                                (4.19)                                                                                                                                     
 
The cost efficiency measure lies between 0 and 1. A score of one indicates a country is on the frontier, while 
non-frontier firms receive scores below one.  This approach is based on conditional expectations which 
generalize the estimators proposed by Jondrow et al. (1982).  
                                                          
38 Kumbhakar, Lien and Hardbaker (2014) demonstrate the procedures for estimating the model which includes fitting a one-way random 
effect model in order to predict the random effect and the error term components. The errors are then used in the following steps to estimate 
the time-invariant (persistent) inefficiency and time-varying (residual) inefficiency. See Kumbhakar, Lien and Hardbaker (2014) for a detailed 
discussion of the estimation procedure. 
39 Kumbhakar et al. (1991), Huang and Liu (1994) and Battese and Coelli (1995) proposed an approach of parameterizing the mean of a pre-
truncated truncated normal distribution as a way to analyze the exogenous influence on inefficiency. See Wang (2002). 
40 Caudill and Ford (1993), Caudill et al. (1995) and Hadri (1999) proposed to parametrize the variance of the pre-truncated inefficiency 
distribution. See Wang (2002). 
41 Cost inefficiency takes a value between one and infinity with a value of one indicating a country on the frontier while a value above one 
means non-frontier country 
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4.4 Data description 
The analysis of cost structure and efficiency of electricity generation in OECD is hampered by the paucity of 
data for the entire OECD countries. Data collected from different international databases for a period from 
1980 to 2009 covers only 25 countries. Years 1980 through to 2009 are respectively the years for which data 
are available for all the variables.  The data necessary for the cost estimation include the variable cost, the 
price of two variable factors i.e. labour (L) and fuel (F); a quasi-fixed capital input (K) together with the 
quantity of electricity generated. Others include carbon emissions, electricity reform indicators i.e entry 
barrier, vertical integration, public ownership and overall market reform, as well as the country-specific 
heterogeneous variables.  
 
The input prices and variable cost were calculated as follows. The price of labour (𝑤1) is computed as the 
ratio of labour compensation42 and the number of people engaged obtained from EU KLEMS.  This is 
obtained in each country’s currency at current price, and converted to constant price by using a value-added 
price index (1995=100). These real local currency measures are then normalised into international units 
using purchasing power parity exchange rate from the Penn World Table (PWT7.1). Fuel price (𝑤2) 
represents the price of fuel used for electricity generation measured in dollars at current prices. It is obtained 
from the energy, prices and taxes folder of International Energy Agency (IEA). The price is converted to 
constant price by normalising using the price index (1995=100) from the World Development Indicators. 
Data on operating cost was calculated as the sum of labour and fuel expenditures. The number of people 
represents labour while fuel consumption inputs measured in kilotonnes of oil equivalent (ktoe) includes all 
varieties of fuel utilised by the generation plants: coal, oil, gas, hydro, nuclear and biomass. As fuel input 
data are available in the same measurement units, we aggregated them into one indicator. This allows for the 
different fuel intensity of different generation technologies. The fuel consumption data is collected from the 
International Energy Agency (IEA). 
 
                                                          
42 The data represents labour compensation for utility i.e. water, gas and electricity as there is no available disaggregated data for the 
electricity sector. It is reasonable to assume that a substantial portion of the employment in the utility industry is actually attributable to 
electricity sector.   
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As for the choice of the outputs, we consider both desirable and undesirable outputs that are jointly produced 
during electricity and heat production. The outputs are electricity generation (𝑦1), which represents the 
annual net electricity output generated by each country measured in gigawatt-hours, and carbon emissions 
(𝑦2) measured in million metric tons. Capital stock is measured in megawatt (MW) of installed capacity. 
Installed capacity is used as a proxy for the quasi-fixed stock of capital in our cost model. This is a 
consistent proxy of capital stock in line with relevant papers (See Jaraitė & Di Maria, 2012). Electricity 
generation and installed capacity are also obtained from International Energy Agency (IEA) while carbon 
emission is sourced from the World Bank Development Indicators. 
 
Besides the standard variables of proper cost estimation, we added electricity sector regulatory reform 
indicators in the model. These include the sub indicators of the reform process; namely entry barriers, public 
ownership, and vertical integration, and overall electricity market reform. They extracted from the OECD 
market regulatory OECD Product Market Regulation database. The OECD’s PMR database contains a large 
amount of information on regulatory structures and policies that is obtained through a questionnaire sent to 
governments in OECD and non-OECD countries. The database covers all OECD countries and 21 non-
OECD countries. These indicators range from 0 to 6, with 0 representing the fully open market in which 
entry barriers, public ownership and vertical integration are minimized and a score of 6 is given to a closed 
market.  Or, as the OECD expresses it: “Scores vary from 0 (the most effective governance structure) to 6 
(the least effective governance structure)”. Incorporating the variable into the cost frontier, costs are 
expected to increase with increasing restriction of the electricity market. A positive sign on the market 
reform variable means that cost rises as index rises from 0 to 6. Moreover, we added country-specific 
heterogeneous variables in our analysis to account for possible shifts of frontier cost level. We also control 
for the degree of industrialisation of each country, which is measured by the industrial output percentage 
share of GDP. We expect a large proportion of industrial customers to increase operating costs in order to a 
balance industrial electricity demand with energy supply as customers can increase their power demand 
anytime.  
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
        
 520 Observations Units Mean SD Min Max                  
Cost US $ (1995=100) 1.69E+07 4.31E+07 7497.12 4.31E+07 
Outputs      
Electricity generation GWh  370562.20 762132.50 903.00 4190541 
Carbon emission MMT 226.59 532.18 1.03 2732.80 
Input prices      
Price of labour US $ (1995=100) 52.36 46.51 0.65 540.48 
Price of fuel  US $ (1995=100) 274.70 331.53 5.40 2643.20 
Quasi-Fixed input      
Capital MW 90173.52 183543.00 1235.00 1026869.00 
Environmental Variables      
Industrialisation % of GDP 24.37 4.10 13.78 32.70 
Entry barriers (0-6) 4.10 2.46 0.00 6.00 
Public ownership 
(0-6) 
4.28 2.17 0.00 6.00 
Vertical integration  
(0-6) 
5.45 0.80 3.00 6.00 
Overall elect. mkt. reform 
(0-6) 
4.47 1.60 1.17 6.00 
 
 
Finally, we included a time trend in the model, measured in years, so as to account for the possible effects of 
Hicks neutral technological change, with the expectation that costs are expected to diminish over time, all 
things being equal. For the estimation, we mean-adjusted and logged each variable by taking the means (in 
order for the cost order coefficient in the model to be interpreted as elasticities at the sample mean). The 
descriptive statistics on the variables used in the empirical estimation are provided in Table 4.2.  
 
4.5   Result and discussions   
We begin our analysis by checking the validity of our stochastic frontier specifications. This involves 
running a pooled OLS based on the test proposed by Schmidt and Lin (1984) in order to confirm the 
presence of technical inefficiency. In the case there were no technical inefficiency, the error term would be 
distributed symmetrically around zero i.e.  𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 0   then 𝜀𝑖𝑡 =  𝜈𝑖𝑡, thereby invalidating the inefficiency 
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assumption. The estimated skewness and kurtosis test for normality from the pooled OLS regression has the 
expected sign and confidently rejects the null hypothesis of the normal residual43. Thus, the test result 
provides evidence for the presence of the one-sided error44. Furthermore, a series of hypothesis tests were 
conducted using log likelihood ratio tests. Table 4.3 presents the results of hypothesis tests that examined a 
number of restrictions.   
     
Table 4.3:  Likelihood ratio test 
 
     Null Hypothesis Test statistics Critical value Decision 
     (0.05 level)   
 Cobb-Douglas 
    
𝐻0: all cross effects null 269.073 𝜒13
2 =22.362 Reject 𝐻0 
 
Hicks neutral technical change 
    𝐻0: 𝜃1 = 𝜃2 = 𝜇𝑗 = 0 36.845 𝜒3
2 =7.815 Reject 𝐻0 
 
Homotheticity 
    𝐻0: 𝛾1𝑗 =  𝛾2𝑗 = 0 46.842  𝜒2
2 =5.991 Reject 𝐻0 
 
         
The hypotheses tests were obtained using the generalized likelihood statistic. This is defined by  𝜆 = 
−2[ln(L𝐻0 − ln(L𝐻1)]. If the null hypothesis is true, 𝜆  has a chi-square  distribution 𝜒𝑝
2 where  𝑝 is the 
degrees of freedom equal to the difference between the number of parameters estimated under 𝐻0 and 𝐻1.  
We test the translog specification against a Cobb–Douglas specification in a bid to confirm if the translog 
gives adequate representation of the cost structure. The Cobb–Douglas frontier is rejected at 1% significance 
level. The chi-square statistic for the restrictions is 269.07, while the critical value at 5% is 22.36. Second, 
we test the hypothesis of Hick-neutral technological progress that technology change has no effect on factor 
augmenting and input demand. The hypothesis of technical bias in the translog cost function is also rejected. 
The homotheticity assumption which emphasises that the level of output has no effect on the demand for 
input is also tested. We impose restrictions on the parameters associated with interactions between input 
                                                          
43 Since our model is a cost frontier function with a composed error term, the distribution of the OLS residual skew to the right (positive) as 
against left (negative) for production function regardless of any distributional assumption 
44 The normality result is available.  
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price and outputs. We reject homotheticity of the technology implying that input prices have significant 
impact on the scale economies. 
 
  4.5.1   Model results  
The cost frontier in equation 4.17 is estimated using the fixed effects for time-invariant inefficiency without 
heterogeneity, FE – Schmidt & Sickles (1984), the true fixed effects for heterogeneity with time varying 
inefficiency, FTE – Greene (2005a) and the four-way component model with heterogeneity, residual and 
persistent inefficiency, FWEC – Kumbhakar et al. (2014), models. Table 4.4 shows the estimated parameters 
from the different specifications of the stochastic cost frontier. The first and third columns of results 
correspond to the fixed and random effects one-way panel model respectively, while the second column 
corresponds to the true fixed effects model, TFE. On grounds of the likelihood function values and the 
significance of the coefficients, the TFE model is clearly preferable.  
 
The results in the third column permit derivation of both time-varying and time invariant inefficiency 
components with latent heterogeneity as well, but only the first step estimates are shown here, which 
correspond to the random effects version of the fixed effects model in column 1. Again, the precision of the 
coefficients is less convincing than the true fixed effects model in the second column and, moreover, the 
additional time-invariant inefficiency component is minimal. On all these grounds, the TFE model in the 
second column clearly performs best, and we focus our interpretation on these TFE results. 
154 
 
    Table 4.4: Estimated results of different Frontier models 
 
           
   Variable   Model I- FE   Model II-TFE   Model III- FWEC (RE)   
  
 
  Coeff Std error   Coeff Std error   Coeff Std error   
                Generation    
 
 1.1538*** (0.0616) 
 
1.1567***   (0.0488) 
 
1.1871*** (0.0650) 
 
                Emissions 
  
 0.0362 (0.0308) 
 
0.0986***   (0.0259) 
 
0.0346    (0.0332) 
 
                Input price ratio 
  
 1.0279*** (0.0064) 
 
1.0163***   (0.0052) 
 
1.0232***    (0.0070) 
                Generation squared  
 
 0.2769** (0.1404) 
 
0.4572***   (0.1171) 
 
-0.2680*    (0.0142) 
 
               Emissions squared  
 
 0.0301 (0.0252) 
 
0.0635***   (0.0207) 
 
 0.0349    (0.0273) 
 
               Generation × Emissions  
 
-0.1367 (0.1012) 
 
-0.3719***   (0.0830) 
 
-0.1141    (0.1120) 
 
               Input price ratio squared 
  
 0.0004 (0.0025) 
 
-0.0001   (0.0020) 
 
-0.0007    (0.0027) 
 
               Generation × Input price  
 
-0.0682** (0.0331) 
 
-0.0408   (0.0261) 
 
-0.0985***    (0.0362) 
 
               Emissions × Input price  
 
 0.0084 (0.0105) 
 
 0.0012   (0.0081) 
 
 0.0120    (0.0116) 
                Time  
 
 0.0020 (0.0015) 
 
 0.002   (0.0013) 
 
 0.0005    (0.0015) 
 
              Generation × Time 
 
-0.0046*** (0.0016) 
 
-0.0057***  (0.0014) 
 
-0.0003   (0.0017) 
 
               Emissions × Time  
 
-0.0019 (0.0013) 
 
0.0009   (0.0011) 
 
-0.0028*    (0.0015) 
 
               Input price × Time  
 
-0.0004 (0.0005) 
 
-0.0005   (0.0004) 
 
-0.0009*    (0.0005) 
 
               Capital  
 
-0.3201*** (0.0521) 
 
-0.3219***   (0.0429) 
 
-0.2877***    (0.0560) 
 
               Capital squared  
 
 0.2390* (0.1238) 
 
 0.2081*   (0.1116) 
 
 -0.2299    (0.1275) 
 
   Generation × capital   -0.3264 (0.0250)   -0.4496**   (0.2160)   0.6034**    (0.2543)  
               Emissions × capital  
 
 0.0775 (0.0917) 
 
 0.2062***   (0.0726) 
 
 0.0616    (0.1020) 
 
               Input price × capital 
  
 0.0424 (0.0333) 
 
 0.0299   (0.0270) 
 
0.0627*    (0.0364) 
 
               Increased industrialization 
  
-0.0007 (0.0020) 
 
 0.0004   (0.0016) 
 
-0.0014    (0.0022) 
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   Increased entry barriers  
 
 0.0092 (0.0064) 
 
 0.0024   (0.0052) 
 
0.0188***    (0.0070) 
 
               Increased vertical integration  
 
 0.0351*** (0.0068) 
 
 0.0270***   (0.0057) 
 
 0.0421***    (0.0075) 
 
               Increased public ownership  
 
 0.0486*** (0.1163) 
 
 0.0334***   (0.0091) 
 
0.0717***    (0.0127) 
 
               Reduced overall market reform 
  
-0.0370** (0.0162) 
 
-0.0101   (0.0143) 
 
-0.0655***    (0.0176) 
 
               Constant  
 
-0.5325*** (0.0710) 
 
 All FE***    
 
-0.4908***    (0.0954) 
 
               Est. SE time invariant heterogeneity  
 
     
 
  
 
0.3080***   
                Est. SE time invariant inefficiency  
 
 0.9352    
 
  
 
0.0002   
 
              Est. SE idiosyncratic error 
 
0.0617   
 
0.0275***   
 
0.0607***  
 
               Est. SE time varying inefficiency  
 
-0.001 
  
0.0556*** 
  
0.0281   
 
               𝜆 = 𝜎𝑢 𝜎𝑣⁄   
    
2.0223***    
 
0.4636***   
 
   Log of likelihood function   705.481   739.814      n/a   
            
Notes: *,**,*** denote statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  Standard error in parenthesis 
156 
 
We discuss several aspects of these results. First, the monotonicity conditions for the translog cost function 
are clearly satisfied with significant coefficients on the generation, emissions and input price terms. 
Generation and the input price are the dominant drivers of total costs with a statistically significant but low 
elasticity of cost arising from emissions handling. The direct impact of neutral technical progress is not 
significant but there is a significant interaction of technical progress and generation output. This reflects a 
common finding amongst international panels that it is input accumulation and output expansion that drives 
productivity over time rather than pure technical progress – see Adetutu et al (2016) for a similar finding for 
the BRIIC economies. The negative sign of the parameter of the quasi-fixed input also show expected sign 
indicating clearly that cost is non-increasing in the quasi-fixed input.  This result is consistent with economic 
theory and satisfies the regularity condition of non-increasing variable costs with respect to capital stock at 
the mean of the data (See Chamber, 1988; Filippini, 2005). The presence of generation capital stock as a 
quasi-fixed input enables us to estimate the rate of return on capital from the negative of the reported cost 
elasticity. We see that at a statistically significant sample mean value of 0.3129 the return on capital in 
generation has been high over the sample period suggesting that producers have been undercapitalised and 
that expansion of generation investment was warranted given the cost of capital that has prevailed in most of 
the sample countries over this period.  
 
Looking at the measurement of the impact of exogenous variables, particularly the variables of interest-
electricity market reform indicator variables on cost efficiency, most of the results are consistent with a 
priori expectation. The coefficient of per capita electricity consumption is negative. However, we were 
unable to establish a statistically significant relationship between per capita electricity consumption and 
variable cost in all the models, at least within the sample period. On the other hand, industry value added i.e. 
industry share of percentage of GDP influences variable cost negatively. This result indicates that a marginal 
increase in industry share of value added does lower variable costs. This finding is reasonable because 
where the market has a higher share of industrial consumers it can be less costly to plan for variations in 
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load throughout the year.  Thus, utility can efficiently manage generation constraints to keep future 
reinforcement costs down for the benefit of both the utilities and customers. 
 
Of primary interest has been the role of regulatory reform and the progress in the product market regulation 
indicators computed by the OECD. In the first and third columns there is an indication that overall market 
reform has not reduced cost, but this appears to be a spurious finding related simply to the country specific 
differences across the sample. When country specific latent heterogeneity is allowed for in the TFE results 
in the second column, which are already preferred for reasons of goodness of fit, it becomes clear that the 
overall market reform indicator is not statistically significant. In other words, the overall reform effort is 
picked up by the heterogeneity of the countries in the sample; this should not surprise us because each of 
these countries has pursued different strategies in designing the regulatory oversight and ownership of the 
generation industry.  
 
On the other hand, two of the OECD’s product market regulation indicators are statistically significant even 
when country-specific heterogeneity is taken into account. These are vertical integration and public 
ownership. Greater vertical integration and a greater degree of public ownership are statistically significant 
in raising generation costs in each of the estimated models. In the random effects model in the third column 
barriers to entry are also significant in raising generation costs. We can speculate on the reasons for these 
findings. Strong vertical integration means that the generation companies are closely allied to the providers 
of transmission and distribution services. These are invariably in a natural monopoly position of market 
power so that some protection of market power from competitive forces could be transmitted back up the 
electrical power supply chain leading to the higher generation costs found in these data. Turning to the 
impact of public ownership, there is a wide acknowledgement in the literature that public and state-owned 
corporations have a mixed range of objectives that can lead to weaker incentives for cost reduction, and this 
hypothesis is confirmed by the data.  
 
158 
 
There are some lessons for the reform process in electricity generation from this research. First, countries 
have approached the market reform process differently. Inter-country heterogeneity is an important 
ingredient of the determination of generation costs, and therefore in reviewing lessons from international 
sample data, significant country differences must be expected. Second, leaving vertically integrated 
industries intact in the reform process reduces the ability to save generation costs – possibly because of the 
natural monopoly aspects of the downstream activities. Therefore, unbundling of the industry to create a 
separate generation sector is likely to enhance efficiency. Third, public and state ownership hinders the 
reduction in generation costs that can be achieved during periods of market reform. Privatisation appears to 
be a more efficient policy to pursue. The findings on scale economies in generation alone tell us that taking 
the quasi-fixed input into consideration, the cost elasticity of scale is 1.05 confirming that a competitive 
equilibrium in generation without the market power impact of economies of scale is feasible and will permit 
the unbundling of generation from transmission and distribution. 
 
4.5.2   Economies of Scale and cost complementarity 
Scale economies in power generation utilities are a measure of how costs change as the utilities expands all 
of its productive resources proportionately to provide increased generation.  We compute short run elasticity 
of scale in line with the unadjusted Panzar-Willig measure while long run returns to scale was estimated 
according to adjusted Braeutigam-Daughety measure. The elasticity of scale is reported in table 4.5 with  𝜀1 
denoting the cost elasticity with respect to electricity generation,  𝜀2 is the cost elasticity with respect to 
emissions and 𝜀𝑘 represents the cost elasticity with respect to quasi-fixed capital.  Standard errors and 
significance tests were constructed using the delta method. We are interested in the difference between the 
unadjusted measure of scale economies 𝑟 and the measure adjusted for the quasi-fixed input 𝑟 ∗. 
Traditionally, economies of scale have been a main characteristic of power generation. Interestingly, our 
scale economies estimates provide additional insight into existing studies. 
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Table 4.5:  Economies of Scale: Inverse of cost elasticity of output vector 
 
Model 
Unadjusted 
Panzar-Willig 
measure, r 
 
Adjusted Braeutigam-
Daughety measure r* 
 Test: 
unadjusted r 
= adjusted 
r* 
Test: 
adjusted 
r* = 1 
     [1/(𝜀1 +  𝜀2)] 
Standard 
error     [(1- 𝜀k) /(𝜀1 +  𝜀2)] 
Standard 
error 
p-value p-value 
TFE    0.797 0.031        1.053 0.031 0.000 0.082 
       
 
Our findings show that input-augmenting scale effects in power generation are not observed in the short run 
leading to increasing costs, but the analysis reveals the presence of mild scale economies in the long-run 
when the return on capital is included in the calculation. 
 
Interestingly, our scale economies estimates provide additional insight into existing studies. Our findings 
show that input-augmenting scale effects in power generation are not observed in the short run leading to 
increasing costs. In other words, the estimated economies of output expansion for the models in the short run 
is about 0.8, indicating the existence of sharply rising costs when capacity is fixed.  In the generation stage, 
the exhaustion of scale economies is usually related to market size which allows competition among power 
generators (Landon, 1983; Joskow, 1996). Effectively, OECD generation utilities do not benefit from 
economies of scale in an attempt to expand their generation operations as they lie in the range at which 
average costs are considered to be on upward steep. However, economies of scale in the long run are 
measured at 1.05 – and are not significantly different from 1, implying constant returns to scale when 
adjustment is made for the quasi-fixed input. 
 
Table 4.6:  Cost complementarity and non-jointness test45 
 
Model Cost complementarity 
 
 Non-jointness 
        Test statistics             P-value             
    
TFE    -0.258  11.83                          0.001 
    
                                                          
45 The test is a nonlinear Wald test which can be implemented by the testnl command in STATA which uses the delta method. We only 
reported the p-value, the test estimate is available upon request.  
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Table 4.6 provides cost complementarity estimates and non-jointness test statistics. The cost 
complementarity estimates are based on the expressions in Equation 4.13. The point estimates for the output 
combination is negative in our model, indicating that the marginal cost in production of a bad output 
decreases as electricity output generation production expands. The test for cost complementarity between the 
two outputs as shown above gives the chi-square values of each model and their associate p-values which 
are less than the generally used criterion of 0.05. Thus, we are able to reject the null hypothesis of non-
jointness of the outputs indicating therefore that there is a possibility to reduce emissions without reducing 
generation. Therefore, the findings provide evidence of economies of scope as a result of cost 
complementarity. 
 
4.5.3   Cost efficiencies  
Using the Jondrow et al. (1982) decomposition of the error term, we assess the cost efficiency for each 
model.  The efficiency score estimates lie between 0 and 1 as shown by descriptive statistic for the cost 
efficiency.  Efficiency estimates are sensitive to the choice of frontier model specification. For comparison, 
the descriptive statistic for the cost efficiency of the true fixed effect and the four-way error component 
models is given in Table 4.7.  The cost reduction potential of each country is given by one less its efficiency 
score. With regards to model II (TFE), that separates only the idiosyncratic error and inefficiency, this has a 
relatively lower average efficiency score of 0.948 against model III (FWEC) which has an average overall 
efficiency score of 0.978.  
 
Table 4. 7: Estimate cost efficiency scores 
   
Model  Mean              SD             Min 
                             
Max 
     
Model I- TFE 0.948       0.055  0.589   0.993 
Model II-FWEC 0.978 0.005 0.947 0.990 
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This result is not surprising due to the fact that the four-way error component model not only separates the 
idiosyncratic error from the inefficiency but also divides stochastic inefficiency terms into two residual and 
persistent inefficiencies, hence the relatively larger average efficiency score. Figure 4.2 shows two 
histograms each overlaid with kernel density plot for the true fixed effect model and four-way error 
component model respectively.  
 
      Figure 4.2: Histograms and Kernel densities for Model II and Model III 
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Nevertheless, the result of our preferred model implies that OECD countries are, on average, 94.8% cost 
efficient in generating electricity. Figure 4.2 reveals that the TFE model which treats time invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity separately from inefficiency is right-skewed which further reinforces the results 
under discussion. Finally, we present a broad check of the link between market structure variables46 and the 
measured efficiency scores in Table 4.8 
 
 
Table 4.8: Pairwise correlations 
 
Industrialization 
Increased 
entry 
barriers 
Increased 
vertical 
integration 
Increased 
public 
ownership Efficiency 
Industrialization 1 
          
Increased entry barriers 0.2636* 1 
         
Increased vertical integration 0.1619* 0.3969* 1 
        
Increased public ownership 0.2501* 0.8495* 0.2971* 1 
       
Efficiency 0.0948* -0.1439* -0.0895* -0.1278* 1 
Note: * means statistically significant at the 5 per cent level 
 
We see that market reform indicators are themselves positively correlated – so that countries that score 
poorly on entry barriers or vertical integration for example also score poorly on the other market reform 
indicators. In terms of the efficiency scores, more industrialized economies have a weak but significant 
correlation with stochastic efficiency, and countries that have worse (i.e. numerically higher) scores on 
market reform indicators have lower stochastic efficiency scores although this time the strongest effect is 
from entry barriers. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
46 We exclude the overall market reform indicator from this table because the efficiency scores are from the TFE model where its 
effect is submerged in the country-specific latent heterogeneity fixed effects 
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4.6   Conclusion and policy implication 
 
This study employs different stochastic frontier methods to estimate a short-run equilibrium model of 
electricity generation variable cost functions in which capital stock is treated as a quasi-fixed input.  This is 
applied to OECD electricity generation sectors while accounting for the impact of electricity market 
structures by using the published OECD product market reform indicators. Empirical models are developed 
for the variable cost function as a translog form and analysed using panel data for 25 countries during the 
period 1980 to 2009. We use three main estimation models: Schmidt-Sickles’ (1984) fixed effects, Greene’s 
(2005) True fixed effects which include country specific latent heterogeneity and Kumbhakar, Lien and 
Hardakar’ (2014) four-way error component effects which accounts for time-invariant inefficiency by 
disentangling time-invariant (persistent) inefficiency from time-invariant heterogeneity. Our results show 
that cost efficiency scores, as well as, their ranking are sensitive to the choice of model specification. We 
find the efficiency score from the Schmidt-Sickles fixed effects model to be much lower than in other 
models as a result of treating unobserved country effects as inefficiency. The true fixed effects model is 
most successful since the additional time-invariant inefficiency component of the four-way model is 
negligible. The results reveal the underlying importance of accounting for unobserved heterogeneity, and 
distinguishing it from inefficiency.  
 
Our results show the significant influence of the electricity market regulatory reform index on the cost of 
electricity generation.  On one hand, public ownership and vertical integration are found to be associated 
with a high efficiency loss while no statistically significant relationship is established for entry barriers. This 
result reiterates the benefits of privatisation of generation assets and private ownership in the power sector. 
Our results have important policy implications for the electricity market reform agenda. The nature of the 
deregulation matters since unbundling and privatization are the factors which encourage the generation 
utility to make maximum use of least cost options for efficiency gain. On the other hand, overall electricity 
market reform shows evidence of cost reduction only when unobserved heterogeneity is not treated 
separately from inefficiency.  
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The estimated economies of output expansion for the models in the short run is about 0.8, indicating the 
existence of sharply rising costs when capacity is fixed. However, economies scale in the long run are 
measured at 1.05 – and are not significantly different from 1, implying constant returns to scale when 
adjustment is made for the quasi-fixed input. Thus, policymakers can create conditions that encourage more 
competition among generators in order to encourage investment in the industry since we find a high return to 
capital investment when we model the shadow price of the quasi-fixed capital input.   Finally, we find that 
market reforms are positively correlated – a country pursuing one type of reform often pursues others as 
well – and that these market structure reforms as measured by the OECD product market reform indicators 
produce more cost-efficient electricity generation. 
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Chapter 5: US Electricity Generation Efficiency: Does Restructuring 
Matter? 
 
 
 
 
5.1   Introduction 
The United States electricity sector has been historically dominated by large, vertically integrated, and 
heavily regulated utilities, with firms exercising monopoly in their local service area while firms are subject 
to control in the form of rate of return regulation. However, a strand of literature on US power sector reform 
starting with the works of Palmer and Burtraw (1995), Joskow (1997) and Ando and Palmer (1998) argue 
that since the late 1990s, due to structural transformation and advances in technology which has changed the 
production characteristics of the industry, a series of significant restructuring policies have been 
implemented. The policies are aimed at promoting competition to enhance more efficient electricity supply, 
lower electricity prices and more innovation by suppliers among wholesale and retail customers. Although, 
the extant literature has no evidence of a mandatory and comprehensive federal electricity restructuring 
program, restructuring activities vary considerably from state to state, with many states introducing only 
limited reform without a fundamental electricity sector restructuring.  
 
Electricity market restructuring began with the enactment of the Federal Energy Policy Act of 1992 and 
FERC Order No. 888 in 199647. On one hand, the former legislation allowed some categories of generators 
to build or purchase electricity generation sources to sell electricity at the wholesale market and required 
transmitting utilities to allow open access to their transmission capacities for wholesale electricity sale to 
any electric utility, federal power marketing agencies and any person generating electric energy (FERC, 
2006, p. 24). On the other hand, the later act facilities the restructuring process by permitting independent 
private and other participants entry into the wholesale market. In both cases, restructuring was mainly 
intended to induce competition in the wholesale market as the starting point of the restructuring program. 
                                                          
47The precursor to restructuring legislations is the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA) which offered the first organisational 
departure from the legitimate monopoly franchise of electricity generation by regulated utilities. The main objective is to promote greater use 
of alternative renewable energy. 
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Competition among independent generators was supposed to create a framework for wholesale power 
transactions so that retail customers and local distribution utilities could purchase power from a wide range 
of alternative suppliers in order to lower wholesale costs and thus lower retail prices (Kwoka, 2008). 
 
At the state level, the wave of restructuring in the US was driven mainly by the regional disparity in 
electricity prices. Prices for both residential electricity customers and large industrial electricity consumers 
were shown to be much higher in most of the Northeastern states and California with price variation up as 
high as 130% across states (See Joskow, 1997 p 126). Indeed, the quest for retail competition was seen as 
way of lowering prices (Palmer and Burtraw, 1995). Thus in 1996, California became the first state to enact 
market restructuring legislation that introduced competition into the retail market. Today, some states have 
active on-going restructuring activities, some have maintained their original structure while some failed to 
achieve the expected outcome of deregulation and suspended further restructuring a few years afterwards.  
 
Figure 5.1: Electricity restructuring by US states as of 2012 
 
 
Source: United States Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2016) 
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Figure 1 shows patterns of restructuring across the U.S., with seventeen states together with the District of 
Columbia having active restructuring as of 201248 while other states have suspended and are not active 
restructuring according to the Department of Energy’s (DOE) of the US Energy Information Administration 
(EIA)  
 
Over all, the key dimension of restructuring in the United States has implications for ownership 
arrangements, resulting in the conversion of some generation capacity from utility status to independent 
power producer status49. Essentially, this impacted on the generation asset remuneration swiftly from a rate 
of return regulation model (in which generators were guaranteed a positive return on their capital costs), to a 
market-based pricing model, under which these assets earned a market price for the output they were able to 
produce. The aftermath of the restructuring witnessed an unprecedented investment in new generation, 
especially renewables, with the share of nuclear generation owned by IPP increasing from zero in 1997 to 
almost 50% in 2012, as utilities sold off their nuclear assets (see Borenstein and Bushnell, 2015).   
 
Since the implementation of market reform, there has been proliferation of empirical studies on the effects 
of restructuring in the electric power industry. One aspect that has attracted much attention is the 
investigation of the efficiency gains from restructuring. Obviously, the debate has been more intense about 
how reform has potentially impacted on the operational efficiency of the investor –owned electric utilities. 
Protagonists of restructuring have earlier advocated that it offers incentives to electricity producers to 
improve their efficiency; however, controversies remain going by the mixed pictures of the findings from 
these studies. Previous studies which have established efficiency gains from restructuring in the US 
electricity sector include Kleit and Terrell (2001), Knittel (2002), Hiebert (2002), Wolfram (2005), Zhang 
(2007) and Craig and Savage (2013). Empirical studies that confirmed the negative efficiency impact of 
                                                          
48 These states are Connecticut, District of Columbia, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Texas. 
49 The extent one considers the electric sector to be deregulated," in the United State, it is due to this fundamental shift in the paradigm for 
compensating owners of generation. 
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deregulation on the electric power industry include Delma and Tokat (2005) and Goto and Tsutsui (2008), 
while Fabzrio et al. (2007) confirms both negative and positive impacts of deregulation on efficiency.  
 
Using a Bayesian stochastic frontier model, Kleit and Terrell (2001) examine the potential efficiency gains 
in electric power generation for 78 steam plants in the year 1996. They find that plants, on average, could 
reduce production costs by up to 13% by eliminating production inefficiency. Knittel (2002) reveals an 
increase in efficiency by about two per cent for coal and natural gas fuelled plant. Hiebert (2002) 
investigates the impact of restructuring on cost efficiency for 633 fossil-fuelled plants from 1988 to 1997and 
finds a mean efficiency increase in the states implementing retail competition to about 50 per cent. Craig and 
Savage (2013) examine the effects of market restructuring initiatives that introduced competition into the US 
electricity industry on the thermal efficiency of electricity generation for 950 plants from 1996 to 2006. 
Their results indicate that found access to wholesale electricity markets and retail choice together increased 
the efficiency of investor-owned plants by about nine percent and that these gains stem from organizational 
and technological changes within the plant.  
 
In contrast, Delmas and Tokat (2005) using data envelopment analysis (DEA) on 177 U.S. electric utilities 
from 1998 to 2001 show that the process of retail deregulation had a negative impact on firms’ productive 
efficiency. Goto and Tsutsui (2008) investigate the impact on technical efficiency change in electric utilities 
in their generation, transmission/distribution, and general administration functions using the input distance 
function and stochastic frontier approach. They examine technical efficiency change using annual data for 
22 U.S. electric utilities firms from 1992-2000, and find that firms located in states that have enforced 
deregulation are less efficient. However, Fabzrio et al (2007) shows both negative and positive impacts of 
deregulation by estimating the input demand functions for 769 fossil fuelled plants from 1981 to1999. They 
indicate that the labour and non-fuel expenses of plants in the states that implemented restructuring 
legislation were about 3 to 5 percent lower than plants in non- restructured states while concluding that 
restructuring yields substantial medium-run efficiency for the investor owned utilities.   
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Our paper contributes to the literature by analysing electric power industry’s performance using consistent 
state-level electricity generation dataset for the contiguous state from 1998-2014. The empirical analysis of 
the production technology and inefficiency builds on the estimation of several specifications of stochastic 
frontier models. As a clear departure from the existing papers, the estimation of different heteroscedastic 
models allows us to address the twofold objectives of this study; investigating the determinants of the 
inefficiency, and an evaluation of the non-monotonic margin effects.  To achieve these objectives, we adopt 
the Wang (2002, 2003) approach that allows both mean and variance of the pre-truncated normal to depend 
on the exogenous variables. To date, this study represents the first empirical work that captures the impact of 
restructuring on efficiency using this robust and flexible approach. An insight into our finding reveals that 
deregulation significantly reduces inefficiency across the models estimated. However, retail choice is found 
to increase inefficiency. Furthermore, the result from the preferred model shows that deregulated states are 
more efficient in electricity generation than non-deregulated states.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the methodological approach. 
Specifically, we present the specification for the estimated models and describes the non-monotonic 
marginal effects. In section 3, we explain in detail the data and variables used. Section 4 presents the 
empirical results from models and the marginal effects. Section 5 presents the concluding remarks and 
recommendations. 
 
5.2.   Methodology 
In this paper, we explore the impact of restructuring by estimating a stochastic production frontier model. 
We adopt this approach in order to unravel the extent of the contribution of restructuring to electricity 
generation in the United State as well as its influence in shaping production efficiency. The stochastic 
frontier analysis (SFA) independently proposed by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and 
van den Broeck (1977) SFA is centred on the concept that deviations from the production frontier defined by 
the ‘‘best practice’’ technology might not be entirely under the control of the firm and might be due to 
measurement errors and other noise upon the frontier. The approach decomposes the error term into two 
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components, a traditional two-sided error term which captures the effects of measurement error and a one-
sided error term to measure technical inefficiency. The general stochastic production function (ALS, 
hereafter) is specified as follows:  
 
                            𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 −  𝑢𝑖𝑡                                                                                                 (5.1)            
    
                              𝑣𝑖𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2)                                                                                                                     (5.2)                                                                                                                
  
                              𝑢𝑖𝑡~𝑁
+(0, 𝜎𝑢
2)                                                                                                      (5.3) 
              
The cross-sectional units are indexed i = 1….,N and the time periods are indexed t= 1, …,T, where N is 
appreciably large (47) and T is 17.  𝑦𝑖𝑡  is the output of each state, 𝛼  is the intercept,   𝑥𝑖𝑡
′  is the vector of 
inputs of the production process and 𝛽 the vector of coefficients to be estimated. The  𝑣𝑖𝑡  denotes a two-
sided conventional idiosyncratic error term which is assumed to follow an i.i.d.  N (0,𝜎𝑣
2) distribution and 
accounts for measurement sampling and specification error, as well as for the effect of other random shocks. 
The  𝑢𝑖𝑡 represents a one-sided and non-negative random variable which measures technical inefficiency and 
has an identically and independent half normal distribution. This model was originally developed for cross-
sectional data but was later extended to accommodate panel data by the inclusion of a time trend or time 
dummy in order to capture technical progress. The nexus between inefficiency and exogenous effects has 
been investigated sequentially using a  two-step approach50 (See Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). Lately, the 
approach has been considered biased due to the misspecification inherent in the first model (Battese and 
Coelli, 1995, Schmidt and Wang, 2002).   
 
                                                          
50 The approach estimates the observation-specific inefficiency measure in the first step, and goes further to regress the efficiency index on 
exogenous variables in the second step. The shortcoming of the procedure is that if the input variables and the exogenous are correlated, the 
first step of the two-step procedure is considered biased. In the event that input variables and the exogenous factors are uncorrelated, 
ignoring the dependence of the inefficiency on the exogenous variable will lead the first step technical efficiency to be underdispersed such 
that the results of the second stage regression are likely to be biased downward (See Kumbhakar et al, 2015)  
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Modelling of exogenous effects on inefficiency has always followed two flexible approaches. First, 
Kumbhakar, et al. (1991), Huang and Liu (1994), and Battese and Coelli (1995) (KGMHLBC hereafter) 
proposed parametrising the mean of the pre-truncated inefficiency distribution.   
 
                                    𝑢𝑖𝑡~ 𝑁
+(𝜇𝑖𝑡, 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2)                                                                                                       (5.4) 
                                        𝜇𝑖𝑡 = 𝒛𝒊𝒕
′ 𝛿 
 
where 𝒛𝒊𝒕 is the vector of exogenous variables. Second, Reifschneider and Stevenson, Caudill and Ford 
(1993) and Caudill et al. (1995) assume   𝜇𝑖𝑡  to be constant but parameterize the variance of the pre-
truncated distribution as a function of the exogenous variables; 
 
                                                𝑢𝑖𝑡~ 𝑁
+(𝜇𝑖𝑡, 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2)                                                                                                        (5.5) 
                                           𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 = exp(𝒛𝒊𝒕
′ 𝛾) 
 
Hadri (1999) generalise the second approach by allowing the variance of the two-sided error term to be 
heteroscedastic, parameterizing the variance of the noise component. This second approach is jointly classed 
as the Caudill and Ford (1993) and Caudill et al (1995) and Hadri (1999) approach (RSCFGH hereafter)51. 
Given that   𝑢𝑖𝑡 has a truncated normal distribution, its variance is a function of both   𝜇𝑖𝑡  and  𝜎𝑖𝑡
2  . Wang 
(2002) proposed another model that combines the features of KGMHLBC and RSCFGH and allows both 
  𝜇𝑖𝑡  and  𝜎𝑖𝑡
2  to be observational specific.  
 
The WANG truncated normal distribution model, with double heteroscedasticity is which parameterised as 
follows: 
 
                                                          
51 The ALS half normal distribution suffers some drawbacks as it assumes that 𝑢𝑖𝑡 and the pre-truncated  𝑢𝑖𝑡  are homoscedastic i.e. both  𝜎𝑢
2  
and  𝜎𝑢
2 parameters are constants. This drawback is addressed by this approach.  Ignoring the heteroscedasticity of 𝑣𝑖𝑡  would not affect the 
consistency of a frontier’s function parameters estimates but could bias the intercept downward and also bias technical efficiency.  Whereas if 
heteroscedasticity of 𝑢𝑖𝑡  is ignored both the   estimates of the frontier parameters as well as the technical efficiency are biased (See  Wang et 
al. 2015)   
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                                   𝑢𝑖𝑡~ 𝑁
+(𝜇, 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 ) 
                                    𝜇𝑖𝑡 = 𝒛𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛿                                                                                                                           
                                 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 = exp(𝒛𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛾) 
                                𝜎𝑣𝑖𝑡
2 = exp(𝒛𝑖𝑡
′ 𝜆)                                                                                                   (5.6) 
 
The determinants vector 𝒛𝑖𝑡
′  includes a constant and other exogenous variables associated with the 
inefficiency. The 𝛿 and 𝛾 are the corresponding coefficient vectors. All other notations remain as defined 
above.  It is instructive to note that whether we allow the mean, the variance, or both the mean and the 
variance of the pre-truncated normal to depend on exogenous factors, both the mean and the variance of the 
truncated half normal will always depend on the exogenous factors. Failure to model the exogenous factors 
appropriately leads to biased estimation of the production frontier model and of the level of technical 
inefficiency, hence leading to poor policy conclusions (see Liu and Mayer, 2008). 
 
 In this paper, we adopt a general-to-specific estimation approach involving five different models which is 
based on a number of variable restrictions in the specific models against the general model. First, we begin 
by assuming the general model is the WANG model in which  𝛿 and 𝛾 are both estimated using the 
maximum likelihood method as parameterised in equation (5.6). Second, we consider the KGMHLBC 
model in which  𝛾 = 0. The model treats exogenous variables as a function of the mean of the pre-truncated 
normal while assuming homoscedastic variance of the pre-truncated normal variable as specified in the Eq 
(5.5). Third, we look at the pre-truncated normal distribution RSCFG model in which  𝜇 = 0. This model 
addresses heteroscedasticity by treating exogenous variables as determinants of the variance of the pre-
truncated normal variable. This is followed by the RSCFG−𝜇  in which   𝛿 = 0  proposed by Alvarez et al. 
(2006) where the mean of the distribution is allowed to be different from zero52. Lastly, we estimate the half 
homoscedastic half normal ALS in which  𝜇 = 𝛾 = 0. We nest the four other restricted models into the 
general model and select the appropriate model that provides the best fit for our data using diagnostics tests 
                                                          
52Alvarez et al. (2006) gives a technical discussion on the desirability of the scaling property arising from the non- zero mean assumption of the 
model which parametrises the inefficiency term as a deterministic function of a set of efficiency covariates, i.e.   
ℎ(. ) = exp(𝒛𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛾) times a one-sided random variable that does not depend on any efficiency determinant, 𝑢𝑖𝑡
∗ ~ 𝑁+(0, 𝜎𝑢
2). 
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such as the Likelihood ratio (LR) and the Akaike information criterion (AIC). The summary of the general 
model together with the restrictions of the other competing models is presented in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1: List of the estimated models  
 
    Variable                   Restrictions               𝑁+ (𝜇𝑖𝑡 , 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2)   
           Mean 
 
           Std Deviation 
 
       WANG Model                
 
                  𝜇𝑖𝑡 = 𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛿              𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 =  exp(𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛾) 
 
KGMHLBC Model        𝛾 = 0      
 
                  𝜇𝑖𝑡 =  𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛿 
  
          𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 =  𝜎𝑢
2 
 
RSCFG- 𝜇 Model         𝛿 = 0   
 
                  𝜇𝑖𝑡 =  𝜇 
  
          𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 =  exp(𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛾) 
        RSCFG Model             𝜇 = 0      
 
                  𝜇𝑖𝑡 =  0 
  
          𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 =  exp(𝑧𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛾) 
        ALS Model                 𝜇 = 𝛾 = 0    
 
                  𝜇𝑖𝑡 =  0 
  
          𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 =  𝜎𝑢
2 
 
        
Given that the composed error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡 =  𝑢𝑖𝑡 +  𝑣𝑖𝑡,  𝑢𝑖𝑡  is estimated as the conditional expectation of the 
one-sided error term, exp(𝑢), given the composed error, 𝑣 + 𝑢: 
 
                                     ?̂? 𝑖𝑡 =  𝐸[𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡]                                                                                               (5.7) 
 
The maximum likelihood residuals are used to replace 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡                    
The measurement of technical efficiency is obtained by deriving the probability density function for u, 
conditional on every numerical realization of the composed error term 𝜀𝑖𝑡.. This approach is based on 
conditional expectations which generalize the estimators proposed by Battese and Coelli (1988). The 
technical efficiency index for each state can be estimated from the point estimates of the technical 
inefficiency (𝑢𝑖𝑡) as the ratio of observed output to corresponding frontier output.  
 
                       𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝐸[exp(−(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝜀𝑖𝑡))]                                                                                                           (5.8)                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                
The technical efficiency index lies between 0 and 1. Scores of one indicates a fully efficient state is on the 
frontier, while non-frontier firms receive scores below one.  
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5.2.1 Marginal effect 
We proceed to derive the marginal effect of the z[𝑗], the jth variable of the 𝐳𝑖𝑡 vector in (5.6). Wang’s (2002) 
model has the advantage of allowing for the estimation of non-monotonic efficiency impacts which implies 
that  𝒛𝑖𝑡 can have, within the sample, both increasing and decreasing effects on the production efficiency. 
The conventional stochastic frontier model is built on the implicit assumption that the exogenous variables’ 
impact on inefficiency are monotonic i.e. the exogenous factors are either strictly efficiency-enhancing or 
efficiency –impeding in the sample, but not both. However, Wang (2002) demonstrates exogenous variables 
can positively (negatively) affect the mean and variance efficiency when the values of the 𝐳𝑖𝑡 vector are 
within certain range, and then the impacts turn negative (positive) for values of 𝐳𝑖𝑡 outside the range.  
 
The non-monotonicity marginal effects of on 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡)  of the jth element of 𝐳𝑖𝑡 can written as; 
  
𝜕𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡)
𝜕𝑧[j]
 =   𝛿[j] [1 − 𝛬 [
𝜙(𝛬)
𝛷(𝛬)
] − [
𝜙(𝛬)
𝛷(𝛬)
]
2
]   +  𝛾[j]
𝜎𝑖𝑡
2
[(1 + 𝛬2) [
𝜙(𝛬)
𝛷(𝛬)
] + 𝛬 [
𝜙(𝛬)
𝛷(𝛬)
]
2
]                        (5.9) 
 
 
where 𝛬 = 𝜇𝑖𝑡 𝜎𝑖𝑡⁄ , 𝜙 and 𝛷 are the probability and cumulative density functions of a standard normal 
distribution. 𝑧[𝑗] is the jth element of 𝐳𝑖𝑡,  and 𝛿 and 𝛾 are associated coefficients of the determinants of 
mean and variance inefficiency. In the event that the variance 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2  is non- parameterised, 𝛾[𝑗] is assumed to 
be zero and constant for all 𝑗 and equation (10) would imply a monotonic 𝐳𝑖𝑡 on  (𝑢𝑖𝑡) . The marginal effect 
takes the sign of 𝛿[𝑗]  which is the same for all values of  𝐳𝑖𝑡. 
 
The marginal effects of 𝐳𝑖𝑡 on V(𝑢𝑖𝑡)  can be expressed as follows: 
 
𝜕𝑉(𝑢𝑖𝑡)
𝜕𝑧[j]
 =   
𝛿[j]
𝜎𝑖𝑡
[𝛬 +
𝜙(𝛬)
𝛷(𝛬)
 ] (𝑚1
2 − 𝑚2)
+   𝛾[j]𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 {1 −
1
2
[
𝜙(𝛬)
𝛷(𝛬)
] ((𝛬 + 𝛬3 + (2 + 3𝛬2) [
𝜙(𝛬)
𝛷(𝛬)
]) + 2𝛬 [
𝜙(𝛬)
𝛷(𝛬)
]
2
}
 
                    (5.10) 
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where 𝑚1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑚2 are the first two moments of 𝑢𝑖𝑡 represented as  
 
𝑚1  =   𝑓(𝜇𝑖𝑡,𝜎𝑖𝑡) = 𝜎𝑖𝑡 [𝛬 +
𝜙(𝛬)
𝛷(𝛬)
 ]                                                                                                                   (5.11) 
 
𝑚2  =  𝑔(𝜇𝑖𝑡,𝜎𝑖𝑡) = 𝜎𝑖𝑡
2 [1 −  𝛬 [
𝜙(𝛬)
𝛷(𝛬)
] − [
𝜙(𝛬)
𝛷(𝛬)
]
2
]                                                                                       (5.12) 
 
Equations (5.9) and (5.10) reveal that the marginal effects of the non-monotonic inefficiency effects consist 
of two terms, indicating the impact of the variables on the mean and variance of the inefficiency 
components.  
 
 
5.3  Data and descriptive statistics 
This section discusses the data used to implement the stochastic production frontier model. The study is 
based on a US state level electricity panel data set for a sample of 47 states (i=1,…, 47) over the period 1998 
to 2014. The sample period covers the era of the implementation of major electric industry restructuring 
policy, especially the Electricity Generation Customer Choice and Competition Act which introduces retail 
competition into the electricity industry in most states between 1998 and 2002.   For our purposes, we limit 
the analysis to the contiguous states (i.e. Alaska and Hawaii are excluded)53.  The data set is based on 
information from the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) US Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
database, the Bureau of Economic Analysis of US Department of Commerce, and the US Census Bureau. 
Our choice of inputs and output is consistent with the literature such as Coelli et al. (2013), Jaraitė & Di 
Maria (2012), among others.  
 
                                                          
53 The District of Columbia and Vermont were initially considered in the analysis but were later filtered out as outliers after running a pooled 
OLS for the whole sample.   
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The capital input is measured in megawatts (MW) of installed capacity. Installed capacity is commonly used 
as a standard measure of capital stock of electricity generation in the literature54. Installed capacity in this 
study is defined as the maximum amount of electricity that a thermal electricity station can produce at any 
given point in time. It describes the maximum capacity that a system is designed to run at. Installed capacity 
is collected from Form EIA-860 of the US Energy Information Agency (EIA).  The labour input refers to the 
economically active population in electricity generation for each state measured in thousands of employees. 
Information on the number of people employed for electricity generation is taken from the US Bureau of 
Labour Statistics.  The quantity of energy input is measured as the total heat content in billions of British 
thermal unit (billion BTUs) for each state, and includes all varieties of energy consumed from different 
energy sources by the generation plants such coal, petroleum, natural gas, nuclear, geothermal and other 
gases. Energy consumption at the state level from coal, petroleum and natural gas are reported on physical 
quantity units in EIA-906, EIA-920 and EIA-923 Forms (tons of coal, barrels of oil and mcf of natural gas). 
The reported heat content information for individual fuels is taken from the EIA so as to convert energy 
consumption into billion BTU. After converting the energy consumption into the same measurement units, 
we aggregated them into total heat content in billion British thermal units. The output variable is each state’s 
aggregate electric power industry net generation of electricity for each year from various energy sources 
(coal, hydro, natural gas, petroleum). Electricity generation is measured in consumption in megawatt hours. 
Total electric power industry net generation derives from the summation of generation by different type of 
producers such as electric utilities generator, Combined Heat and Power and independent power producers. 
The data is extracted from Forms EIA-906, EIA-920 and EIA-923 of the US Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) database   Input variables are capital, labour and energy.  
Previous studies have identified factors that could shape the operating environment but are not directly 
related to the performance of the generation plants. These exogenous factors are categorised into political 
and economic variables that could influence the mean of the inefficiency. First, we consider the market 
                                                          
54 Installed capital is used as the measure of the services of capital input. The use of installed capital as proxy for capital stock is consistent with 
the literature.  Although, a potential issue is that some parts of the installed capital of a generator (conventionally measured as the electrical 
power rating of the capacity) may not in practice have been part of the ‘used and useful’ capital stock, as defined by US public service 
regulators. However, industry wide practice is to use installed capacity in the engineering sense as a comparable measure of the stock of 
capital services.  
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restructuring variables encompasses the different levels of deregulation which utilities face in each state and 
the degree of competition allowed in the electricity market. Of course, several studies in the literature 
propose broader indicators of market restructuring as follows;  (a) plant access to wholesale electricity 
market places through a regional transmission organisation (b) the date at which formal hearings on 
restructuring began; (b) the date at which formal hearings on restructuring legislation enacted; (d) the 
implementation of retail choice under legislation; and (e) complementary aspects of restructuring, such as 
access to wholesale markets, permit capacity trading, the mandatory divestiture of generation assets and the 
type of rate of regulation (Fabrizio et al, 2007; Zhang, 2007;  Craig & Salvage 2013; Davie and Wolfram, 
2012).  
  
For our purpose, we rely on the current restructuring classification originally developed by the Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) of the US Department of Energy (EIA, 2010). The Energy Information 
Administration defines restructuring as when a monopoly system of electric utilities has been replaced with 
competing sellers and classifies electricity restructuring into active, not active and suspended. According to 
the restructuring information update only seventeen states and the District of Columbia are active in 
restructuring activities. It is interesting to observe the spatial clustering. Most restructured states are 
predominantly the Northeastern region and East North Central, barring Maryland, District of Columbia, 
Oregon and Texas. In addition, the EIA further breaks down the restructuring activities by state into 
deregulation and retail choice – either yes, no or suspended. Therefore, considering this classification, we 
employ two indicators, deregulation and retail choice to construct dummy variables for restructured and 
non-restructured states. For deregulation and retail choice variables, states where deregulation/retail choice 
is ‘yes’ are assigned the value of one and zero if they are ‘no’or ‘suspended’. We also control for political 
variables that might likely influence the state restructuring process by including a dummy variable REP 
GOV which is equal to one when the state has Republicans who control both the governorship and the 
legislature. PUC is a dummy variable that equals one if the majority of the state’s PUC commissioners are 
Republican and zero if otherwise. Republican PUC members are more likely to promote retail competition.  
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A negative coefficient on the restructuring variables would mean positive impacts on technical efficiency. 
The data is constructed using the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioner (NARUC). 
 
Finally, we also control for state specific heterogeneity captured using two major observable exogenous 
variables, which are all obtained as follows. Population density measures the number of people in an area 
relative to its size. It is computed as the ratio of thousands of people per square kilometre of land area. Data 
on population is obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the US Department of Commerce while 
land area information is extracted from the US Census Bureau. The real GDP per capita for each state allows 
us to assess the impact of economic structure on the mean of inefficiency. The real GDP is measured for 
each year in thousand US in chained 2009 dollars and obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of 
the US Department of Commerce. The summary statistics on the variables used in the empirical estimation 
are provided in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics 
 Variable                     Mean        Sd. Dev.           Min 
                                                 
Max 
 
Net electricity generation (MWh) 8.89e+07        7.24e+07  5971545 4.38e+09 
 
Installed Capacity (MW) 23442.53        19903.80 1385 124214.9 
 
Energy (million BTU) 6.16e+08        5.90e+08 3430158 3.93e+09 
  
Labour (‘000 people) 5713.24        6569.51 10 37599 
 
Deregulation (1= yes , 0 = no) 0.3134        0.4642 0 1  
Retail Choice (1= yes , 0 = no) 0.2479        0.4321 0 1  
PUC (1= yes , 0 = no) 0.6546        0.4758 0 1  
REP GOV (1= yes ,0 = no) 0.6811        0.4664 0 1  
GDP (million U.S2009$) 44574.71        7864.20 28764 69787  
POP (ppl/sq.km of land area) 0.1720        0.2258 
 
0.0051 1.2154  
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5.4 Empirical Result and Analysis  
 
5.4.1 Model results  
 
We estimate the translog production function, with inputs of capital, fuel consumption and labour and the 
exogenous variables, a flexible functional form which assumes that the output of a firm can be written as a 
quadratic function of the logarithms of the factor inputs55. Our empirical analysis is programmed in Stata 
using the maximum likelihood code written by Wang (2005). Indexing each input by j or k, j or k = 1,.3, and 
time dummies by𝐷𝑇𝑡 , the estimated equation can be written as follows: 
 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑙𝑛(𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑡)
3
𝑘=1
+
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝑗𝑙𝑛(𝑥𝑖𝐽𝑡)𝑙𝑛(𝑥𝑖𝑘𝑡)
3
𝑗=1
3
𝑘=1
 +  ∑ 𝛼𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=2
𝐷𝑇𝑡  +   𝑣𝑖𝑡 −  𝑢𝑖𝑡               (5.13) 
 
As a preliminary step to our analysis, we estimated a pooled OLS regression of the stochastic production 
frontier in order to ascertain statistically whether the data contains inefficiency effects. If there were no 
technical inefficiency, the error term will be symmetric i.e. 𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 0, the model reduces to the standard 
regression model and the composed error term collapses to the two-sided error, i.e.  𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑣𝑖𝑡 .  Thus, the 
data will not support the technical inefficiency analysis.  Figure 1 displays the histogram of the residuals 
following the OLS estimation. Compared with a normal density distribution, the residual shows a skewed 
distribution to the right, indicating the presence of inefficiency in the model.  In order to demonstrate the 
skewness more empirically, a skewness test for normality proposed by Coelli (1995) rejects the null 
hypothesis of normal residual56.   The computed statistic equals -4.807. Because it a normal distribution, the 
critical value is 1.96, therefore, the result confirms the rejection of the null hypothesis of no skewness in the 
OLS residual. 
 
 
                                                          
55 The translog function can be approximated by the second order Taylor series (Christensen, et al. 1973). 
56 Coelli (1995) notes that under the null hypothesis of normal residual, the third moment of the OLS residual is asymptotically distributed as a 
normal random variable with mean 0 and variance 6𝑚2
3/𝑁 . The statistic is given as M3T=𝑚3 √6𝑚2
3/𝑁⁄ . 
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Figure 5.2: Histogram chart of the OLS residual 
 
 
 
In this paper we propose to study the impact of restructuring on electricity generation efficiency. Therefore, 
we have included in all the competing models deregulation and retail choice indicators for restructuring.  We 
include PUC and REP GOV so as to control for political influence on restructuring while the real GDP per 
capita and population density act as control variables for economic structure and spatial diversity 
respectively. We opine that our findings might be dependent on the empirical models in relation to the 
inefficiency determinants. We implemented several model selection tests while imposing restrictions on the 
translog production function in order to obtain the preferred model. Since the WANG model is nested to the 
other models, we carried out the standard likelihood ratio LR test suggested by Alvarez et al (2006). The LR 
test is given by 𝜆 = −2(ln 𝐿0 - ln 𝐿1)  where ln 𝐿0 and ln 𝐿1 represents the maximum log-likelihood value 
under the null hypothesis H0 and the alternative H1 respectively. If  𝜆  of the hypothesis is greater than the 
critical value of chi-square, then this null hypothesis is rejected.  However, Lia and Huang (2010) pointed 
out that the standard LR test may have the tendency of favouring the model with a greater number of 
parameters since there is no penalty on imposing extra parameters. Therefore, we estimate the Akaike 
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information criterion (AIC) to further justify our selection decision. The Akaike information criterion is 
defined as: AIC =   −2 (ln (likelihood)) + 2K, where the likelihood is the probability of the data given the 
model, and K is the number of free parameters in the model. Thus, a model with the smaller value of AIC 
fits the data better than one with the larger AIC.  
 
The LR test shows the four other competing models nested in the WANG model. Considering the WANG 
model as the baseline model, we proceed to test the restrictions that would best fit our data. We set the null 
hypotheses that each restricted model is more appropriate for our data against the alternative hypotheses of 
the unrestricted model. The results of the model selection tests are given table 3 below. The likelihood-ratio 
test shows that the KGMHLBC (𝛾 = 0), RSCFG- 𝜇 ( 𝛿 = 0 ) , RSCFG (𝛿 = 0) and ALS (𝜇 = 𝛾 = 0)  
models are all rejected in favour of the WANG model at a one per cent significance level due to the 
inclusion of exogenous variables in the mean and variance of the heteroscedastic inefficiency term. The 
table also reports the WANG model as the best frontier specification with the smallest AIC = -874.701.  
Undoubtedly, the data favours the WANG model over other simpler alternative models.  
 
Table 5.3: Model selection tests 
   
 
Model       WANG   KGMHLBC RSCFG- 𝜇 RSCFG ALS 
      
Log-likelihood                    478.350   419.148  400.945  398.799 369.650 
      
AIC    -874.701 -768.297 -731.889 -729.600 -705.300 
      
LR testa                     GM   118.403  154.812   159.101 213.643 
      
#  Restrictions        -   6  6   7      13 
      
1% critical valueb       -  16.704  16.704   17.755    27.026 
      
aIn the LR test, GM denotes the general model. All other competing models are nested in the general model.   
bThe critical value of the chi-square is taken from the table in Kodde and Palm (1986, Econometrica)     
 
 
The empirical model for the analysis is based on five different frontier models to investigate the impact of 
restructuring on technical inefficiency. Table 5.4 reports the maximum likelihood estimates of the 
technological parameters which seem to be very similar in magnitude. The production input variables are log 
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mean corrected prior to estimation which enables the estimated coefficients to be directly interpreted as 
elasticities. As expected, the estimated values of the output elasticities for all the inputs are positive, 
suggesting that the estimated translog production function is a well-behaved function.  Specifically, in our 
preferred model (in the first column), the estimated output elasticities with respect to capital, energy and 
labour are 0.629, 0.268 and 0.011 respectively. The elasticities indicate that, ceteris paribus, a one 
percentage increase in capital will, on average, result in a 0.63% increase in electricity generation. Similarly, 
a one percentage increase in energy use will result in a corresponding increase in electricity generation by 
0.27%.  The estimated parameter associated with labour is not statistically significant.  Arguably, this 
finding might be due to the fact workers have little scope to influence the performance of the electricity 
industry, particularly true of the generation sector of the industry, where costs are dominated by the capital 
required to build plants and the fuel required to operate them (see Bushnell and Wolfram, 2009).  The capital 
input has the highest impact on production technology. This is consistent with the capital-intensive 
characteristic of the electricity generation industry. The second-order coefficient of both capital and energy 
inputs are positive and statistically significant indicating the effect on production is positively increasing. In 
addition, Table 5.5 reports the coefficient estimate for the time dummies across the models of the frontier 
model. The positive coefficients on the time dummy variables indicate a steady upward shift of the 
production function over time, demonstrating technical progress. This is more significant in the earlier part 
of the sample period since in the later years - after the start of the global financial crisis - the whole US 
economy including the electricity sector experienced a slowing down in demand growth while the economy 
recovered.           
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Table 5.4: Estimated results of the Frontier models 
 
           Variable WANG Model   KGMHLBC Model   RSCFG- 𝜇 Model   RSCFG Model   ALS Model 
  Coeff Std error   Coeff Std error   Coeff Std error   Coeff Std error   Coeff Std error 
               Capital  0.629*** (0.023) 
 
 0.771*** (0.023) 
 
 0.722***   (0.019) 
 
 0.721***  (0.019) 
 
 0.715*** (0.020) 
               Energy  0.268*** (0.015) 
 
 0.225*** (0.017) 
 
 0.211***   (0.015) 
 
 0.212***  (0.015) 
 
 0.216*** (0.015) 
               Labour  0.011 (0.007) 
 
 0.023** (0.008) 
 
 0.020**   (0.007) 
 
 0.021**  (0.007) 
 
 0.018* (0.007) 
               Capital  Squared  0.188*** (0.019) 
 
 0.076*** (0.014) 
 
 0.083***   (0.016) 
 
 0.079***  (0.015) 
 
 0.089*** (0.016) 
               Energy  Squared  0.154*** (0.009) 
 
 0.099*** (0.010) 
 
 0.086***   (0.008) 
 
 0.085***  (0.008) 
 
 0.085*** (0.008) 
               Labour  Squared -0.005*** (0.001) 
 
-0.004*** (0.001) 
 
-0.004***   (0.001) 
 
-0.004***  (0.001) 
 
-0.004*** (0.001) 
               Capital × Energy -0.341*** (0.023) 
 
-0.204*** (0.023) 
 
-0.191***   (0.019) 
 
-0.188***  (0.020) 
 
-0.184*** (0.020) 
               Capital × Labour  0.094*** (0.011) 
 
 0.040*** (0.007) 
 
 0.052***   (0.008) 
 
 0.052***  (0.008) 
 
 0.044*** (0.010) 
               Energy × Labour -0.055*** (0.007) 
 
-0.022** (0.006) 
 
0.023**   (0.006) 
 
-0.022***  (0.006) 
 
-0.019** (0.006) 
               Time dummies  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes     Yes  
               Constant -0.023*** (0.024) 
 
0.179*** (0.040) 
 
0.032   (0.026) 
 
 0.051***  (0.025) 
 
  0.052*** (0.025) 
               
               Sigma v -4. 472*** (0.090) 
 
-4.679*** (0.525) 
 
-4.679***   (0.161) 
 
-4.755*** (0.196) 
 
-4.844*** (0.211) 
               
𝜎𝑣
2 0.011*** (0.001)   0.009* (0.005)   0.009***   (0.001)   0.009***  (0.002)    0.008*** (0.002) 
Notes: *,**,*** denote statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  Standard error in parenthesis 
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Table 5.5: Time dummy estimates 
 
Variable WANG Model   KGMHLBC Model   RSCFG- 𝜇 Model   RSCFG Model   ALS Model 
  Coeff Std error   Coeff Std error   Coeff Std error   Coeff Std error   Coeff Std error 
               𝐷𝑇1998  0.201*** (0.028) 
 
 0.199*** (0.031) 
 
 0.189***   (0.030) 
 
 0.189***  (0.030) 
 
 0.198*** (0.031) 
               𝐷𝑇1999  0.201*** (0.028) 
 
 0.206*** (0.031) 
 
 0.204***   (0.031) 
 
 0.204***  (0.030) 
 
 0.211*** (0.031) 
𝐷𝑇2000  0.172*** (0.028) 
 
 0.186** (0.031) 
 
 0.174***   (0.030) 
 
 0.173***  (0.030) 
 
 0.181*** (0.031) 
               𝐷𝑇2001  0.132*** (0.028) 
 
 0.141*** (0.031) 
 
 0.123***   (0.030) 
 
 0.122***  (0.030) 
 
 0.129*** (0.031) 
𝐷𝑇2002  0.099*** (0.027) 
 
 0.118*** (0.030) 
 
 0.105**   (0.030) 
 
 0.104**  (0.030) 
 
 0.110*** (0.031) 
               𝐷𝑇2003  0.067* (0.027) 
 
 0.090** (0.030) 
 
 0.076*   (0.030) 
 
 0.075**  (0.030) 
 
 0.078** (0.030) 
𝐷𝑇2004  0.063* (0.027) 
 
 0.089** (0.030) 
 
 0.073*   (0.030) 
 
 0.072**  (0.030) 
 
 0.073** (0.030) 
               𝐷𝑇2005  0.069* (0.027) 
 
 0.099** (0.030) 
 
 0.083**   (0.030) 
 
 0.083**  (0.030) 
 
 0.080** (0.031) 
𝐷𝑇2006  0.034 (0.027) 
 
 0.077* (0.030) 
 
0.060**   (0.030) 
 
 0.058*  (0.030) 
 
 0.058* (0.031) 
𝐷𝑇2007  0.052** (0.027)   0.086** (0.029)  0.074**   (0.030)   0.072**  (0.030)  0.071** (0.030) 
𝐷𝑇2008  0.047* (0.027)   0.078** (0.029)  0.069*   (0.030)   0.069**  (0.030)  0.067** (0.030) 
               
𝐷𝑇2009  0.007 (0.027)   0.017 (0.029)  0.007   (0.030)   0.006  (0.030)  0.010 (0.030) 
𝐷𝑇2010  0.035 (0.026)   0.052* (0.029)  0.043   (0.030)   0.044  (0.030)  0.045 (0.030) 
               
𝐷𝑇2011  0.016 (0.028)   0.021 (0.029)  0.027   (0.030)   0.025  (0.030)  0.024 (0.030) 
𝐷𝑇2013  0.012 (0.007)   0.022 (0.029  0.025   (0.006)   0.026  (0.030)  0.026 (0.030) 
𝐷𝑇2014  0.009 (0.026)   0.021 (0.029)  0.022   (0.030)   0.022  (0.030)  0.021 (0.030) 
               
Notes: *,**,*** denote statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  Standard error in parenthesis 
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We now turn our attention to the impact of restructuring on electricity production across states. We 
incorporated several exogenous variables into the heteroscedastic alternative models by allowing the 
variables to affect the mean and variance of the inefficiency. This also includes estimating the general 
homoscedastic ASL model. The result of the inefficiency determinants is reported in Table 5.6. Since the 
AIC and LR tests have support the WANG model, our discussion is centred on the model that allows both 
the mean and the variance of the   pre-truncated distribution of the inefficiency to depend on the exogenous 
factors. Tellingly, our preferred model points to the reliability of the variance of the inefficiency to 
appreciably capture the impacts of the exogenous variables on production inefficiency, as most of the 
restructuring variables are insignificant. The preferred model also shows that the estimated restructuring 
coefficients on the variance of the inefficiency have the expected signs (with the exception of retail choice) 
and are statistically significant. 
 
Focusing on the variance of the inefficiency, overall, our finding shows the importance of restructuring in 
the electricity generation industry. The coefficient of deregulation is statistically significant at 1% and 
negatively correlated with inefficiency, while retail choice is positively correlated with inefficiency. The 
sign of the coefficient of the deregulation variable means a negative impact on technical inefficiency, thus a 
positive effect on efficiency in the production of electricity due to the impact of restructuring. This 
particularly holds true for the a priori expectation that deregulation represents a key factor in improving 
electricity production efficiency. This finding is largely consistent with previous studies such as Kleit and 
Terrell (2001), Knittel (2002), Hiebert (2002), Zhang (2007) and Craig and Savage (2013). The sign on 
retail choice is quite surprising as it appears states that have implemented retail competition in the 
generation segment seem less efficient. The result is contrary to the findings of Joskwo (2006) that 
wholesale and retail restructuring has led to lower prices. A plausible interpretation arising from this finding 
could be that retail choice market reform might not be a sufficient condition for restructuring as only a few 
number of deregulated states have permitted consumers access to competitive suppliers of generation. 
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Table 5.6: Estimate for the inefficiency components 
 
           Variable WANG Model   KGMHLBC Model   RSCFG- 𝜇 Model   RSCFG Model   ALS Model 
  Coef. Std. error   Coef. Std. error   Coef. Std. error   Coef. Std. error   Coef. Std. error 
               Mean function               
               𝛿0  -0.606*** (0.135) 
 
 0.287*** (0.036) 
 
-0.199*** (0.184) 
 
0 
  
0 
 
Deregulation  -0.049 (0.084) 
 
-0.181*** (0.023) 
 
 0 
  
0 
  
0 
 
Retail choice   0.011 (0.084) 
 
 0.066** (0.022) 
 
 0 
  
0 
  
0 
 
PUC   0.369 (0.028) 
 
-0.055** (0.017) 
 
 0 
  
0 
  
0 
 
REP GOV   0.470*** (0.103) 
 
 0.090*** (0.018) 
 
 0 
  
0 
  
0 
 
GDP  -0.812*** (0.116) 
 
 0.112** (0.040) 
 
 0 
  
0 
  
0 
 
POP  -0.200*** (0.023) 
 
 0.049*** (0.008) 
 
 0 
  
0 
  
0 
 Variance function 
                𝛾0 -3.156*** (0.336) 
 
-4.679*** (0.525) 
 
-2.978*** (0.413) 
 
-3.470*** (0.209) 
 
-3.263*** (0.158) 
Deregulation -2.135*** (0.440) 
 
0 
  
-1.015*** (0.267) 
 
-1.113*** (0.314) 
 
0 
 
Retail choice  0.558* (0.300) 
 
0 
  
 0.246 (0.234) 
 
 0.221 (0.271) 
 
0 
 
PUC -0.489 (0.321) 
 
0 
  
-0.775*** (0.207) 
 
-0.908*** (0.226) 
 
0 
 
REP GOV -0.955** (0.337)  0    1.056*** (0.235)  1.218*** (0.250)  0  
GDP  6.224*** (0.886)  0    1.477** (0.449)  1.663** (0.504)  0  
POP  1.180*** (0.233)  0    0.213** (0.085)  0.260** (0.101)  0  
#  Observations  718   718    718   718   718  
               Log-likelihood 478.350 
  
419.148 
  
 400.944 
  
398.800 
  
371.529 
 Notes: *,**,*** denote statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  Standard error in parenthesis 
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It is noteworthy to exercise some caveat with respect to the interpretation of the retail choice 
coefficient as it is only slightly significant at 10%. From these result, we can conclude that 
electricity deregulation has significant potential benefits in enhancing technical efficiency.  
 
The inclusion of PUC and REP GOV enables us to get better intuition into the political 
dynamics of restructuring on inefficiency. Interestingly, the coefficients of PUC and REP 
GOV are negatively correlated with inefficiency. These findings imply an increase in 
technical efficiency as the majority of the state commissioners on public utility commission 
are Republicans and when the state has Republicans control both the governorship and the 
legislature. Intuitively, a plausible explanation to these findings is the tendency of these states 
controlled by Republicans to influence some political decisions that support restructuring 
policy in order to promote competition among the electric power generators. In contrast, we 
found real per capita gross domestic product and population density to be positive and 
statistically significant.  
 
Table 5.7: Estimate technical efficiency scores 
   
Model  Mean                 SD Min                       Max 
WANG 0.897 0.096 0.283 0.998 
     
KGMHLBC 0.763 0.074 0.568 0.963 
     
RSCFG- 𝜇 0.885 0.075 0.527 0.987 
     
RSCFG 0.871 0.076 0.540 0.975 
     
ALS 0.861 0.077 0.476 0.971 
 
 
Besides the determinants of the inefficiency, we are also interested in the unit-specific 
inefficiency so as to ascertain the distribution of the efficiency.  In doing so, we computed the 
Battese and Coelli efficiency estimates for each observation in all the models. The summary 
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statistics of the efficiency index across competing models are reported for comparison in 
Table 5.7.  The efficiency index summary statistics shows that our preferred model has the 
highest average efficiency of 0.897. This finding means that, on average, states electricity 
generation is 89.7 per cent of the maximum output. Better still, it implies that the states lost 
about 10.3 per cent of the potential generation output to technical inefficiency.  
 
Figure 5.2: Kernel densities of efficiency scores of the estimated models 
 
 
Figure 5.2 plots the kernel density estimates of the efficiency scores for the five models. The 
kernel density reveals the WANG mode as the most rightly skewed distribution, which 
further reinforces WANG as our preferred model. dc 
 
In order to draw further distinctions on the impacts of deregulation on the states’ technical 
efficiency in electricity generation, we categorise the efficiency index into states in which 
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deregulation has been implemented and is currently on-going and their counterparts (which 
have not implemented or suspended deregulation activities). Instead of reporting all the 
results from the alternative models, we use our preferred model, the WANG model, to 
evaluate the efficiency impact of deregulation as shown in Table 5.8. Comparing the 
efficiency result, we found out that, on average, deregulated states are more efficient in the 
electricity generation with a mean efficiency score of 0.928 compared with the non-
deregulated states. According to the result, the non-deregulated states can potentially close 
their average electricity generation inefficiency gap by 4.5 per cent with the implementation 
of a restructuring market reform. Furthermore, it is intriguing to observe that the average 
technical efficiency of deregulated states surpasses that of the whole sample average 
efficiency index. The result further strengthens our earlier finding that deregulation 
constitutes a major factor at improving electricity production efficiency due to its negative 
impact on the variance of inefficiency.  
 
Table 5.8: WANG model efficiency scores 
   
                                      #  Observations    Mean      SD     Min     Max 
 
Deregulated States                     225 0.928 0.092 0. 283    0.998 
     
Non-deregulated States             493 0. 883 0.095 0. 563    0.988 
     
Whole Sample                           718   0.897    0.096    0.283    0.998 
   
  
 
 5.4.2 Marginal Effects results 
 
Having discussed the slope parameters of the exogenous variables, we now focus on the 
marginal effect. The marginal effect indicates by how much the technical inefficiency will 
change if each of the exogenous variables changes, ceteris paribus. The estimation of 
marginal effect is important to our analysis as the estimated slope parameters of the 
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inefficiency determinants are only indicative of the direction and not the magnitude. 
Therefore, marginal effects are evaluated for both the mean and the variance of the technical 
inefficiency i.e. 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡) and 𝑉(𝑢𝑖𝑡) as explained in equation (5.9) and (5.10).  
 
Table 5.9: Marginal effects on inefficiency using WANG Model 
 
    
Variable                Marginal effects on E(𝑢𝑖𝑡 )   Marginal effects  on V(𝑢𝑖𝑡 ) 
                       Coeff 
 
  Coeff 
 
       Deregulation     Average       
 
                   -0.119 
  
-0.027 
                             25th percentile 
 
                   -0.115 
  
-0.011 
                             50th percentile 
 
                   -0.074 
  
-0.005 
                             75th percentile                     -0.049   -0.002  
       
Retail choice      Average       
 
                    0.024 
  
-0.006 
                             25th percentile 
 
                  -0.003 
  
-0.002 
                             50th percentile                      0.014   -0.001  
                            75th percentile                      0.028   -0.000  
       
PUC                     Average       
 
                   -0.010 
  
-0.012 
                             25th percentile 
 
                   -0.020 
  
-0.016 
                             50th percentile 
 
                   -0.008 
  
-0.011 
                             75th percentile                      0.024   -0.007  
       
REP GOV             Average       
 
                    0.013 
  
-0.006 
                             25th percentile 
 
                   -0.011 
  
-0.002 
                             50th percentile 
 
                    0.022 
  
-0.000 
                             75th percentile                      0.379     0.021  
       
GDP                     Average       
 
                   -0.005 
  
 0.003 
                             25th percentile 
 
                   -0.604 
  
 0.002 
                             50th percentile                      0.071    0.003  
                            75th percentile                      0.220    0.005  
       
POP                     Average       
 
                   -0.014 
  
 0.012 
                             25th percentile                     -0.144    0.000  
                            50th percentile                      0.011    0.002  
                            75th percentile                      0.038    0.004  
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The mean function marginal effects demonstrate how a change in an exogenous variable 
affects the expected inefficiency. On the other hand, the marginal effects of the variance 
function reveal the partial effect of the exogenous variable on production uncertainty in the 
electricity generation industry. Following Wang’s (2002, 2003) approach, the computed non-
monotonic marginal effects of the exogenous factors on technical inefficiency at the average, 
25th 50th and 75th per centile levels are presented in Table 5.9. 
 
Not surprisingly, the marginal effects on 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡)  and 𝑉(𝑢𝑖𝑡)  of the deregulation variable 
quantifies how an increase in the degree of deregulation changes the expected inefficiency 
and the production uncertainty.  We find that deregulation overall has a negative partial 
effect, i.e. a monotonic impact on the mean and variances of the inefficiency. Indeed, as 
shown on the third column, the partial effect impact on the mean indicates that an increase in 
deregulation reduces production inefficiency by 12 per cent for the whole sample, hence an 
increased electricity generation output by the same size57. This negative pattern is the same 
for the non-linear first, second and third quartiles of the sample. However, we notice a 
decreasing trend in the partial effect from first to third quartiles. This implies that states with 
a low degree of deregulation could restructure market reform activities as they would benefit 
more from deregulation. This explanation is also valid for the marginal effects impact on the 
variance of inefficiency, as increases in deregulation appear to reduce production uncertainty 
(probably because generators were guaranteed returns on their investment, thereby expanding 
their generation capacity). Conversely, for retail choice, the mean marginal effect of the 
sample is positive, while in the first-quartiles it is negative and in the third-quartile positive. 
The opposite marginal effects in these two quartiles means that retail choice affects efficiency 
non-monotonically in the sample. In other word, when there is partial retail choice, a higher 
                                                          
57 The percentage change in output due to changes in exogenous factors is derived from the partial effect of the mean of 
inefficiency as 𝜕𝐸(𝑙𝑛𝑦) 𝜕(𝑧𝑖𝑡)⁄ =  − 𝜕𝐸(𝑢) 𝜕(𝑧𝑖𝑡)⁄ .   
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retail choice reduces the production inefficiency. However, retail choice tends to decrease 
production uncertainty, possibly due to large number of consumers depending directly on 
demand for generation outputs.   
 
The marginal effects of PUC, REP GOV, GDP and POP variables provide other interesting 
insights into the non-monotonic marginal effect. PUC, on the average, has a negative 
marginal effect of -0.010 in the mean inefficiency function, which represents an increase in 
efficiency by 1 per cent.  The first-quartiles and second-quartiles are also negative while the 
non-monotonic third quartile is positive (0.024). This finding for the first and second 
quartiles suggest that states represented by few numbers of republican commissioners on 
public utility commission could potentially improve on their technical efficiency. The 
positive sign for the third 75th percentile indicates that states with a high number of 
republican commissioners on the public utility commission do not experience a further 
increase in technical efficiency by increasing the number of their republican commissioners. 
For these variables, the marginal effects also differ with respect to production uncertainty. In 
particular, increased GDP and POP seem to increase production uncertainty, probably 
because of excess demand over supply, occasioned by higher income and population. 
  
5.5   Conclusions  
One area that has attracted much attention in the industrial organisation literature is the 
debate on the efficiency gains from restructuring. Controversies remain going by the mixed 
findings from past studies. This paper attempts to analyse the electric power industry’s 
performance using a consistent state-level electricity generation dataset for the contiguous US 
states from 1998-2014. First, we estimate several specifications of stochastic production 
frontier models to investigate the impacts of restructuring on technical efficiency in order to 
find a channel for policy adjustment. More specifically, we adopt the Wang (2002, 2003) 
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approach that allows both mean and variance of the pre-truncated normal to depend on the 
exogenous variables. Second, we examine the non-monotonic marginal effects of exogenous 
factors on technical efficiency.  
 
Our results indicate a positive impact of deregulation on technical efficiency across all the 
estimated models. The finding is largely consistent with previous studies on deregulation’s 
impact on efficiency. In particular, our preferred model reveals that states where deregulation 
is active are more efficient. More importantly, the result shows that non-deregulated states 
can increase their technical efficiency by 4.5 per cent if they implement deregulation. Despite 
the influence of positive deregulation, retail choice is found to reduce technical efficiency at 
10 per cent significant level. The results of marginal effects show that deregulation has a 
reducing impact on production inefficiency by 12 per cent, and a 2.7 per cent decrease in 
production uncertainty for the whole sample, hence an increase electricity generation output 
by same size. Conversely, retail choice exhibits non-monotonic marginal effects impact on 
production inefficiency and overall reducing in the variance of the inefficiency.  
 
Finally, we found that political institutions and structure within the state affects the level of 
technical efficiency. Performance seems to improve as Republicans control both the 
governorship and the legislature, as well as when the majority of the state commissioners on 
public utility commissions are Republican, as they have a high propensity to influence some 
political decisions that could potentially support restructuring policy in order to promote 
competition among the electric power generators. However, increased GDP per capita and 
population density seems to increase production uncertainty probably because of the inability 
to accurately forecast future electricity demand because of occasional excess demand over 
supply arising from higher income and population. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions and future research 
 
6.1   Summary 
This thesis consists of three independent but related essays which quantitatively examine the 
impact of power sector market reform on efficiency of the electricity generation. The long-
lasting debates on the efficiency gain from power sector reforms remains largely unresolved, 
at best controversial, which underscores the need for more comprehensive studies of this 
kind. This thesis contributes to the existing empirical literature by extending the 
methodological dimension of measuring cost and technical efficiency from electricity market 
reforms with an application to both macro level cross-country and US state level data. The 
thesis demonstrates that countries which are advanced in their level of reform attain a higher 
efficiency in generating electricity compared to their counterparties in the rest of the world. 
This objective was further generalised for the developed economies of the OECD countries, 
in order to delve into the cost efficiency and other cost characteristics of electricity generation 
while recognising the production of undesirable output in the generation process. In addition, 
the dynamics of the marginal effect of restructuring activities in the US states electricity 
generation efficiency was analysed. The aforementioned issues were addressed via the three 
papers in Chapters 3, 4 and 5.  
 
6.2 Empirical Findings and Policy Implications 
Stemming from the research questions set out in chapter 1, we discuss our empirical findings 
around these questions and ascertain whether we have provided answers to them. The first 
essay tries to provide answers to these three questions; “do countries with significant reform 
progress attain higher efficiency in generating electricity compared to their 
counterparties?”, “do unobserved heterogeneities measure the influence of deregulation?” 
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and “what is the key driver of total productivity growth?”. This paper estimates technical 
efficiency of 91 countries by specifying three different models; the time varying model, the 
true fixed effect and true random effect models. Although, the analysis in the first paper 
shows that our findings are sensitive to the choice of model specified, we establish that the 
degree of democratic freedom (as shown by political rights of a country) positively influences 
electricity generation. Results show increasing efficiency in electricity generation across 
sampled countries over the period under consideration, with Germany being the most 
efficient in electricity generation whereas Tanzania, a seemingly socialist country, is 
consistently ranked the least efficient country.  
 
Another emerging debate which this study touches on is the potential ability of unobserved 
heterogeneities to capture deregulation in addition to efficiency measurement. Findings from 
the estimates of the intercept reveal that countries with marked deregulation, especially for 
the Latin American countries and Africa, are being pushed close to the frontier. A major 
contributing factor for these countries to be located on the frontier is that they are 
increasingly becoming more democratic and reform oriented. The thesis also shows that 
mean efficiency changes serve as the main driver of total factor productivity growth which 
implies movement towards the frontier. 
 
The following policy implications derive from chapter 3. It is evident that political rights, a 
necessary condition for electricity reform, substantially increase electricity generation 
efficiency. Nonetheless, reform variable, proxy by reform stage in each country, does not 
significantly impact electricity generation due to the simultaneity of reform steps. However, 
regardless of the stage of electricity reform, democracy in a country is the right ingredient for 
the implementation of electricity market reform. The pushing towards the frontier of these 
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countries explains the potential influence of politically driven electricity reform. Therefore, 
reform policies designs in these countries must consider the country-specific level of 
democracy. In particular, policy that conditions development loans and aid on the 
democratisation and deregulation of the electricity segment is a veritable avenue to scale up 
efficiency in the electricity generation segments, especially in developing countries. 
Governance improvements are crucial in these countries so as to control corruption and 
consolidate the nascent efficiency gains. Improvements in governance are also necessary in 
order to have independent regulation in place as the electricity reforms progress. 
 
The second essay concerns these three questions; “what are the impacts of the electricity 
regulatory reform indicators on cost efficiency?” “does the cost complementarity exist 
between generation and carbon emission?” and “is there any difference between scale 
economies in the long run and the short run?”.  Given the substantial level of reform 
witnessed so far in the OECD countries, this paper looks at the impact of different market 
regulatory indicators on the cost of electricity generation. Employing the short-run cost 
function in which capital stock is treated as a quasi-fixed factor input, frontier models, 
including the four-way error component model, are developed for the cost function for a 
panel dataset of 25 countries during the period 1980 to 2009. Findings show that public 
ownership and vertical integration appear to have significant and sizable increasing impacts 
on cost. This result reiterates the benefit of privatisation of generation assets and private 
ownership in the power sector. Our results have important policy implications for the 
electricity market reform agenda. The nature of the deregulation matters since unbundling 
and privatization are the factors which encourage the generation utility to make maximum 
use of least cost options for efficiency gain. Cost complementarity between generation and 
emissions is investigated and found to be significant. This suggests an important policy signal 
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for a carbon emission strategy in the power sector given the potential of lowering emission 
while increasing electricity generation. By incorporating quasi-capital input into the cost 
function, the estimated economies of output expansion for the models in the short run 
indicates the existence of sharply rising costs when capacity is fixed. However, economies 
scale in the long run shows constant returns to scale when adjustment is made for the quasi-
fixed input. Finally, we find that market reforms are positively correlated – a country 
pursuing one type of reform often pursues others as well – and that these market structure 
reforms as measured by the OECD product market reform indicators produce more cost-
efficient electricity generation. 
 
Given the increasing cost implication of the estimated parameter of public ownership and 
vertical integration, Chapter 4 proffers policy recommendations which suggests that the 
ownership of unbundling represents the key aspect of electricity market reform in these 
countries as it may help to leverage additional financial and human resources, diversify 
technology and managerial approaches, and spread risk. Arguably, the prospects of 
competition and innovation in the electricity sector are hinged on implementation of a policy 
for that allows private ownership and participation. Hence, privatisation of state owned utility 
assets through property rights reallocation should be encouraged as it helps to reduce 
associated cost inefficiency. Obviously, investment adequacy too is increasingly essential 
given the need to make substantial investments in generation capacity from different 
technology sources. Thus, policymakers should create conditions that encourage more 
competition among generators in order to encourage investment in the industry since we find 
a high return to capital investment when we model the shadow price of the quasi-fixed capital 
input.  This will bolster investment for expansion and replacement of existing assets as they 
become obsolete, with the possibilities to accommodate large amounts of renewables.  
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While Europe has sought to move away vertical integration given its successive directives, 
however it still in a de facto operation in some countries. Institutional arrangements of 
complete separation of the constituent segments should be implemented and completed 
followed by an effective regulatory oversight (where none previously existed or are not in 
existence).  Moreover, due to the presence of cost complementarity, there is a possibility of 
reducing emissions without necessarily reducing generation with the existing technologies. 
Therefore, the use of emission control instruments can cause generators to internalize the cost 
of environmental pollution without significant effects on electricity generation output.  
Hence, environmental policy that creates incentives for investment in new technologies-, 
especially low carbon technologies- for emission abatement would be yield desirable 
outcome for combating environmental pollutions in generation. 
 
Finally, the third essay considers two main research questions; “Does restructuring shape the 
mean and variance of electricity generation inefficiency?” and “what is dynamic of the 
marginal effect of restructuring?”. This paper examines the performance of the electric 
power industry using consistent state-level electricity generation dataset for the 47 US 
contiguous states from 1998-2014. The stochastic production frontier for five competing 
models was estimated in order to identify the determinants of technical inefficiency and the 
marginal effects. The positive impact of deregulation on technical efficiency across the 
models estimated was established. More specifically, deregulated states are more efficient in 
electricity generation than the non-deregulated states. One would have expected retail choice 
to equally increase production efficiency but our result shows otherwise. Findings also show 
that inter political affiliation explains technical efficiency. Again, another vital issue on the 
debate of electricity reform which this essay addresses is the dynamic nature of the marginal 
effect of restructuring. Some critics of reform have argued that restructuring policy could 
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potentially have a positive impact on inefficiency at certain ranges and then turn negative 
outside these ranges. Therefore, the findings reveal that both deregulation and retail choice 
have an overall monotonic impact on the mean and variances of the inefficiency, although the 
marginal effect of retail choice reduces technical efficiency.   
 
The main policy implications arising from chapter 5 are as follows. First, deregulation has 
consistently had an increasing influence on production efficiency. Thus, statutory measures 
that facilitate full deregulation on states which have not yet implemented deregulation could 
drive production efficiency as well as reduce the large electricity price disparity in the retail 
market among utilities in different state. In addition, states which have suspended 
deregulation could consider rolling back as research reveals compelling evidence that non-
deregulated states can potentially increase their technical efficiency by 4.5 percent if they 
implement deregulation. Second, implementation of this measure could be fast tracked using 
political institutions and instruments as our finding suggests that electricity generation 
performance appears improved when Republicans control both the governorship and the 
legislature, as well as when the majority of the state commissioners on the public utility 
commission are Republican. It may be argued that this relates to the political ideology of this 
party which supports market oriented restructuring policy that potentially promotes 
competition among the electric power generator. 
 
6.3 Limitations of the research 
Every research study, regardless of how well conducted or constructed, suffers some 
limitations. Hence, this study acknowledges a number of limitations which by no means 
undermine our analyses or the findings thereof. The major limitations recognised in the 
research work pertain to the issue of data. First, the study was constrained by the lack of data 
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that accurately captures electricity market reform variables for each country. A case in point 
is the reform scores employed in chapter 3 in which electricity market reform scores are 
assigned to each country based on the reform status of that country. Of course, this approach 
of measuring reform might not be the most appropriate indicator to reflect all characteristics 
and intensity of the reforms in various countries. However, we believe it is an indicator of 
reform progress, rather than reform success and it does help to satisfactorily categorise 
countries in term of reform steps58.  Moreover, the estimation of different models that account 
for unobserved heterogeneities would reasonably pick up some cross-country differences in 
reforms that are not accounted for in the models. Second, following a similar study (See 
Jaraitė, and Di Maria, 2012), we use economically active population data in the utility supply 
industry as a proxy for labour due to paucity of data for cross-country disaggregated labour 
for electricity generation in chapters 3 and 4. There is a caveat here given the unlikely 
implementation of deregulation policy in all the industries across countries at the same time. 
Besides, there might be large differences in the distribution of workers across the various 
utilities in sampled countries which might not be sufficiently captured by different intercepts. 
At any rate, the potential drawback is lessened by the fact electricity sector accounts for the 
largest of share of utility labour.  Lack of data also explains the exclusion of other OECD 
countries from the sample in chapter 4 which could have made the sample more 
representative and our findings more robust and generic. 
 
Lastly, given that market reform is an on-gong process, we cannot claim that we have 
covered all aspects of the reform process and then generalised our findings of the positive 
impact of reform on electricity generation efficiency. Infact, retail choice in chapter 5 shows 
                                                          
58 The electricity market reform score variable ranges from 0 to 8. It is constructed using reform steps that have been taken 
in each country; (1) introduction of independent power producers, (2) corporatization of state-owned enterprises, (3) law 
for electricity sector liberalization, (4) introduction of unbundling, (5) establishment of electricity market regulator, (6) 
introduction of privatization, (7) establishment of wholesale electricity market, and (8) choice of supplier (See Erdogdu , 
2013). 
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some unintended negative consequences on reform. On the whole, the estimated models have 
revealed, to a certain extent, that the methodological application of recent developments 
regarding efficiency and productivity analysis has adequately mitigated the potential bias in 
our analysis of the impact of electricity market reform. 
 
6.4 Directions for future research 
This thesis analysed the impact of market driven electricity reforms on efficiency in three 
separate essays. In the first essay, we used the stochastic input distance function to explain 
the impact of reform on technical efficiency in 91 countries across the world. In the second 
essay, we investigated the impact OECD product market regulation indicators on cost 
efficiency in the face of quasi capital input. While in the third essay, we examined the 
influence of restructuring on US state electricity generation and  technical efficiency.  
Essentially, our findings demonstrated the mixed evidence of market-based reforms in 
improving efficiency. For this reason, there is a need for further research on electricity reform 
within the context of efficiency analysis.  
 
Since market driven electricity reform is still in progress and gradually evolving, especially in 
the developing and transition economies, more interesting findings could potentially arise 
from the analysis of the reform impact on efficiency (with the application of more appropriate 
reform variables as opposed to the use of reform scores employed in chapter 3). This could 
serve as a basis for establishing concrete economics justification for policy reform 
recommendation and adoption to these countries.  
The results of the impact of restructuring on the mean and the variance of inefficiency reveals 
negative impact of retail choice on production efficiency and the marginal effect. Although 
the findings lend more credence to the positive impact of deregulation on efficiency, the 
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ensuing findings on the estimates of retail choice as reported in the third essay is shrouded 
with suspicions as to the benefit of retail competition arising from implementing market 
restructuring. Needless to say, further research is required to assess the actual degree of 
competition in the electricity market. This research can be situated in the context of the US 
electricity utility-level analysis using the application of Boone indicators as a measure of 
competition. Boone explains that firms are punished more harshly (in term of profit) for 
losing efficiency as well as when there are more firms in the market owing to a fall in entry 
barriers due to competition.   
 
Chapter 5 also offers another prospect for spatial stochastic frontier analysis in order to report 
some underlying negative externalities from deregulation. Fossil-fuel-fired plants for 
generating electricity produce environmental pollution in the form of carbon dioxide, 
nitrogen oxides and sulphur dioxide emissions. The emission rate could vary considerably 
depending on the stage of deregulation in each state, with the possibility of a spillover effect. 
Therefore, a study on the environmental efficiency of deregulation by incorporating at least 
one pollutant as an undesirable output is vitally important. This might provide ample 
evidence for discouraging fossil-based generation towards achieving objectives of 
decarbonisation the power sector. 
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Appendix 1: Reform scores by country 
 
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
 Australia Argentina Albania Algeria Bosnia-Herzegovina Costa Rica Serbia Belarus 
 Austria Belgium Ecuador China Honduras Cyprus Tanzania Botswana 
 Bulgaria Bolivia Estonia Ethiopia Switzerland Malta Uruguay Cuba 
 Canada Brazil Indonesia Ghana Vietnam Mexico 
 
Iran 
 Czech Rep. Chile Jordan Jamaica 
 
Zambia 
 
Israel 
 Denmark Colombia Luxembourg Kenya 
   
Paraguay 
 El Salvador Croatia Macedonia Morocco 
   
Trinidad and Tobago 
 Finland Dominican Rep. Malaysia Qatar 
     France Georgia Mongolia Senegal 
     Germany Iceland Nigeria South Africa 
     Greece India Pakistan Sri Lanka 
     Hungary Ireland UAE Thailand 
     Italy Japan Venezuela 
      Latvia Lithuania 
       New Zealand Moldova 
       Norway Netherlands 
       Panama Nicaragua 
       Poland Peru 
       Portugal Philippines 
       Romania Russia 
       Singapore Slovakia 
       Spain Slovenia 
       Turkey Sweden 
       USA 
        United Kingdom               
 Source: Erdogdu, 2013  
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Appendix 2: Cost Complementarities and Non-jointness 
 
The translog cost function; 
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and homogeneity of degree +1 in w has been imposed by dividing each of the input prices by 
Kw . We write the vector of optimal share weights as: s  and write sˆ  to represent the diagonal 
matrix with the shares on the leading diagonal. Concavity with respect to input prices 
requires that the sub-matrix of the Hessian:  
 
sssB ˆ                                                                  [2] 
 
is negative definite, throughout the sample. If mean corrected data are used, then the 
concavity condition at the sample mean is negative definiteness of: 
 
βββB  ˆ                      [3] 
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Cost complementarities are derived from the sub-matrix of the Hessian that refers to output 
effects. Output elasticities are in the vector: 𝛆𝐲 and ?̂?𝐲 is the diagonal matrix with output 
elasticities on the leading diagonal. 
 
In general cost complementarities are given by: 
 
𝐀 − ?̂?𝐲 + 𝛆𝐲𝛆𝐲′                                                  [4]                          
 
At the sample mean with log mean corrected data these become: 
 
𝐀 − ?̂? + 𝛂𝛂′             [5]                        
 
The cost complementarities can be numerically evaluated throughout the sample using [4] but 
they cannot be statistically tested in this form since each is a nonlinear function of the 
variables. However the cost complementarities at the sample mean using [5] can be tested 
because with log mean corrected data they are regression coefficients. Cost complementarity 
is a feature of the off-diagonal elements, typically 
 
𝜕2(𝐶 𝑤𝐾⁄ )
𝜕𝑦𝑟𝜕𝑦𝑠
= (
𝐶 𝑤𝐾⁄
𝑦𝑟𝑦𝑠
) (𝛼𝑟𝑠 + 𝛼𝑟𝛼𝑠) 
 
Only the sign of the second bracketed term matters since the first must be positive. The test 
is: 
𝐻0: 𝛼𝑟𝑠 + 𝛼𝑟𝛼𝑠 = 0  versus   𝐻1: 𝛼𝑟𝑠 + 𝛼𝑟𝛼𝑠 ≠ 0 
This is a nonlinear Wald test which is implemented by the testnl command in STATA which 
uses the delta method.  The data include ly1, ly2 and ly12 to which represent log of output 1, 
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log of output 2 and log of output 1 X log of output 2, the test for cost complementarity 
between outputs 1 and 2 is: 
 
testnl (_b[ly12]+(_b[ly1]*_b[ly2])=0 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3: Four Ways Error Component Model 
The FWEC model is written 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝐱′𝑖𝑡𝜷 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
There are four components to the error term: 
 
Inter-firm heterogenblankty, 𝜇𝑖, which is a time-invariant random error assumed to be a zero 
mean, constant variance normally distributed random variable, 𝜇𝑖~𝑁𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎𝜇
2) 
Idiosyncratic error, 𝑣𝑖𝑡,  which is a time-varying random error assumed to be a zero mean, 
constant variance normally distributed random variable, 𝑣𝑖𝑡~𝑁𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎𝑣
2) 
Time-invariant inefficiency, which is a time-invariant random error assumed to be a zero 
mean, constant variance normally or exponentially distributed random variable truncated 
below at zero, 𝜂𝑖~𝑁𝑖𝑑
+(𝜇, 𝜎𝜂
2) or 𝑓(𝜂) = 𝜎𝜂𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝜎𝜂
2𝜂). Referred to by KLH as persistent 
inefficiency. 
 
Time-varying inefficiency, which is a time-varying random error assumed to be a zero mean, 
constant variance normally or exponentially distributed random variable truncated below at 
zero, 𝑢𝑖𝑡~𝑁𝑖𝑑
+(𝜇, 𝜎𝑢
2) or 𝑓(𝑢) = 𝜎𝑢𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝜎𝑢
2𝑢). Referred to by KLH as residual 
inefficiency 
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There are potentially four error component variances which can give rise to a number of 
different models. The relationship between the KLH model and four other panel models 
considered is demonstrated in table A1, from which it can be seen that the Pitt-Lee (1981) 
model adopted by BLANK is both the oldest vintage model and the most restrictive in its 
assumptions. None of the restrictions has been tested by BLANK and the BLANK response 
simply rejected model (2) (which was suggested by Frontier Economics (FE)) without 
commenting on the estimated results on the grounds that it was inappropriate to specify 
inefficiency as time-varying rather than time-invariant. BLANK failed to report that even 
though model (2) specifies inefficiency as time varying, there is nothing in the specification 
to stop the estimated inefficiencies bblankng relatively stable over time, so that the BLANK 
theoretical objection is unfounded.   
 
Table A2: Alternative models 
Error component 
included 
Error 
variance 
componen
t 
(1) Pitt-
Lee (1981) 
adopted by 
BLANK 
(2) 
Greene 
(2005) 
(TFE/TR
E models) 
suggested 
by FE 
(3) 
Kumbhaka
r and 
Heshmati 
(1995) 
(4) 
Separate 
the time-
invariant 
effects, 
FE 
(5) 
Kumbhakar, 
Lien and 
Hardaker 
(2014) 
suggested 
by FE 
Time-invariant 
inter-firm 
heterogenblankty 
𝜎𝜇
2 = 0 > 0 = 0 > 0 > 0 
Idiosyncratic 
error 
𝜎𝑣
2 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 
Time-
invariant/persisten
t  inefficiency 
𝜎𝜂
2 > 0 = 0 > 0 > 0 > 0 
Time-
varying/residual 
inefficiency 
𝜎𝑢
2 = 0 > 0 > 0 = 0 > 0 
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It is clear from Table A3 that the BLANK model is a special case of the other models, in 
particular all of the models (1)–(4) are special cases of model (5), with the BLANK version 
bblankng the most restrictive. In principle therefore it may be possible to carry out 
comparative testing.  
 
Estimation is a multi-step procedure in the case of models (3)-(5) using pseudo-likelihood 
estimation as suggested by Fan et al (1996), therefore care must be exercised. Maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE) is used for all the parameters including both frontier cost 
function parameters and variance components in models (1) and (2), but, invoking the 
assumptions in the Fan et al paper, MLE is used only for the variance components in models 
(3)-(5). However, since our interest is in the error variance components, this allows the 
availability of two types of test for the null hypothesis: H0: 𝜎𝑃
2 = 0, 𝑃 ∈ {𝑣, 𝜇, 𝜂, 𝑢}  
(i) a generalised likelihood ratio test of the error variance component with corrected 
degrees of freedom 
(ii) use of the asymptotic normality property of the MLE estimators of the error 
variance components to apply a test based on (?̂?𝑃 𝑆𝐸(?̂?𝑃)⁄ )~𝑁(0,1) 
 
Models (1) and (2): use the STATA options for xtfrontier and sfpanel. Models (3)-(5) use the 
multi-step procedure described in Kumbhakar, Lien and Hardaker (2014), and variants of 
this. 
 
Step 1 
Begin by converting the truncated-error components to zero-mean constant-variance errors as 
follows 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝐱′𝑖𝑡𝜷 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝐸(𝜂𝑖) − 𝐸(𝜂𝑖) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡) − 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡) 
Then 
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𝑦𝑖𝑡 = [𝛼0 + 𝐸(𝜂𝑖) + 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡)] + 𝐱′𝑖𝑡𝜷 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + (𝜂𝑖 − 𝐸(𝜂𝑖)) + (𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡)) 
That is 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝐱′𝑖𝑡𝜷 + 𝛼𝒊 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
This now has the form of a one-way panel model with time-invariant and time-varying 
components, each of satisfies by construction the zero-mean condition 
 In this case: 
 𝛽0 = [𝛼0 + 𝐸(𝜂𝑖) + 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡)]  
This is a constant intercept term, with 𝐸(𝜂𝑖) = (√2 𝜋⁄ ) 𝜎𝜂 in the half-normal case and 
𝐸(𝜂𝑖) = 𝜎𝜂 in the exponential case, and 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡) = (√2 𝜋⁄ ) 𝜎𝑢 
 𝛼𝑖 = 𝜇𝑖 + (𝜂𝑖 − 𝐸(𝜂𝑖))  
This is a zero mean time-invariant random error with constant variance   
 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + (𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡)) 
This is a zero mean time-varying random error with constant variance   
 
This equation is now in the form of the standard zero-mean one-way panel random effects 
model – very similar to the Pitt-Lee (1981) modelled utilised by BLANK, except for the zero-
mean conversion.  
Fit this model and retain the results: ?̂?, 𝛽0, ?̂?𝑖 and 𝜀?̂?𝑡 
 
 
Step 2 
Use the predicted residuals from the one-way random effects panel estimated in step 1 
𝜀?̂?𝑡 = 𝑣𝑖𝑡 + (𝑢𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡)) + (𝜀?̂?𝑡 − 𝜀𝑖𝑡) 
Therefore 
226 
 
𝜀?̂?𝑡 = −𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡) + [𝑣𝑖𝑡 + (𝜀?̂?𝑡 − 𝜀𝑖𝑡)] + (𝑢𝑖𝑡) 
These are the usual time-varying residual components of the one-way panel composed error 
without the random effects component. The first term on the RHS is a constant, the second 
term in square brackets is a zero mean constant variance idiosyncratic error if  (𝜀?̂?𝑡 − 𝜀𝑖𝑡) is 
treated as asymptotically zero (by the Law of Large Numbers). The third term is the time-
varying inefficiency component, assumed to be half-normally distributed. Therefore, this step 
can be solved by fitting the standard basic stochastic frontier analysis model with pooled data 
using 𝜀?̂?𝑡 as the dependent variable and regressing this against a constant term and the 
composed normal and half-normal error components model.  
 
Kuosmanen, Johnson and Saastamoinen (2014) show that this procedure implements the Fan 
et al (1996) pseudo-likelihood method for semi-parametric stochastic frontier analysis. 
 
Hence in step 2, the parameters of the time-varying inefficiency component combined with 
time-varying idiosyncratic error are obtained: ?̂?𝑢, ?̂?𝑣 and the JLMS or BC procedures for 
deriving estimated time-varying efficiency can be implemented. We are also able to test the 
hypothesis common to models (2), (3) and (5): 
 
𝐻0: 𝜎𝑢
2 = 0 against 𝐻1: 𝜎𝑢
2 > 0 
 
KLH refer to this component as Residual Efficiency, RE: 
𝑅𝐸 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−?̂?𝑖𝑡) 
Step 3 
Use the predicted random error effects from the one-way random effects panel estimated in 
step 1 
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?̂?𝑖 = [𝜇𝑖 + (𝜂𝑖 − 𝐸(𝜂𝑖))] + (?̂?𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖) 
Therefore 
?̂?𝑖 = −𝐸(𝜂𝑖) + [𝜇𝑖 + (?̂?𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖)] + 𝜂𝑖 
 
Applying arguments similar to those already used in step 2, the pseudo-likelihood procedure 
can be invoked. The first term on the RHS is a constant, the second term in square brackets is 
a zero mean constant variance idiosyncratic error representing heterogenblankty if  (?̂?𝑖 − 𝛼𝑖) 
is treated as asymptotically zero. The third term is the time-invariant inefficiency component, 
assumed to be half-normally distributed. Therefore, this step can be solved by fitting the 
standard basic stochastic frontier analysis model with pooled data using ?̂?𝑖 as the dependent 
variable and regressing this against a constant term and the composed normal and half-
normal error components model.  
 
Hence in step 3, the parameters of the time-invariant inefficiency component combined 
heterogenblankty treated as a random effect are obtained: ?̂?𝜂 , ?̂?𝜇 and the JLMS or BC 
procedures for deriving estimated time-invariant efficiency can be implemented. We are also 
able to test the hypothesis common to models (1), (3), (4) and (5): 
 
𝐻0: 𝜎𝜂
2 = 0 against 𝐻1: 𝜎𝜂
2 > 0 
The tests can then be combined to distinguish model (5) from the others. 
 
KLH refer to this component as Persistent Efficiency, PE: 
𝑃𝐸 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−?̂?𝑖) 
Overall efficiency is then calculated as  
𝑂𝐸 = 𝑃𝐸 ∗ 𝑅𝐸 
